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ABSTRACT 
  
Gregory Mole: Privileging Commerce: The Compagnie des Indes and the  
Politics of Trade in Old Regime France 
(Under the direction of Jay M. Smith) 
 
This dissertation explores the history of the Compagnie des Indes (French East India 
Company), the privileged corporation established by the monarchy to oversee French settlement 
and trade in India from 1719 to 1769. Underfinanced, overly centralized, and wracked by 
infighting, the Company nonetheless became a key site of political experimentation in the final 
decades of France’s Old Regime. It also came to occupy a central place within the public life of 
the eighteenth century. A source of ongoing controversy, the corporation attracted a range of 
both critics and commentators, from jurists and Enlightenment philosophes to shareholders, 
crown officials, and colonial administrators. As these various groups wrestled over the principles 
and practicalities of Company trade, they also revisited prevailing assumptions about the 
political authority of the absolutist monarchy. The politics of the French state were thus 
reconfigured to accommodate the exigencies of its empire.  
 Focusing on a series of colonial scandals, this dissertation examines how concerns over 
empire inflected the political language and governing principles of the Old Regime. It uses the 
Company to place previously unexplored tensions over colonial governance, economic 
management, and labor regulation at the center of eighteenth-century public debate. It likewise 
connects political developments in India to the constitutional crises that beset the monarchy in 
the final decades before the French Revolution. In so doing, this dissertation ultimately reframes 
iv 
the evolution of the early-modern French state as a global process driven by controversies and 
rivalries that originated far outside France’s borders.    
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Introduction 
 
In 1773, Voltaire published his Fragments sur l’Inde—a lesser-known work that doubled 
as both a history of the late Mughal Empire and a chronicle of European colonization on the 
subcontinent. Like other prominent commentators on the political economy of the Old Regime, 
the philosophe viewed the Indian trade in terms of waste, excess, and “ruinous luxury”: a 
decadent traffic that led “simple citizens” to bedeck themselves with “more diamonds than 
queens” and to “corrupt their nostrils with the disgusting powder[s]” of the Orient.1 He worried 
as well about the political consequences of establishing trade links with India. Voltaire described 
an alarming scene of “costly establishments,” “vast [conquered] domains,” and destructive 
rivalries: an entire empire born out of “the idleness of our cities and the greed of [our] traders.”2 
In India, he concluded, self-serving competition and the drive for profit had displaced both the 
ambitions and interests of Europe’s most powerful monarchs. 
Voltaire’s criticism focused, in particular, on the activities of the Compagnie des Indes 
(French East India Company), the privileged trading corporation commissioned to oversee 
French commerce and settlement in India from 1719 to 1769. The philosophe outlined a long 
history of peculation, poor returns, and crimes against the crown. He likewise denounced the 
Company’s administrators, whom he claimed were consumed by “avidity” and guided by a 
                                                
1 Voltaire, Fragments sur l’Inde et sur le général Lalli et sur le comte de Morangiès (1773), 4-5. On the French 
fixation with luxury and its destructive tendencies, see John Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, 
Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
2 Voltaire, Fragments sur l’Inde, 4. 
2 
“personal interest that stood in opposition to the general good.”3 According to Voltaire, 
Company officials had consistently exploited their distance from royal supervision to fashion 
themselves into de facto “sovereigns.” They had adopted the ornaments and titles of Indian rulers, 
carving out local fiefdoms around the French territories on the subcontinents. They also started 
wars without bothering to consult the crown, and pled neutrality when the monarchy called on 
them to furnish it with troops and supplies. What should have been a mere “merchant society” 
had instead become a refractory kingdom: a parasitic body politic that ignored the needs of the 
French nation in pursuit of its own ends.   
 Such claims resonate loudly within both the history and historiography of the Company. 
As Danna Agmon notes, the story of French settlement in India has been transformed into a 
“trope of failure,” conjuring images of lost wars, foundering trade, embarrassing scandals, and 
stillborn imperial ambitions.4 At the heart of this narrative is a sense of profound contradiction 
between the commercial interests and institutional practices of the French monarchy, which 
founded the Company in 1719. The royal edict that chartered the Company described the 
overlapping interests that bound the corporation to the king: it referred to “the needs of the state” 
that would be met by  “reestablish[ing] and augment[ing] French commerce in India.”5 But, in 
practice, crown policymakers often did more to hinder than facilitate Company operations; they 
not only failed to provide the corporation with consistent military support, but also catered to the 
                                                
3 Ibid, 8. 
4 Danna Agmon, “An Uneasy Alliance: Traders, Missionaries, and Tamil Intermediaries in Eighteenth-Century 
French India” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2011), 284-285. Kate Marsh detects a similar narrative within the 
French cultural imaginary, one that casts the history of French settlement in India as a story of “lost empire.” See 
Kate Marsh, India in the French Imagination (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2009), 78. 
5 ALA C 749, Arrêst du conseil d’éstat du roy, concernant la Réunion des Compagnies des Indes Orientales et de la 
Chine, à la Compagnie de l’Occident, 17 June 1719. 
3 
whims of privileged officeholders who opposed its trading monopoly.6 The monarchy likewise 
stifled commercial opportunities by saddling the Company with an inflexible and overly 
centralized administration—a convoluted bureaucracy that prevented merchants from acting on 
their own initiative.7 To critics like Voltaire, meanwhile, the corporation represented a 
perversion of the healthy commercial society envisioned by the crown; Company monopoly 
simply channeled the instruments of public power toward the pursuit of destructive private gains. 
As was the case with French domestic manufacturing, the crown’s reliance on privileged 
middlemen to facilitate its economic goals constituted a source of dynamic internal tension 
throughout the eighteenth century.8  
 This dissertation provides both a history of Company settlement in India and a study of 
state formation in the early-modern world. Rather than offer a new perspective on an old 
question—why the Company ultimately failed—it instead uses the corporation as a window into 
the transformations wrought by colonial trade on the politics of the Old Regime. Far from merely 
weakening the bonds between the crown and its subjects, or exposing fundamental contradictions 
in French political practice, Company settlement in India also served to expand the conceptual 
                                                
6 On the structural limitations facing Old Regime commercial practice, see Julia Adams, The Familial Sate: Ruling 
Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 121-122. 
For those specifically related to the Company, see Pierre Boulle, “French Mercantilism, Commercial Companies and 
Colonial Profitability,” in Companies and Trade: Essays on Overseas Trading Companies during the Ancien 
Régime, ed., L. Blussé and F. Gaastras (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1981), 117. 
7 Catherine Manning, Fortunes à faire (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996) and Emily Erickson, Between Monopoly and 
Free Trade: The English East India Company, 1600-1757 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). 
8 Jeff Horn, The Path Not Taken: French Industrialization in the Age of Revolution (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2007), especially chapter 2. On the shifting relationship between corporatist institutions and crown regulators in the 
eighteenth century, see William Sewell, Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old 
Regime to 1848 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 62-91. Michael Kwass, meanwhile, has shown 
how anxieties over corporatist regulation of goods and labor were then transferred to the state in a broad-based 
attack against despotism: Michael Kwass, Contraband: Louis Mandrin and the Making of a Global Underground 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). For a recent reassessment of these generally oppositional 
models, see Junko Takeda, “French Mercantilism and the Early Modern Mediterranean: A Case Study of Marseille’s 
Silk Industry, French History 29, No. 1 (2015): 12-14. 
4 
limits of royal sovereignty. As a number of scholars have shown, the monarchy represented the 
lodestar of early-modern French commercial life: for statesmen and merchants alike, trade was 
imagined as a form of public service whose legitimacy stemmed from its capacity to facilitate the 
needs of the crown.9 While overseas commerce exposed certain institutional limits to royal 
authority—spurring the king to commission proxy agencies like the Company to trade, settle, 
and administer on his behalf—it also underlined the importance of the monarchy as a source of 
political legitimacy. In everything from the negotiation of trading concessions to the pursuit of 
commercial wars in India, corporate agents invoked the name of the king to explain their 
activities and justify new policy decisions—even, paradoxically, when such efforts contravened 
existing crown regulations. They imagined new applications for royal power, reinterpreting 
monarchical authority so that it could fit with, and make sense of, new economic and political 
conditions. By consistently citing the sovereign power of the crown, Company employees 
ultimately changed its meaning. This process blended traditional understandings of kingship with 
visions of a more depersonalized, commercially oriented, and bureaucratic state.  
 This dissertation examines the Company as a key feature of a political world constructed 
not merely through conflict and polarized opposition, but also through the ongoing negotiation 
between different sovereign institutions. It is story of an Old Regime constituted around a variety 
of political forms—from a far-flung empire to a centralized state, from a territorially-bound 
nation to a corporatist society composed of scattered agencies that, like the Company, exercised 
their own forms of proxy sovereignty. It is a story, in particular, about the understandings of 
                                                
9 This connection between commerce and royal service, articulated first by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
theorists like Jean Bodin and Antoine de Montchrestien, remained a vital element of the political economy of the 
eighteenth century. Well into the final decades of the Old Regime, private commercial enterprise was understood to 
lack intrinsic value; instead, the merits of trade were reflected by its capacity to benefit the public interests of the 
state. See Henry Clark, Compass of Society: Commerce and Absolutism in Old-Regime France (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington, 2007). 
5 
French nationhood that emerged from this dynamic. Studies of eighteenth-century France project 
an image of a starkly agonistic political culture, of clearly formed battle lines separating state 
from society, monarchism from republicanism, and reformers from entrenched reactionaries. Yet 
as Jay Smith has argued, the early-modern state was neither an “already-coercive force” nor a set 
of “a priori ideological, institutional, and historical imperatives”; instead, it represented a 
“cultural field in which relations and meanings were never fixed.”10 A study of the Company’s 
efforts to settle and trade in India—and the controversies, lobbying efforts, and arguments 
generated by this process—reveal a political context where even the basic meaning of absolute 
state power was far from understood. As I show, the central focus of political thought in early-
eighteenth-century France was not in determining where sovereignty should reside, but in 
answering the question of how it could be most effectively distributed.11 
 To understand the history of the Company, I explore a series of colonial scandals, each of 
which evolved from small, personal conflicts to sensational cause célèbres. An exploration of 
these specific conflicts achieves two goals. First, this effort exposes the human side to the 
impersonal processes of globalization, state-building, and economic restructuring that dominate 
narratives of the eighteenth century. While adding “flesh and bone” to otherwise abstract 
developments, it also reveals the contingencies and personal interests that propelled state 
centralization in France—a trend that, from the perspective of hindsight, appears all too often as 
                                                
10 Jay M. Smith, The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 
1600-1789 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 6. Such arguments fit within a broader framework 
of scholarship on state formation in the early-modern period—all of which emphasize the dynamic and collaborative 
processes undergirding political centralization. While concentrating mostly on the Dutch Republic, Adams has made 
similar claims about the negotiated nature of state formation France and Britain in her study of patrimonialism. See 
Adams, The Familial State.  
11 Richard Ross and Philip Stern, “Reconstructing Early Modern Notions of Legal Pluralism,” in Legal Pluralism 
and Empires, 1500-1850, ed., Lauren Benton and Richard Ross (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 
131-132. 
6 
inevitable.12 This narrative focus likewise lays bare the complex agendas and overlapping 
relationships that shaped France’s colonial history in the final decades of the Old Regime. In 
place of a simple binary dividing metropolitan regulators from refractory colonial agents, we 
instead see Company employees negotiating a shifting line between licit and illicit behavior, and 
public and private interest.  
Second, an analysis of Company scandal also underscores the influential role that the 
corporation played within French political life. The Old Regime economy is typically assumed to 
have channeled the majority of its capital into risk-averse investments like venal offices, rentes, 
and land.13 The supposedly patrimonial nature of French financial culture has obscured the 
importance of entrepreneurial projects like the Company during the eighteenth century—both in 
economic and political terms. Indeed, even as new scholarship has challenged the perception that 
the monarchy was essentially backward facing and anti-entrepreneurial, France’s overseas 
empire has continued to occupy a marginal position in the history of the Old Regime.14 As this 
dissertation shows, however, even minor Company disputes could become transoceanic 
controversies with far-reaching political consequences. Concerns over the Company consumed a 
range of actors and institutions—from colonial employees and metropolitan administrators to 
                                                
12 On the importance of pairing microhistorical perspectives with macrohistorical narratives of French globalization, 
see Kwass, Contraband, 13. 
13 This focus on the risk-averse nature of the economy, and the ways in which Old Reime politics and social 
organization reinforced it, is particularly apparent in Daniel Dessert, Argent, Pouvoir et Société au Grand Siècle 
(Paris: Fayard, 1984) and Herbert Lüthy, La Banque Protestante en France de la Révocation de l’Edit de Nantes à 
la Révolution, Volume 1 (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1959).  
14 For more optimistic accounts of French economic performance in the eighteenth century, see Jean-Pierre Poussou, 
“Le dynamism de l’économie Française sous Louis XVI,” Revue économique 40, no. 6 (1989): 974 and L.M. Cullen, 
“History, Economic Crises, and Revolution: Understanding Eighteenth-Century France,” Economic History Review 
46, no. 4 (1993): 640. Much of this optimism has been pegged to the growth of a powerful French consumer society 
during the last few decades of the Old Regime. See Daniel Roche, A History of Everyday Things: The Birth of 
Consumption in France, 1600-1800, trans. Brian Pearce (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) and Colin 
Jones, “The Great Chain of Buying: Medical Advertisement, the Bourgeois Public Sphere, and the Origins of the 
French Revolution,” American Historical Association 101, No. 1 (1996): 13-14. 
7 
French jurists, Enlightenment philosophes, and royal ministers. In the increasingly global world 
of the eighteenth century, the politics of even the smallest colonial settlement were embedded 
within, and had the potential to transform, the politics of France’s entire imperial system.  
On the one hand, the contests and controversies precipitated by Company operations in 
India laid bare the graft, violence, and disorder that, in the words of James Epstein, often 
“haunted metropolitan imaginings” of empire in the early-modern world.15 On the other hand, 
Company scandal created an important point of contact between colonial politics and the public 
life of the Old Regime. Eighteenth-century France bore witness to an emerging culture of literary 
consumption and informed discussion: an incipient public sphere through which the problems of 
the day were analyzed as part of a broadening political debate.16 Company agents both benefitted 
from, and contributed to, this process. Like parlementaire barristers, Jansenists, and other 
dissident polemicists, employees seized upon France’s expanding “politics of public opinion” to 
state their case in colonial scandals. They exploited a variety of publishing opportunities, from 
official Company memoranda to self-published mémoires disseminated through the help of 
sympathetic patrons in France. This process not only helped “bring home” the realities of empire 
                                                
15 James Epstein, Scandal of Colonial Rule: Power and Subversion in the British Atlantic during the Age of 
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 15-17. 
16 This idea has mostly been articulated through derivations of Habermas classic thesis on the genesis of the critical 
public sphere. See, for instance, Sarah Maza, Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Célèbres of 
Prerevolutionary France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) and David Bell, Lawyers and Citizens: 
The Making of a Political Elite in Old Regime France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). For qualifications 
and critiques of this argument, see Thomas Kaiser, “Money, Despotism, and Public Opinion in Early Eighteenth-
Century France: John Law and the Debate on Royal Credit,” in The Journal of Modern History, 63 No. 1 (1991): 1-
28 and James Van Horn Melton, The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). For Habermas’s original argument: Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 33-43. 
8 
to a curious public readership, but also sparked an ongoing debate about the political, economic, 
and legal implications of corporate monopoly.17    
 Nonetheless, Company polemicists did more than just insert themselves into preexisting 
channels of publication and contestation; they also helped to create them. Comparatively little of 
the Company’s archives remains—its records were mostly consumed by untimely fires or 
destroyed to avoid them from falling into enemy hands. But like their competitors in the Dutch, 
Portuguese, and especially British East India Companies, French employees were part of a vast 
epistolary network: an empire of paper constituted through official memoranda, commercial 
orders, and council reports, not to mention private correspondence between Company merchants 
and their patrons and family members back home.18 Such an extensive circulation of letters and 
ideas suggests an important spatial component to the publishing culture of the Old Regime. 
Company writing helped to establish a firm sense of political hierarchy—a colonial chain of 
being linking administrators in Asia and the Indian Ocean to metropolitan directors and, 
ultimately, the king. Yet it also helped employees navigate a complex imperial geography that 
transcended any firm center-periphery divide.   
Through both their official and personal correspondence, Company members connected 
different colonial sites into a coherent web of political relationships. They created informal 
coalitions and regional networks of power that often fit within, but were also distinct from, the 
official hierarchies of the Company. They negotiated with foreign power brokers (both European 
                                                
17 On the elision between “colony” and “metropole” brought about by Company writing—especially writing about 
scandal—see Indra Mukhopadhyay, “Imperial Ellipses: France, India, and the Critical Imagination” (PhD diss., 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2008), 63. 
18 Miles Ogborn, Indian Ink: Script and Print in the Making of the English East India Company (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007) and Philip Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early 
Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 11. In his description 
of English East India Company lobbying efforts, Stern describes the construction of a corporate public sphere 
designed to project humanist images of good management, active citizenship, and classical virtue onto the 
Company’s administrative and commercial efforts in India.  
9 
and Indian) to create new diplomatic settlements on the subcontinent. And they reinterpreted the 
contradictions and conflicts of interests that developed in the course of Company business to fit 
within a preexisting framework of established protocol, accepted legal practices, and prevailing 
economic principles.19 Part of a loosely defined conglomeration of people and settlements—what 
Kerry Ward calls an “empire within a state”—Company employees fashioned a range of 
identities, from that of loyal subject to local sovereign, Mughal feudatory to private merchant.20 
The distance between the Company’s settlements in Asia and its home offices in Paris meant that 
it could take up to two years for news and a corresponding response to travel.21 This gap 
provided employees with considerable latitude in disclosing new developments to Company 
authorities. By delaying reports, withholding certain information, and constructing favorable 
interpretations of local events, colonial agents could reframe the power structures and reinterpret 
the organizing principles of the entire Company enterprise in India.    
Finally, a study of Company scandal sheds light on the global dimensions of 
developments that, until this point, have been seen as the exclusive domain of domestic politics: 
the formation of a centralized French state, and the erosion of France’s traditional corporatist 
social system. In everything from the parceling out of municipal privileges to the creation of a 
standard system of taxation, the crown confronted a variety of competing impulses—between 
centralization and decentralization, bureaucratization and the extension of patrimonial practices, 
                                                
19 Such efforts belong to a broader process of imperial negotiation and knowledge making, as the contours of 
colonial systems were worked out through abstract instruments like letter writing, treaty making, and mapping. See 
Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Dale Miquelon, “Envisioning the French Empire: Utrecht, 1711-1713,” French 
Historical Studies 24, no. 4 (2001): 653-677; Michael Clanchy, “Does Writing Construct the State?,” Journal of 
Historical Sociology (2002): 68-70. 
20 Kerry Ward, Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 57. 
21 Agmon, “An Uneasy Alliance,” 12-13. 
10 
the bolstering of hierarchy and the cultivation of citizenship. As historians like Gail Bossenga 
and Michael Kwass have shown, these internal tensions continued to grow over the course of the 
eighteenth century, until the entire Old Regime system collapsed under the weight of its own 
contradictions.22 The Company’s conflict-laden history, however, reveals that the fault lines 
dividing the “modernizing,” bureaucratic crown from its patrimonial heritage were rarely so 
clearly defined. Indeed, incipient globalization and the daily pressures of empire-management 
seemed to require the presence of both a powerful, centralized monarchy and a decentralized 
administration of proxy agencies that could assume the responsibilities of local government. 
Company trade reinvigorated traditional notions of corporate privilege and liberty by directing 
them toward new ends: policing a scattered network of French merchants, and negotiating the 
complex local politics encountered in India. Yet it also underlined the need for a strong, 
supervisory state, which could provide legitimacy, military support, and legal sanction to the 
Company’s activities.  
An analysis of the publishing and lobbying efforts of Company employees underscores 
the importance of empire in shaping Old Regime political norms. By the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, crown officials had begun to pursue a vigorous policy of colonial 
development.23 From the Caribbean to the Indian Ocean, the monarchy established a string of 
                                                
22 Gail Bossenga, The Politics of Privilege: Old Regime and Revolution in Lille (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 13; Michael Kwass, Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century France: Liberté, 
Egalité, Fiscalité (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 322-323. 
23 Recent scholarship on both the Old Regime and Revolution has adopted a global perspective to understand the 
history of France in the eighteenth century. While this “global turn” has revealed important new connections 
between France and territories both inside and outside of its colonial empire, it has concentrated mostly on the 
centrifugal flows of ideas and politics from the French kingdom to sites across the world. Meanwhile, the impact of 
empire, colonization, and global expansion on developments in France has received far less attention, particularly 
outside the realm of elite intellectual culture. For “state-of-the-field” assessments of this global focus, see Suzanne 
Desan, Lynn Hunt, and William Max Nelson, ed., The French Revolution in Global Perspective (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2013) and David Bell, “Questioning the Global Turn: The Case of the French Revolution,” 
French Historical Studies 37, no. 1 (2014): 1-24. 
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trading companies—imbued not only with exclusive commercial rights, but also a mandate to 
govern on behalf of the crown. In many ways, this delegation of power represented a 
continuation of older political practices; the theoretical absoluteness of royal power was always 
limited by the decentralized realities of early-modern governance. Historians of the seventeenth 
century, for instance, have identified a number of the practical limitations that faced the French 
monarchy during this age of relentless state building: Louis XIV may have spoken a language of  
aggressive centralization, but in reality he depended on the collaboration of a variety of 
provincial elites to exercise power.24 Yet such a cooperative process, in which the need for 
accommodation tempered state expansion, is thought to have mostly unraveled by the end of the 
Sun King’s reign. Spiraling debt, rural unrest, and a consequent need for economic restructuring 
created an expanding gulf between the crown and the privileged middlemen upon whom it had 
once relied.25 As I argue, by contrast, the crown’s imperial experiments actually perpetuated the 
collaborative dynamics of the previous century. Colonial expansion riddled the supposedly clean 
lines of absolutist sovereignty with competing legal regimes, unequal zones of economic 
development, and multiple layers of political administration.26 To administer this complex 
                                                
24 On the collaboration between the crown and French elites, see William Beik, Absolutism and Society in 
Seventeenth-century France: State Power and Provincial Authority in Languedoc (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 32; Sharon Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth- Century France 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). For a comprehensive summary of this position, see William Beik, “The 
Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration,” Past and Present No. 188 (Aug., 2005): 195-199. 
25 The broad contours of this narrative were most famously outlined by Alexis de Tocqueville in his classic thesis of 
state centralization, although he understood the progressive alienation of society to be a longer process with its roots 
in the fifteenth century. See Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, trans. Stuart Gilbert 
(New York: Anchor Books, 1983). On the applicability (or inapplicability) of Tocqueville’s narrative to eighteenth-
century politics see James Riley, The Seven Years’ War and the Old Regime in France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1986), 155-190; David Kammerling Smith, “Structuring Politics in Early-Eighteenth Century 
France: The Political Innovations of the French Council of Commerce,” Journal of Modern History 74, no. 3 (2002): 
492-493; and Kwass, Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century France, 319-322. 
26 A good example of how colonial expansion perpetuated and expanded the pluralistic legal culture and political 
culture of the Old Regime comes from the litigation cases of early French settlers in Canada. See Helen Dewar, 
“Litigating Empire: The Role of French Courts in Establishing Colonial Sovereignties,” in Legal Pluralism and 
Empires, 1500-1850, ed., Lauren Benton and Richard Ross (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 49-53. 
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imperial system, the crown was forced to rely upon an array of agents and intermediate 
institutions. 
For the monarchy, the benefits of this arrangement far outweighed the limitations. In 
parceling out political power to a range of colonial intermediaries, the crown softened deep-
seated sociocultural tensions that, in the final decades before the Revolution, would unleash 
themselves in a storm of protest and popular revolt. On both an institutional level and in the 
minds of contemporary theorists, France remained a patchwork of sovereign powers and 
overlapping administrations long into the eighteenth century. As was the case in numerous 
colonial scandals, proxy institutions like the Company frequently bore the brunt of popular 
dissatisfaction when crown policy failed. Critics challenged the means by which the monarchy 
delegated its authority, and the trustworthiness of the agents it commissioned. What they did far 
less often was openly question the legitimacy of the king.27 Even embarrassing public 
controversies served to reinforce rather than challenge the political power of the monarchy. As 
Company employees moved beyond the practical limits of crown supervision, and as they 
encountered new rivalries and unforeseen challenges, they consistently relied upon crown 
authority to provide themselves with political traction. Thus positioned as a third party in a wide 
range of local conflicts and personal disputes, the crown found itself imbued with new forms of 
power by the very agents it commissioned to govern on its behalf.28  
                                                
27 Kwass, by contrast, argues that discontent over the actions of delegated authorities like the General Farms 
ultimately undermined the authority of the crown, though the timing of this development lines up with the 
arguments of this dissertation, which suggests that the crises of empire of the 1750s and 1760s upset the 
collaborationist dynamic described above and eliminated the crown’s ability to insulate itself through the sovereign 
institutions commissioned to govern, fight, and trade on its behalf. See Kwass, Contraband, 10-11. 
28 This model of state building draws, in particular, on Georg Simmel’s concept of teritus gaudens: a “rejoicing third” 
that benefits by acting as an intermediary between competing parties. Simmel describes two forms of arbitration 
processes: one in which the third party actively projects itself as a mediator, and another, more indirect model where 
the “tertius gains an advantage only because action by one of the two conflicting parties brings it about for its own 
purposes.” In other words, the tertius can benefit merely by being invoked or activated, rather than through the need 
for direct action. This second model most effectively describes the growth of French state power through Company 
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This dissertation thus describes the gradual, often-unexpected process of state formation 
that paralleled the monarchy’s active attempts to expand its power in the final decades of the Old 
Regime. Next to the image of an aggressively centralizing monarchy that often features in 
studies of the eighteenth century, we see a state that was in many ways constructed from the 
outside-in. Institutions like the Company played a key role in this process, as did the competing 
interests, political blocs, and opinions generated by the daily process of empire management in 
India. Yet if colonial expansion established a tenuous balance between the centrifugal and 
centripetal tensions infusing Old Regime politics, the dissolution of much of France’s empire 
during the Seven Years’ War shattered this delicate ecosystem. In India, the collapse of French 
military power established a new political settlement that robbed the Company of most of its 
sovereign authority. In France, defeat prompted a thoroughgoing reassessment of both 
administrative practices and political ideology. In either case, the monarchy reeled as the 
political space around it was abruptly compressed. For both royal policymakers and 
contemporary political theorists, the dissolution of France’s imperial system necessitated the 
creation of a more effective French state. The growing discord of the 1770s and 1780s was in no 
small part due to this abrupt shift in the conceptual shape of the nation, which highlighted the 
growing gap between the public agenda of the crown and private needs of its subjects. 
 
“The very reason and nature of public credit” 
The activities of the Company were always a function of the perceived goals of the crown, 
many of which shifted over the course of the eighteenth century. The first version of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
conflict. See Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel (New York: The Free Press, 1950), 154-155. Another 
useful template comes from Michael Braddick’s arguments about state formation in early modern England. Braddick 
envisions the state as “a mind without a body”—a central power that is instantiated through an interchangeable 
series of agents, offices, and agencies. This framework likewise suggests a process of state expansion that is 
contingent and driven by multiple bodies and forces rather than by some preformed central will. See Michael 
Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700 (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 20-21. 
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corporation was established in 1664 as part of the finance minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s 
ambitious scheme to revitalize the economy of absolutist France. Despite the commitment of 
both Colbert and Louis XIV (its chief investor), the Company struggled in competition with the 
more-established trading corporations managed by the Dutch, English, and the Portuguese. Early 
employees founded a string of commercial outposts across the coastline of the subcontinent, 
from Bengal to the Gujarat, but they failed to turn these settlements into profitable trading 
centers. By the 1680s, the Company was bankrupt, and had little choice but to rent out its 
monopoly to a group of merchants from Saint-Malo.  
The Indian trade remained in the hands of this private consortium for nearly thirty years, 
until the arrival of an ambitious Scottish financier, John Law, at the French court in 1716. As the 
crown struggled to cover its debts in the aftermath of the War of the Spanish Succession, Law 
moved into a position of power behind his radical proposal for the reform of state finances. The 
Scotsman approached the crown with a scheme to create a national bank and replace French 
specie with a paper-based currency—a proposal intended to facilitate France’s shift into a credit 
economy. Central to this plan was the reestablishment of the French East India Company, which 
he merged with several other trading corporations (those responsible for commerce in China, the 
South Seas, Canada, and the West Indies) in order to create a newly expansive Compagnie des 
Indes Perpetuelle.  
While Law’s plan enjoyed a rash of early successes, it also created a financial bubble that 
eventually crashed the French economy in 1721.29 The Company survived the ensuing tumult, 
but its reputation did not: the corporation became a source of popular derision among the legions 
                                                
29 For a study of the economic factors that contributed to the collapse of Law’s System, see Antoin Murphy, John 
Law: Economic Theorist and Policy-Maker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Lüthy, La Banque Protestante 
en France de la Révocation de l’Edit de Nantes à la Révolution; and Larry Neal, “I am not Master of Events”: The 
Speculations of John Law and Lord Londonderry in the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2012). 
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of investors who had lost their fortunes by purchasing its shares.30 Stripped of many of the 
privileges that it enjoyed under Law, the Company was set once again to the task of trading and 
settling in India. Its record over the following decades would prove uneven: whereas commerce 
flourished in the French factories in Bengal, it languished in settlements along India’s western 
coast. Internal scandals wracked the Company, as administrators turned against each other, 
engaged in unsanctioned wars, and built private fortunes over the course of their tenure. At the 
same time, the British emerged as a serious threat to French interests on the subcontinent. As 
European conflicts such as the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War spilled 
over to India, the English gradually gained control of the French settlements there. The terms of 
the 1763 Treaty of Paris restored these towns to the Company; but the heavy burden of military 
costs, underperforming trade, and public scandal combined to seal the corporation’s fate. Over 
the following years, the crown gradually turned against the Company, stripping away its 
commercial privileges before finally dissolving it in 1769.  
Law built his Company along highly centralized lines. The corporation was jointly 
administered by a coalition of ten directors and two royal commissioners, while plenary 
executive power resided in the hands of the Controller-General. Shareholders came from all 
walks of Old Regime life, though mostly consisted of court financiers and rentiers. As investors, 
they had little say in matters of corporate governance.31 Although the crown instituted several 
                                                
30 The severity of this popular response is detailed in Kaiser, “Money, Despotism, and Public Opinion in Early 
Eighteenth-Century France: John Law and the Debate on Royal Credit,” 1-2. Here Kaiser argues that the protests 
generated in response to Law’s bubble played a critical role in the development of public opinion in France 
(backdating this trend by several decades). 
31 These limitations, though, did not prevent shareholders from milking patronage connections to advocate for 
institutional change. Lüthy’s extensive study of financial life in the eighteenth century offers an in-depth look at 
how financiers, who floated loans and conducted business on behalf of the nobility (incapable of engaging in such 
business for fear of losing its noble status) used their political connection and economic capital not only to secure 
new investment opportunities but also to push for reforms outside of formal political channels. Herbert Lüthy, La 
Banque Protestante en France de la Révocation de l’Edit de Nantes à la Révolution, 325-330. 
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important reforms, particularly in 1731 and 1746, this basic administrative dynamic remained in 
place until a few years before the Company’s dissolution in 1769.32 A fusion between royal 
officials and independent administrators, the corporate leadership possessed an ambiguous 
mandate, governing a Company that seemed, at once, both public and private, state-run and 
semi-autonomous. The precarious balance between these positions helps explain why the 
meaning of Company sovereignty was so easily reinterpreted over the course of the eighteenth 
century. It also accounts for the public imprint left by Company scandals. The corporation was 
closely connected to the court politics at Versailles; even its middling bureaucrats owed their 
position to the intervention of well-placed courtiers. When embroiled in a personal conflict, 
Company employees could call on a range of important patrons to advocate on their behalf, 
turning minor disputes into polarizing public controversies.  
The Company ruled over a far-flung series of colonial settlements, although the ambit of 
this jurisdiction shifted over the course of the eighteenth century. A key component of Law’s 
plan was the consolidation of France’s various imperial dominions under Company control. At 
the height of the “System,” corporate leaders thus administered a global network of settlements 
and factories. The Company’s trading empire extended from Louisiana to Saint-Domingue, the 
Barbary Coast to the West African littoral—and encompassed both large settlements and small 
trading factories in India and China. This imperial chain slowly dissolved over the course of the 
1720s, as the crown reformed its colonial policies in the wake of Law’s bubble. Unprofitable 
investments like the Barbary Coast settlements were progressively abandoned, while the 
monarchy seized the Company’s lands in Louisiana—a transfer codified in a 1731 royal edict 
                                                
32 The most comprehensive study of the Company’s administration is provided Wilbur Dalgliesh, The Perpetual 
Company of the Indies in the Days of Dupleix: Its Administration and Organization for the Handling of Indian 
Commerce, 1722-1754 (Philadelphia, PA: 1933) and Philippe Haudrère, La Compagnie française des Indes au XIIIe 
siècle, volumes 1 and 2 (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2005). 
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that ceded political authority to the king in exchange for a loan. This broad restructuring reduced 
Company sovereignty to a few colonies in Asia and several slave-trading ports along the Guinea 
coast. The latter remained small in size, and had only a limited impact on either the Company’s 
bottom line or its internal politics.33  
Company administrators consequently devoted the majority of their attention after 1731 
to the management of the Indian colonies, as well as their agricultural settlements and victualing 
stations on the Iles de France and Bourbon (Mauritius and Réunion Island). The jurisdiction of 
the corporation was concentrated in sites that were predominantly coastal, urban, and mixed in 
population. In all five of the major French settlements in India—Pondichéry (the Company’s 
chief colony), Chandernagor, Mahé, Karikal, and Yanam—Company agents rarely numbered 
more than a few hundred European settlers. The vast majority of the corporate employees living 
in India were soldiers; the rest consisted of administrators, merchants, support staff (ranging 
from clerks to surgeons and parish priests), and, in some cases, immediate family members.34 An 
admixture of rigid “imperial designs” crafted by metropolitan planners and a frontier politics 
governed by “local contingencies,” Company settlements conformed to the unpredictable pattern 
of early-modern colonial settlement described by Shannon Dawdy.35 On the one hand, colonies 
like Pondichéry were administered according to preexisting hierarchies of office and race. The 
settlement was divided into “white” and “black” towns, and its employees were limited by 
metropolitan statute to the purchase and export of a specific set of commodities. On the other 
                                                
33 On the Company’s West African settlements, see Becker Gaston-Martin, L’ère des négriers (1714-1744): Nantes 
au XVIIIe Siècle (Paris, F. Alcan, 1931) and Pierre Bonnassieux, Les Grandes Compagnies: étude pour servir à 
l’histoire de la colonisation (Paris: E. Plon, 1892). 
34 For estimates of the number of Company employees living in India, and projections about their labor and 
demographic distribution, see Manning, Fortunes à faire, 198-201.  
35 Shannon Lee Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 2008), 3-5. 
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hand, metropolitan provisions were rarely observed, and sometimes openly flouted. Across India, 
Company employees engaged in mixed-race marriages, insinuated themselves into local trading 
networks, and established regional political coalitions. Exercising neither “consistent loyalty” 
nor “constant resistance,” these individuals instead followed a pattern of what Jane Burbank and 
Frederick Cooper have termed “contingent accommodation”—a flexible politics of 
opportunity.36    
The effort to determine how Company settlements fit within the political space of the Old 
Regime, and what to make of the many instances where metropolitan statutes were contravened, 
provided an ongoing source of contention. This dissertation offers a roughly chronological order 
of Company settlement and politics over the course of the eighteenth century. Yet it also focuses 
on the moments of conflict that brought concerns over Company jurisdiction, trade, and political 
responsibility to the fore of public consciousness. As William Sewell notes, “lumpiness, rather  
than smoothness, is the normal texture of historical temporality.”37 This claim rings especially 
true in the case of early-modern colonialism, where deep-seated convictions were often sidelined 
by practical need, political authority was reshaped by the charisma and personal influence of 
individual leaders, and news arrived in discrete and often distressing bundles.38 The Company’s 
history is defined by long periods of compromise and accommodation, followed by dramatic 
disruptions that called into question the wisdom of certain practices or the trustworthiness of 
                                                
36 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 14. 
37 William Sewell, Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), 226.  
38 More generally, information exchange in the early-modern period posed problems when it came to discerning the 
accuracy of colonial reports. Exploration and colonization fulfilled an Enlightenment desire for discovery, but 
reports from these voyages and enterprises often failed to meet the necessary empirical criteria to be considered 
trustworthy. See Philip Stern, “Exploration and Enlightenment,” in Reinterpreting Exploration: The West in the 
World, ed., Dane Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 54-79.  
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specific administrators. Put another way: it is a story punctuated by quick bursts of change, 
accompanied by protracted intervals of reaction and readjustment. For much of the eighteenth 
century, the faults and controversies generated by the Company reinforced state authority. But as 
France’s imperial presence in India collapsed, many of these unresolved issues were eventually 
projected onto the crown itself.  
The first chapter of the dissertation examines the conditions under which the Indian 
monopoly was established in 1664. It follows the dissolution of the Company and its consequent 
reestablishment under Law, as well as the economic chaos resulting from the bursting of the 
Mississippi Bubble. This chapter focuses in particular on how the ideological foundations behind 
Company commerce, as well as understandings of the best practices for trading and settling in 
India, were reworked over the course of the early eighteenth century by various interest groups. 
Beneath the veneer of a state-controlled commercial enterprise emerged a complex lobbying 
network of courtiers, merchants, shareholders, and political functionaries—each of whom hoped 
to preserve the Company while also refocusing it toward new ends. 
Next, I analyze the everyday problems of colonial governance and trade encountered by 
Company employees in India during the 1720s and 1730s. Employees struggled to balance 
metropolitan dictates with local political and trading conditions, and to reconcile the need for 
local innovation and initiative with the centralized administrative structure of the corporation. 
These difficulties projected onto a broader set of French debates about the function of 
patrimonial practices like nepotism and the purchase of government offices. As this chapter 
shows, Company trade continued to raise uncomfortable questions about not just the governance 
of France’s overseas colonies, but also about the sovereign composition of the Old Regime more 
generally.  
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The third chapter moves into the first of a series of public scandals involving high-placed 
Company administrators. Here I explore the fallout from the 1746 French conquest of Madras, a 
British colony on the southeastern coast of India. A military success, this development soon 
turned into a costly dispute between the Company governors who oversaw Madras’s capture. 
Both men claimed final authority in the disposition of the conquered city—a contest that first 
spurred local fighting between their supporters, and that then evolved into a heated polemical 
exchange over the legal foundations of Company sovereignty. Resolved through a series of 
lawsuits back in France, this controversial episode signaled the growing importance of the 
Company within the political life of the early-modern state. By reinterpreting their own powers 
and jurisdictions, both governors ultimately expanded the application and meaning of crown 
authority. 
The following chapter explores the ramifications of another scandal: this one stemming 
from the practice of subcontracting Company troops to local political leaders in exchange for 
territorial concessions. Employed during the Second Carnatic War (1749-1754), a series of 
dynastic crises in southern India, such policy became a source of Company-wide dissension as 
French troops found themselves pulled into a broadening conflict against the British and the 
regional claimants they supported. French failure ultimately divided the Company into opposing 
political blocs. Each party clung to a specific vision of colonial governance in India—with one 
side arguing that the Company should restrict itself to small, commercially-oriented settlements, 
and the other asserting that French interests were best served through the creation of a large 
territorial empire. Once again, the dispute gave way to a lengthy judicial drama, played out in a 
series of lawsuits and libel cases during the 1750s and 1760s. 
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I then analyze the collapse of Company power in India over the course of the Seven 
Years’ War (1756-1763). As reluctant participants in this global conflict, Company employees 
struggled to cooperate with the regular French officers sent to the subcontinent to oversee the 
war effort there. As France’s military fortunes in Asia quickly declined—and as several 
important settlements were besieged and captured—corporate administrators became embroiled 
in a divisive cycle of accusation and recrimination with the royal army. This process culminated 
in the fall of Pondichéry, the Company’s chief colony, with mutual claims of treason being 
levelled by both sides. The controversy over the collapse of the French settlements would not be 
resolved until 1766, when the chief French general in India, the comte de Lally, was tried and 
executed for his part in Pondichéry’s surrender. Decried by critics as a classic case of 
scapegoating, this episode also highlights the changing place of the Company within the political 
topography of the Old Regime. Through an unrelenting lobbying campaign started soon after the 
collapse of the French settlements, employees succeeded in turning a perceived crime against the 
Company into a capital crime against the nation.   
The final chapter examines the gradual dissolution of the Company in the aftermath of 
the Seven Years’ War, and the growing politicization of its shareholders in response to this 
development. While examining the vicious dispute that occurred as investors squared off against 
the royal ministers attempting to abrogate the Company’s monopoly, I also explore the deeper 
shifts within French political theory that occurred as a result of the fall of France’s overseas 
empire. As I show, the collapse of the Company played a significant role in a broader process of 
conceptual adjustment. In the years following the Seven Years’ War, an empire where authority 
was composite, overlapping, and shared was replaced by a centralizing nation-state that proved 
increasingly jealous of its power. The distance between the crown and the corporate institutions 
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beneath it consequently widened, and the politics of accommodation that characterized the first 
half of the eighteenth century gave way to the oppositional dynamic that defined the last few 
decades before the Revolution. 
 In closing, this dissertation is not merely an attempt to recover the people, events, and 
places that constituted the French experience in India. It is instead a reminder that the complex 
dynamics of eighteenth-century politics cannot be fully understood outside the framework of 
France’s empire. The practices and reigning ideas of the Old Regime were neither preformed nor 
projected out; they were reshaped through a dynamic process of conflict and negotiation, adapted 
to suit the changing circumstances of sites far outside the seats of Bourbon power, and then 
thrust on the crown in a bundle of new legal assumptions, economic theories, and political ideals. 
In short, if the Company was the product of royal regulation and planning, so too was the French 
monarchy reshaped by Company intrigue and politics; their histories were not merely intertwined, 
but also mutually constituting.  
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CHAPTER 1: COMMERCE, COMPANY, AND THE CROWN  
 
The King, who is committed to nothing so much as making his reign productive and happy, 
having recognized the importance of navigation and long-distance voyages, and that these are not 
just a guaranteed mark of the power of the state, but even more an infallible means of creating 
abundance, believes that it is to his glory and paternal benevolence toward his people to have them 
undertake the East Indies trade. 
— François Charpentier  
 
 
Such was François Charpentier’s rationalization for France’s growing interest in Indian 
commerce in his 1665 polemic, Relation de l’établissement de la Compagnie française pour le 
commerce des Indes orientales.39 Hired by the crown to generate investment interest in France’s 
newly chartered trading corporation, the Compagnie des indes orientales, Charpentier provided a 
step-by-step description of the Company’s origins, regulations, and future plans. He lauded not 
only the potential of trade in the Indian Ocean, but also the selflessness of the king in granting 
his subjects access to such lucrative commerce. The economic interests of the state were thus 
clothed in the garb of benevolent paternalism. 
Charpentier’s description was more than just rhetorical flourish. In both the Relation de 
l’établissement de la Compagnie and his 1664 Discours d’un fidèle sujet touchant 
l’établissement d'une compagnie française pour le commerce des Indes Orientales he reproduced 
a vivid portrait of royal economic policy.40 The monarchy under Louis XIV worked vigorously 
to shape popular consumption. While the court at Versailles defined new fashion trends, the king 
                                                
39 François Charpentier, Relation de l’établissement de la Compagnie française pour le commerce des Indes 
orientales (Paris, 1665). 
40 Charpentier published the Discours d’un fidèle sujet touchant l’établissement d'une compagnie française pour le 
commerce des Indes Orientales (Paris, 1664) as part of the same propaganda campaign. The Discours is more 
laudatory of both the monarchy and the profit potential of the East Indes trade than the Relation, perhaps reflecting 
the crown’s initial priority of creating enthusiasm for the Compagnie des indes orientales among a French 
population reluctant to invest in overseas commerce. 
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enticed subjects to invest in ennoblements, offices, and other privileges——reinforcing the 
corporatist foundations of absolutist rule. Under this arrangement, crown ministers “determined” 
value within French society; they steered entrepreneurs toward the manufacture of luxury goods, 
while denouncing alternative, private trading options as immoral.41 The establishment of the 
Compagnie des indes orientales represented an attempt to extend this strategy of state oversight 
to overseas commerce. Charpentier’s task was to imbue this commercial venture with a sense of 
civic virtue and reciprocal interest. According to him, the king granted his subjects access to the 
wealth of the East Indies, while the expansion of French trade would redound to the glory of the 
state. Overseas commerce was to be a fundamentally political and patriotic undertaking.  
A large and nationally backed trading corporation was central to the commercial vision 
that Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis XIV’s finance minister, developed for the French state.42 
Envious of the growing influence of both the Dutch and English in Asia, Colbert established the 
Compagnie des indes orientales in 1664 as a means of achieving two related goals: opening up 
new channels for foreign trade while simultaneously denying commercial opportunities to 
France’s rivals. Whereas the English and Dutch both delegated control of their respective East 
India Companies to private merchants, however, the Compagnie des indes orientales remained 
state-run. Charpentier’s invitation on behalf of Louis XIV to share in the profits of the East 
Indian trade was really a call for investors to purchase stock in a corporation in which they 
                                                
41 Henry Clark, Compass of Society: Commerce and Absolutism in Old-Regime France (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 
2007). Clark refers to this trend as the “royal determination of value,” and sees it as a key element of Ludovician 
economic policy. For more on the relationship between state centralization and the development of taste, fashion, 
and consumerism see Clare Crowston, Fabricating Women: The Seamstresses of Old Regime France (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2001). 
42 Colbert’s vision is often aligned with the tenets of mercantilism, but not as they are traditionally understood. For 
instance, he encouraged the export of bullion to stimulate trade in the East Indies, in spite of the supposed 
mercantilist maxim that bullion should be stockpiled domestically in order to promote national economic power. See 
Glenn Ames, Colbert, Mercantilism, and the French Quest for Asian Trade (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 1996), 20. On a more traditional, bullionist view of Colbert’s policies, see Aimé Richardt, Colbert 
et le Colbertisme (Paris: Tallandier, 1997), 124-125.  
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would have no managing authority, and in which commercial interests came second to the needs 
of the monarchy and the strategic concerns of the kingdom. The propagandist’s goal was not 
only to make this project appealing to potential shareholders, but also to explain how such an 
administrative arrangement would suit the cause of commercial expansion.  
Charpentier’s claims were a carefully-crafted fiction. But they have often been taken as 
evidence of an institutional reality: that the Company was always a product of crown initiative 
and campaigning. In political terms, this trend has meant that the early history of the corporation 
has primarily been told from the perspective of a select group of royal ministers and 
policymakers. In economic terms, it has meant that the competing impulses and ideas that shaped 
the establishment of the Company have been subsumed under a common rubric of commercial 
practice known as “mercantilism.” Conventionally associated with the state regulation of trade 
and domestic manufacturing—a protectionist tradition known in French as dirigisme—this term 
has long been used by scholars seeking to highlight the importance of the crown in shaping the 
economic life of the Old Regime.43 By framing the Company as a product of mercantilism, 
historians have used the corporation mostly to confirm the standard narrative of French 
commercial development: one that aligns France’s economic growth directly with the evolution 
of the early-modern state. 
  Far from merely facilitating the economic goals of state policymakers, however, the 
corporation also carved out space for a variety of competing lobbying interests and political 
programs. Beneath Charpentier’s bold pronouncements about royal magnanimity lay a deep-
seated uncertainty about how to manage foreign trade, not to mention an enduring skepticism 
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about the benefits that overseas commerce would provide to French society.44 The uncertain 
implications of royal monopoly inspired a range of both committed supporters and vicious 
critics—from crown officials to Ponant merchants, Paris speculators to Enlightenment 
philosophes. Colbert’s efforts thus sowed the seeds for a polarizing public debate that linked 
concerns over the corporation to broader criticisms of the absolutist state. This conflict would 
evolve over the following decades, as various interest groups grappled for authority over the 
Company.  
This chapter traces the early history of the Company, from its establishment in 1664 to its 
restructuring in the aftermath of Law’s Bubble: the last set of major reforms the corporation 
would face during its years of operation. Of central interest here are the diverse strategies, 
campaigning efforts, and petitioning work that shaped the public image of the corporation in the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Such a focus reveals the many parties involved in 
the development of the Company: a diverse array of actors and institutions whose engagement 
with the corporation exposes many of the underlying limits to crown authority in the early-
modern period. It likewise suggests the importance of the Company as a lobbying network that, 
from the very beginning, connected outside interest groups to court patronage and the 
mechanisms of state power. Finally, the Company’s tumultuous beginnings also shed light on the 
shifting assumptions about trade that infused discussions of corporate monopoly. For both 
detractors and advocates, the value of Company commerce was never simply a question of cost 
and profit. Disputants invoked a wide-range of ideological traditions to make sense of the 
Company and its privileges—from reason-of-state arguments to Renaissance humanism, neo-
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Aristotelian science to incipient credit theory. Such a broad approach to issues of commerce 
paralleled similar debates in England and the United Provinces, and underscores the permeability 
of the boundaries demarcating economic knowledge from other fields of early-modern inquiry.45 
From its very inception, the Company provided a framework through which questions about the 
social order, moral legitimacy, and political hierarchy of the Old Regime were worked out.  
 
Absolutist Trade 
The seventeenth century was littered with failed French attempts to settle and trade in the 
East Indies, most of which were undertaken by private companies operating from France’s 
Atlantic ports. Inspired by the success of Dutch merchants trading in Asia, the small Compagnie 
des marchands de Saint Malo, Laval et Vitré sent a fleet to the Straits of Malacca in 1601. 
Although company ships successfully traded there with the Sumatran kingdom of Aceh, the 
corporation quickly collapsed under the dual weight of Dutch hostility and internal dissension.46 
A second company, operating with the support of the influential admiral and statesman Henri de 
Montmorency, established itself in Rouen in 1615. Though larger and better funded than its 
predecessor, the Compagnie de Montemorency fared little better: the corporation ceased 
operations in 1620 in response to both continued Dutch aggression and the death of its patron.47 
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Undeterred by these failures, Cardinal Richelieu sponsored a new venture in 1626. Soon after 
negotiating a peace treaty with the United Provinces at Compiègne, he created the Compagnie de 
Morbihan—an ambitious corporation that drew on ships, crews, and capital from across France. 
Yet even with the benefits of Richelieu’s patronage and the removal of the Dutch threat to 
French commerce, this company soon foundered. The Cardinal simply could not entice or coerce 
enough merchants to commit to the enterprise.48  
French efforts from the 1630s to the early 1660s were decidedly smaller in scale, but 
enjoyed more success. Merchants in Dieppe organized annual expeditions of a least one ship to 
the Indian Ocean; French vessels explored the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and northwestern coast of 
the Indian subcontinent; and a private society established colonies in the Mascarene Islands. 
These accomplishments overseas, however, paled in comparison to those of the English and 
Dutch, both of whom boasted large, joint stock corporations, and built a string of successful 
factory-towns across the Indian Ocean. Overall, French undertakings during this period remained 
desultory. France’s Atlantic ports continued to compete rather than cooperate with each other, 
and the capital and commercial expertise required for larger expeditions remained scattered 
throughout the coastal provinces of Normandy and Brittany.49    
Where in this long history of failure and frustration lay the incentives that drove Colbert 
to commission a French East India Company? The Controller-General’s motives become clearer 
when considered against broader patterns in European commercial practice and theory during 
seventeenth-century. Sophus Reinart notes the emulative nature of early-modern political 
economy, which led to the reproduction of commercial policies, strategies, and ideas throughout 
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the continent. Instead of focusing on questions of commodity flows and profits—the “balance-
of-trade” fixation that was supposed to have captured the minds of the period—economic writers 
worried far more about the constitution of their respective states. The capacity for commercial 
progress was understood to reflect a nation’s specific government, laws, institutions, and cultural 
practices.50 Colbert was less concerned about the specific commodities contained within the 
Indian market than in reproducing the success of his European rivals there.  
 In short, competition and a consequent “jealousy of trade” fixed the gaze of statesman 
like Colbert on the economic programs of France’s most immediate rivals: England and the 
Dutch Republic.51 Both states boasted extensive commercial connections in Asia, and possessed 
large trading corporations through which they pursued their economic and political interests 
there. To challenge these successful trader nations, Colbert sought to reproduce their commercial 
infrastructure within the context of Bourbon absolutism. A powerful East India Company, he 
believed, would provide a practical solution to the most pressing questions facing the French 
monarchy: how to gain a favorable balance of trade, how to create self-sufficiency through 
improved domestic manufacturing, and how to gain an edge on France’s rivals on the global 
commercial stage. The force of crown authority would overcome the earlier deficiencies that had 
plagued French commercial operations in India.   
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 Understanding the competitive impulses that inspired the creation of the French East 
India Company explains the particular course of its development. Motivated by geo-political 
rivalry, Colbert approached economic reform as a problem of political will: both the Company 
and its trading practices were tailored to fit the competitive needs of the French monarchy. The 
1660s were the height of the Controller-General’s power, and he relied upon a combination of 
executive fiat, personal influence, and sheer intimidation to clear the ground for his vision. 
Colbert reprinted Charpentier’s arguments in leaflets that he sent to possible investors, 
broadcasting the profit potential of the Company, and leaned heavily on the parlements, the 
provincial estates, and various municipal governments to fund his trading enterprises.52 He also 
secured the public backing of the crown, which agreed to cover one-fifth of all Company 
expenditures on shipping during the corporation’s first three years of operation. Louis XIV even 
delivered the inaugural address to the first meeting of Company investors in 1668—a speech in 
which he promised shareholders who had not yet met their stock obligations that “his memory 
was too good to forget them.”53 These efforts followed on the heels of a series of reforms 
designed by Colbert to rationalize the economy, as he improved tax collection, streamlined 
France’s archaic system of internal tariffs, and created a royal council of commerce to 
consolidate mercantile expertise.54  
As Reinert argues, the  “entangled” set of ideas, principles, and perspectives on trade that 
comprised early-modern commercial was ultimately “mediated by the centripetal pull of 
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competing local contexts.”55 Simply put, the process of imitating and adapting commercial 
practices to new contexts ultimately changed their meaning. Consider Colbert’s efforts to ground 
his new Company within the moral framework of late French humanism through the 
pamphleteering of Charpentier. Driven by early-seventeenth-century thinkers such as Antoine de 
Montchrestien and Emeric Crucé, this humanist tradition posited that trade was a fragile 
endeavor that needed to be molded by a strong, centralized authority if it were to prosper.56 By 
invoking the moral authority of the crown, Colbert framed Company trade as a symbiotic process 
that connected economic prosperity to processes of state centralization. Such work paralleled the 
petitioning efforts of earlier English and Dutch writers like Thomas Mun, Josiah Child, and 
Hugo Grotius—advocates of corporate trade who engaged in prolonged efforts of pleading and 
debate to fix their respective East India companies on a firm ideological footing. In each case, 
monopoly was as much an economic instrument designed to meet existing market conditions as 
it was political program oriented around specific social, moral, and administrative goals.       
Colbert did far more than simply repurpose the commercial practices of his rivals and 
sheath them in the ideological plating of absolutist political theory; he also used the power of his 
office to pursue his own agenda within the French ministry. From its very inception, the 
Company thus bore the stamp of Colbert’s specific interests and intellectual fixations. Despite 
efforts by historians to categorize his administration under a single ideological program 
(mercantilism, Cartesianism), Colbert’s policies were more experimental and reactive than 
driven by a specific doctrine. As Controller-General, he subscribed to a combination of 
pragmatic statecraft, ecumenical thinking, and, perhaps most important, dilettantism backed by 
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the machinery of royal power.57 This eclecticism represented an important administrative 
strength, revealing an openness to new projects and ideas. But it also stood as an important 
limiting factor in the early history of the Company. Despite his wide ranging curiosity, Colbert 
showed a surprising lack of interest in the realities of France’s overseas colonies. He was also 
unreceptive to criticism, and proved unwilling to listen to French merchants when they 
complained about the suitability of his projects to existing market conditions.58 
The correlation between personality and deficiencies in corporate practice is readily 
apparent in Colbert’s organization of the Compagnie des Indes. To surpass his rivals, the 
Controller-General imagined he would borrow from their practices and employ state power to 
make them work within the French context. Colbert thus used the Dutch East India Company 
(Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie), which was managed by private assemblies scattered 
throughout the United Provinces, as an institutional model for his own trading corporation. The 
Controller-General divided the Company’s administration between municipal chambers in Paris, 
and five of France’s largest commercial centers: Lyon, Rouen, Le Havre, Nantes, and 
Bordeaux.59 Each city assembly would possess an independent budget, which it would employ to 
furnish and conduct its own trading ventures. Merchant expertise, it was believed, would flow 
naturally from these trading hubs. Yet while Colbert successfully replicated the institutional 
structure of the VOC, he failed to account for the drastic differences between the fiscal 
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landscapes of France and the United Provinces. In the Dutch Republic, urban traders had 
replaced seigniorial interests as the chief financial power in the United Provinces; in France, by 
contrast, the economy remained rooted in the ownership of land and the purchase of offices. 
Successful merchants bought their way into the nobility or lent money to the crown rather than 
build their fortunes through commerce.60  
 Indeed, even with Colbert’s full commitment behind it, the new Company experienced a 
fitful beginning. The finance minister’s subscription campaign succeeded in raising only 
7,400,000 livres out of the 15,000,000 that he deemed necessary for the Company’s starting 
capital; and over half of this amount came directly from the king. Private investment was 
concentrated overwhelmingly in Paris, particularly among the Sun King’s intimates: the royal 
family, princes of the blood, and officials of the court accounted for close to 2,000,000 livres of 
the subscribed capital.61 Colbert struggled to generate enthusiasm for the East Indian trade 
outside of these circles. The city magistrates of Toulouse, for example, met little more than one-
third of the contribution requested of them by the finance minister. While they pledged their 
commitment to the king and his commercial enterprises, municipal leaders seemed to have found 
the appeals to self-sacrifice and national community promoted by Charpentier unconvincing. The 
Toulouse council searched for the minimum level of investment needed to satisfy the crown 
without sacrificing local political and economic interests.62 Such lukewarm commitment was 
symptomatic of a more general problem. Potential investors simply saw Colbert’s campaign for 
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what it was: an obligation imposed by the crown. When subscriptions were purchased, they were 
done so reluctantly, and shareholders often failed to cover their full investment obligations. 
Those few merchants who actually purchased subscriptions in the Company found they 
could do little to shape corporate policy. Colbert oversaw the Company’s finances, while the 
king appropriated the stockholders’ right to select Company directors after 1668.63 As 
shareholder assemblies met with decreasing frequency, decision-making powers shifted even 
more to the monarch and his ministers. Colbert’s political aspirations also cost the Company in 
mercantile expertise. Colbert had ascended to the top of the Sun King’s cabinet by denouncing 
the former minister of finance, Nicolas Fouquet. While such political gamesmanship advanced 
Colbert’s career, it also earned him the enmity of Fouquet’s family, which possessed extensive 
trading experience and boasted useful overseas contacts.64 Colbert labored tirelessly to bolster 
commercial expertise within the Company. He brought in Dutch experts such as François Caron, 
the former head of the VOC’s trading-factory in Japan, to assume a leading role in trading 
operations, and appointed several prominent French merchants as directors. But these actions did 
little to change the fact that the Company was essentially a political project with an improvised 
commercial agenda. Colbert’s corporation would thus lack consistently in both mercantile 
experience and guidance.  
The Company possessed greater resources, a more substantial political backing, and 
loftier ambitions than France’s previous ventures in the Indian Ocean. Like these unsuccessful 
earlier efforts, however, the new trading corporation struggled to construct a coherent 
commercial strategy. Colbert’s obsession with the VOC led to a series of early letdowns. One of 
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the finance minister’s primary commercial goals was to create a French entrepôt on Madagascar 
that would rival the Dutch colony of Batavia. As he imagined it, this colony would provide a 
base for future French operations in the Indian Ocean, as well as for voyages to China and Japan. 
This plan, though, proved both costly and difficult to implement. From the Company’s first 
voyage to the island in 1665, the French encountered numerous setbacks, including undersupply, 
the resistance of the local Malagasy kingdoms, and a lack of coordinated leadership. Unable to 
overcome the basic problem of maintaining the colony, Company employees could do little to 
expand French trade in the Indian Ocean. By 1667, they had run a deficit of 1,800,000 livres.65 
The Company made repeated efforts to improve and reinforce its languishing settlements in 
Madagascar, but failed to turn the island into a viable entrepôt. With their presence reduced by 
disease and warfare to a few colonists in the factory-town of Fort Dauphin, the French finally 
abandoned their settlement plans in 1671.66 
The Company’s experience in Mughal India was to prove no easier. The French arrived 
as latecomers to the subcontinent, trailing behind the Portuguese, Dutch, and English by several 
decades in establishing a serious trading presence there. This delay, however, did not stop the 
Company from quickly making its commercial presence known. On 4 September 1666, French 
envoys secured a firman, or royal mandate, from the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb that granted 
them the right to trade in the port of Surat. Located along the northwestern coast of the 
subcontinent in the province of Gujarat, Surat was a busy and cosmopolitan city: the future 
governor of French India, François Martin, described it as a modern-day Babylon whose roads 
were “always full of carts, elephants, camels, beasts of burden, coaches, horses, palanquins, and 
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other vehicles.”67 The 1666 firman granted the French the same trading rights as their two main 
European competitors in Surat, the Dutch and the English. Despite this dispensation, though, the 
French struggled in competition with their more established rivals. As the Company’s early 
shipments failed to turn a profit, dissension split the ranks of its senior administrators.68 By 1670, 
the French had begun scouting new locations for a factory-town. Company leaders recognized 
that their employees needed time and opportunities to build local trading relationships. Busy 
Surat offered neither. 
By 1683, The French had shifted their attention definitively from Surat to a more 
promising site along the Coromandel Coast: Pondichéry. But this change of location did little to 
offset the Company’s chronic shortage of capital. Colbert’s death in that same year dealt a 
serious blow to France’s already flagging fortunes in the Indian Ocean. Louis XIV’s chronic 
wars also cost the Company dearly in shipping and infrastructure, culminating in the temporary 
Dutch seizure of Pondichéry in 1693 (they would return the city in 1699 as part of the terms of 
the Treaty of Ryswick). For the next few years, the underfinanced Company teetered 
precariously on the edge of insolvency, using the proceeds from the single load of cargo it could 
afford to ship each year to finance its next annual voyage to Asia.69 After Colbert’s death, his son, 
the marquis de Seignelay, assumed administrative responsibilities over the Company. He 
attempted to stave off disaster, but he could do little to improve the corporation’s desperate 
financial situation. In 1685, the crown decided to liquidate the Company’s debts and lease its 
commercial monopoly to a private society of merchants from Saint-Malo.  
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Even as a failure, however, Colbert’s efforts revealed how readily the mechanisms of 
state power could be deployed to the purpose of expanding overseas trade. His projects suffered 
from what Julia Adams terms the “idiosyncratic rhythms” of French statecraft under Louis XIV: 
a “systole/diastole” that juxtaposed periods of tremendous interest in specific projects with long 
periods of neglect—all related to the caprices of the French court.70 Yet the finance minister 
nonetheless created both an institutional foundation for later companies, and a ready set of 
ideological justifications for the consolidation of commercial interests under crown authority. 
His efforts to establish a workable Company monopoly would prefigure longer term 
developments in the corporation’s history. Over the following century, the nature of French 
settlement in India would be closely shaped by the institutional practices of the absolutist state. 
Personal influence and the quest for royal favor inflected processes of reform and administrative 
centralization.  
 
Commerce Reimagined 
France spent most of the thirty years following Colbert’s death on a war footing, engaged 
in a nearly unending series of conflicts with the English, Dutch, and their various allies. This 
bellicose period saw the progressive dismantling of the Controller-General’s fiscal policies. 
Focused almost exclusively on the short-term goal of funding the French military, Colbert’s 
successors discarded his program of careful debt management. These ministers borrowed heavily, 
farmed out tax collection privileges, and sold sinecures and ennoblements with new vigor. Louis 
XIV’s death in 1715, which resulted in the creation of a regency government under the control of 
the Duc d’Orléans, added the messy politics of succession to the litany of problems facing 
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France. By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession that same year, the French economy 
was in shambles. 71 
The financial crisis that followed this conflict precipitated a string of reforms meant to 
reduce the debt and streamline the French economy. Under the regency government, political 
opportunism went hand-in-hand with broader shifts to commercial epistemology. As one 
prominent specialist notes, this era “quickly turned into a period of unprecedented 
experimentation in peaceful, contestatory public politics.”72 Eager to curry royal patronage and 
glean the rewards for their foresight, petitioners known as donneur d’avis flooded the royal 
council with proposals. These reformers included men such as Etienne Lécuyet de la Jonchère, 
treasurer to the War Minister, and the famed polymath Henri de Boulainvilliers, as well as a 
number of lesser known administrators, academics, and writers. The reformist impulses of the 
period helped clear space once again for crown experimentation in monopolistic trade. Both 
Lécuyet de la Jonchère and Boulainvilliers recommended consolidating France’s commercial 
enterprises under a single trading company, the proceeds of which would be used to pull the 
crown out of insolvency.73   
The search for economic alternatives fixed the French gaze once more on practices and 
policies across the English Channel. Although France and England had fought on different sides 
of the War of the Spanish Succession, their common struggles in the aftermath of the conflict 
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inspired an intense period of cross-fertilization. “Anglomania” gripped France during the 
Regency period; salons celebrated English society, statecraft, and manners as symbols of 
modernity and progress.74 Such affinities extended beyond the level of culture to include a 
widespread fascination with English commercial practices and political economy. As was the 
case throughout the eighteenth century, the success of England’s fiscal-military state inspired a 
string of continental imitators, each of whom hoped to secure important advantages by adopting 
English practices.75  
For both regency ministers and French economic theorists, the hardships encountered 
during the final years of the Sun King’s reign underscored the success of English trading 
practices and commercial ideas. With its vibrant investment culture, efficient tax collection 
system, and national bank, the English state coped with the heavy costs of war far more 
effectively than its Bourbon enemies.76 Early-seventeenth-century English commentators may 
have bemoaned the country’s deficit in trade when compared with the United Provinces. But 
over the course of the 1600s England had undergone a financial revolution fueled by the 
development of a powerful credit-based culture. The anxieties and enthusiasm generated by these 
economic changes penetrated to nearly every corner of English society—from the Halls of 
Parliament to the epistolary networks of prominent academics and natural philosophers, debtors’ 
prisons to the brokerages of “Exchange Alley.” Financial news likewise circulated across the 
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English Channel in a wave of letters, trade papers, and published polemics. The Regency’s 
interest in England during the early eighteenth century reveals the cyclical nature of commercial 
emulation, which seemed to thrive through a precise combination of economic hegemony by one 
power, relative weakness by another, and a vigorous exchange of ideas between both.77 
It was within this climate of financial hardship and commercial envy that the John Law 
first came to the attention of the French ministry. A Scottish émigré, gambler, and commercial 
theorist, Law approached the regency government with a radical proposal to restructure the 
economy through the creation of a national bank and trading corporation. As a proponent of 
credit-based economies, in which paper currency tied to a central bank would replace specie, the 
Scotsman was the driving force behind the reconstitution of the Compagnie des Indes. His 
larger-than-life personality has attracted an array of critics and apologists; he has been 
characterized as everything from a misinformed theorist and a charlatan to an economic pioneer 
undermined by the ignorance of his opponents and the irrationality of the Old Regime’s fiscal 
landscape.78 As Herbert Lüthy points out, however, Law “did not act in a vacuum.”79 An ardent 
lobbyist who had experienced numerous frustrations in pitching his economic ideas to Scottish, 
English, Genoese, and, on a prior occasion, French authorities, he tailored his ideas to ensure a 
positive reception within the absolutist ministry. In the process, he transformed corporate 
monopoly from a crown-sponsored trading privilege to an instrument of public finance. 
Put simply, Law saw the circulation of goods and currency as the foundation of economic 
growth. He first laid these ideas down in the treatise Money and Trade considered with a 
                                                
77 Reinert, Translating Empire, 38-44. 
78 For a breakdown of these historiographical camps, see Kaiser, “Money, Despotism, and Public Opinion in Early 
Eighteenth-Century France,” 1.  
79 Lüthy, La Banque Protestante en France de la Révocation de l’Edit de Nantes à la Révolution, Volume 1, 268. 
41 
proposal for supplying the nation with money, which he published anonymously in 1705. Here 
Law argued that trade was not just a component of the economy, but a barometer for a nation’s 
financial health. Fiscal strength, he wrote, “consists in numbers of People, and Magazines of 
Home and Forreign Goods. These depend on Trade, and Trade depends on Money.”80 Law drew 
upon the work of earlier English academics, particularly those who comprised the seventeenth-
century correspondence network known as the Hartlib Circle. Inspired by the empirical 
methodology of Sir Francis Bacon, these economic writers broke with conventional wisdom 
(based on Aristotelian and Ciceronian worldviews that placed natural limits of economic 
expansion) to suggest that society, and even human nature, had the capacity for infinite 
improvement. At the center of the Hartlib Circle’s ideology was a belief in the ameliorative 
effects of credit, the proliferation of which would spark economic growth and, in turn, create a 
happier and more productive population. While Law did not adopt Hartlibean ideas wholesale, 
he nonetheless insisted on the social value of widespread credit. The circulation of money, he 
believed, would create the conditions for a more harmonious society: “procuring the general 
Good of the Kingdom” by “indissolubly uniting the king’s interest with that of private 
Persons.”81 
Fortuitous circumstances ensured Law’s rapid rise. Court interest in English culture and 
commercial practices meant his proposals received a welcome reception at Versailles. The 
ongoing financial crisis helped as well. The royal ministry initially rejected Law’s banking 
project in 1715. But mounting debt created growing sympathy for the Scotsman at court. The 
regency’s implementation of the Visa—a partial bankruptcy accompanied by the creation of a 
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special Chamber of Justice tasked with the punishment of abusive financial practices—silenced 
Law’s potential rivals and provided the political foundation for a wholesale restructuring of 
French finances. Noblemen and parlementaires who might have otherwise criticized Law’s 
efforts muted their opposition so as to avoid the attention of the Chamber of Justice.82  
These factors provided the conditions for a vertiginous rise to power. In May 1716, Law 
received permission to establish the General Bank, a private institution underwritten by his own 
funds. He then successfully lobbied to transform the organization into a royal bank. At first used 
exclusively for the payment of state taxes, the bank’s notes gradually became regular currency. 
In 1717, Law expanded this arrangement by founding a royally sanctioned trading corporation, 
known variously as the Company of the West, the Mississippi Company, and the Compagnie 
perpétuelle des Indes. This corporation was intended to perform the dual function of encouraging 
trade and settlement in French Louisiana—a massive swath of territory that covered nearly a 
third of what would become the continental United States—and of eliminating state debt. The 
profit potential of Law’s reforms attracted attention in London, as Parliament embarked on a 
similar project of financial consolidation through its South Sea Company.83 One of the few cases 
where French economic reform paced British commercial development, this cross-Channel 
exchange proved disastrous for both sides.  
Law’s program of economic recovery followed a twisting path of new investment 
opportunities and shifting debt obligations. The Scotsman hoped to convince purchasers of state 
debt to convert their holdings into Company stock. Since dividend payments on corporate shares 
would initially be lower than the crown’s debt obligations, the government would gradually 
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become solvent, while the growing value of Company stock would strengthen the value of Law’s 
new currency and appease investors. This vision, accompanied by Law’s tireless petitioning, 
propelled the Company’s meteoric growth from 1717 to 1720. As Law gained greater power 
within the regency government, the Mississippi Company accumulated numerous privileges and 
trading monopolies, assuming, among other things, control of the French slave trade in Senegal 
and Guinea, the exclusive right to sell beaver pelts from Acadia, authority over tobacco customs 
in France, and a monopoly on French commerce in India and Asia. By 1720, the Company 
managed a vast swathe of France’s economy.84 
Law’s ambitious process of fiscal restructuring, known metonymically as his “System,” 
consolidated almost all of France’s commercial interests into a single company. Size, 
centralization, and standardization joined with circulation, credit, and confidence to become the 
bywords of the new financial order. The principles behind Law’s Company bore certain 
similarities to those of Colbert’s. Like Colbert, Law emphasized the interconnected nature of the 
French economy. The traffic in African slaves and the sale of goods from French trading 
outposts would promote the development of new settlements in North America, which would in 
turn add value to both Company stock and the new paper currency.85 But whereas Colbert saw 
trade as one component of the economy, Law envisioned corporate commerce as the centerpiece 
of France’s financial regeneration. The Company, and the system of credit that it supported, 
would facilitate the wholesale reform of French society. Money would flow rather than stagnate 
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as rentes and investments in ennobling offices, and the purchase of Company shares would 
replace the crown’s ineffective strategies for debt management.    
Also like Colbert, Law’s scheme had little grounding in the realities of French overseas 
trade. The Scotsman certainly did not lack for commercial expertise. He had assiduously studied 
the practices of English and Dutch East India Companies, modeling his “System” on their 
investment structures. But he treated corporate commerce primarily as a tool for economic 
restructuring, and concerned himself less with the subtleties of the Company’s diverse overseas 
interests than in assembling monopolies, economic privileges, and political capital to bolster his 
system of public credit. Law needed to market his ideas, both to the regent and to potential 
investors; what mattered most was his ability to promote the value of Company commerce. He 
therefore exaggerated the wealth of the Mississippi territory, claiming that it contained “mines” 
more “fertile” than those exploited by the Spanish in Mexico, and hid the extensive maintenance 
and infrastructure costs for the Louisiana colony from investors.86 He also made sweeping claims 
about the commercial struggles of private merchants groups such as the Malouin Society, 
painting them as corrupt, irresponsible, and unsuccessful while ignoring any evidence to the 
contrary.87 The viability of Company trade meant little at the height of Law’s power in 1719 and 
1720. As the mechanism through which the “System” generated wealth, commerce was 
represented through outlandish claims about the wealth of France’s far-flung colonies, optimistic 
notions about social regeneration, and the rising price of Company stock.  
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 Law’s Company reflected both his deeply held convictions about the economy, and the 
lobbying efforts designed to advance his cause. The Scotsman employed a shifting set of claims 
to justify the expansion of Company powers and prerogatives. For example, before arriving in 
France Law expressed doubts that a despotic monarchy could accommodate a thriving overseas 
trade. By 1715, however, he had changed his position to argue that only an absolutist government 
offered the stability and centralization necessary for commercial success.88 This adaptability 
ensured the Company’s rapid growth. To the regent, the Company represented an expansion of 
the monarchy’s economic powers and relief from an ever-growing debt. To the public, the 
corporation was a valuable investment opportunity, capable of generating vast wealth over a 
short period of time. Unlike Colbert, Law succeeded in making his Company appealing to a wide 
audience. Corporate commerce became more than a tool of statecraft, catering solely to the geo-
political and economic interests of the king.  
Speculative fever gripped France at the height of Law’s influence. In 1720, the cost of 
Company shares rose almost overnight, skyrocketing in value from 500 to 12,000 livres. 
Investors came from across the social spectrum; nobles, courtiers, merchants, soldiers, and 
artisans all sought to profit from the rapid explosion in stock prices. Families sold their fortunes 
to purchase as many shares as possible. The mania was so great that French duchesses would 
kiss John Law’s hands as they pleaded with him for shares. The Duchesse d’Orléans, upon 
observing these acts, wondered what areas of his body non-noble ladies might kiss in exchange 
for these valuable commodities.89  
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 Such an arrangement, though, proved unsustainable. Law transformed the Company into 
an appealing investment, but he relied on deceit, coercion, and exaggeration to generate popular 
enthusiasm for his project. The Scotsman’s vision for a harmonious balance between public and 
private interests, overseas commerce and the domestic economy, struggled to accommodate 
natural fluctuations in the market. The price of corporate shares did not correspond to the 
Company’s actual worth, and when the cost of this stock could no longer be artificially inflated, 
the entire “System” collapsed.  
 
An Equitable and Efficient Exchange 
 1720 was a disastrous year for John Law and the Company. By the late winter, the value 
of shares had blown up to such a precarious point that even minor attempts at regulation resulted 
in catastrophe. A series of measures promulgated in February and March 1720 sowed the seeds 
for the “System’s” breakdown. In order to inflate the price of Company stock, Law used the 
royal bank to purchase shares in the corporation. When the Bank and the Company merged in 
February, however, Law put an end to this policy, which had required the constant printing of 
new banknotes. Likely motivated by a desire to restore some balance to the economy and prevent 
the devaluation of paper money, Law’s actions instead precipitated a dramatic drop in share 
prices. Attempts to halt this plunge by fixing the price of shares and manipulating the value of 
French specie further eroded public confidence.90 Later efforts to adjust share prices and bring 
them back under their natural ceiling precipitated a panic. Over the following months, the 
“System” crumbled.   
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By June, France was in chaos. Investors rushed to sell their steadily depreciating stock. 
According to the Gazette de Bruxelles, the general bank’s office on the Rue Quincampoix was so 
overrun by the “mob” of shareholders, petitioners, and speculators “that one individual 
suffocated.”91 The Histoire du système des billets de banque evoked a similar sense of turmoil. It 
noted the lines of refugees who made their way into Paris from the countryside, overfilling the 
city’s inns and sleeping in “alleys” and “monasteries,” as well as others who resigned themselves 
to passing the night in their “carriages,” sacrificing comfort to ensure that the vehicles would not 
be stolen in the growing tumult.92 In cities across France, vandalized street signs denounced Law 
as an “execrable tyrant” who had pushed the nation to financial ruin.93 With thousands of 
investors on the edge of bankruptcy, unscrupulous speculators made a fortune, shorting their 
shares and then purchasing large quantities of corporate stock when prices bottomed out. By the 
end of December, Law had fled across the border to the Austrian Netherlands.94  
 Many blamed the Company directly for the mayhem. The anonymous author of the 
Décision théologique sur les actions de la Compagnie des Indes, for instance, argued that the 
corporation was little more than an instrument for currency manipulation—an “arbitrary increase 
and debasement” of specie that served the interests of a few plutocrats and financiers.95 By 
camouflaging the destructive designs of these speculators, the Company lured the public to 
financial ruin. Through his dishonest dealings and arbitrary devaluation of metal currency, Law 
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came to symbolize the worst excesses of absolutist rule.96 So too did the Company. Richard 
Cantillon, a former colleague of Law’s, worried that the regency’s decision to concentrate state 
finances in this institution left the economy vulnerable to the machinations of unscrupulous 
ministers.97 Montesquieu voiced similar concerns in his 1721 Lettres Persanes.98 Within the 
popular imagination, Company activity became a symbol of peculation, venality, and secrecy. 
One of the more damning criticisms was also one of the most creative. A 1727 Anagram 
manipulated the title Compagnie des Indes Orientales to spell out “Indigne atelier des ânes 
[shameful workshop of asses].”99 
The actions of several high-placed employees in the aftermath of the bubble collapse 
further discredited the Company. In April 1721, the director of the corporation’s port in Lorient, 
Eduoard Rigby, came under official scrutiny for his excessive personal spending and unreliable 
bookkeeping. Gerard Mellier, the Mayor of Nantes, complained of ships “languishing” in Lorient 
for “fourteen months, ” juxtaposing the “disorder” of the port with Rigby’s opulent behavior.100 
While the city’s inventory books were a mess—a jumble of “crossed out words, erasures, and 
scribbling between the lines”—Rigby lived an untroubled life of luxury, going around town with 
his “liveried servants, his squires, and his gentlemen” and “conducting himself like sovereign 
prince.”101 Ostentatious in display, he proved imperious in his administration. While rebuking 
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one subordinate, for instance, he remarked: “Do you not know that I, Rigby, am the king of 
Lorient inside and out?”102 This volatile combination of arrogance, pomp, and inconsistent 
accounting made Rigby’s superiors suspicious. At the end of May, Rigby was arrested and sent 
to the Bastille on charges of corruption and embezzlement. His chief cashier and accomplice, 
Rodollet, was detained soon after in Lorient’s harbor fort of Port-Louis. Over the following 
months, state officials systematically reviewed Rigby’s papers, Rodollet’s receipts, and the 
Company’s inventories in the city.103 Rigby would die in prison two years later—before he could 
receive an official trial, but long after his actions had created a scandal.  
Acting through the banker Joseph Pâris-Duverney, whom it tasked with reorganizing the 
Company, the state enacted a large-scale restructuring of the corporation between 1721 and 1723. 
One of Law’s strongest critics, Pâris-Duverney consolidated several offices, increased royal 
oversight by placing the Company under the nominal direction of the Controller-General, and 
made the corporate administration more stable and transparent.104 The Company directorate 
shrank from twenty members to twelve, and the crown appointed a set of commissaires to act on 
behalf of its interests among the corporate leadership. Eight syndics would be elected in the 
shareholder assembly each year to represent investors.105 A 1721 Visa liquidated the Company’s 
debts and reimbursed shareholders—sometimes at a fraction of their initial investment—while 
fines were imposed on directors and speculators who had profited from the collapse of the 
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“System.”106 The crown solidified Company finances by guaranteeing the tobacco monopoly and 
by giving the corporation control over the sale of coffee; the small but consistent returns from 
these privileges ensured the regular payment of investor dividends in the future.107 Throughout 
the 1720s, the king also stepped in to finance the Company directly.  
Well-documented as these reforms are, they were only part of a larger campaign to 
restore the Company’s public image and political capital. In the wake of Pâris-Duverney’s 
restructuring, a diverse group of financiers, Company administrators, and royal ministers worked 
together to silence the corporation’s growing chorus of critics.108 Anonymous pamphleteers 
joined with celebrated French writers like Jean-François Melon, a former secretary of Law’s, to 
offer a new defense of corporate monopoly. While their writings were by no means coordinated, 
Company apologists reiterated themes consistent with their need to distance the corporation from 
Law. This exculpatory process entailed a reimagining of the Company’s place in French society. 
Advocates scaled down Law’s claims about the limitless economic growth created by overseas 
commerce and turned instead to traditional arguments about the regulation of labor and the utility 
of corporate privilege to justify the Company’s monopoly. In a flurry of polemics, published 
works, and special petitions, trade was thus recast from the linchpin of France’s financial 
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regeneration to a specialized vocation requiring experience, connections, and expertise. Such 
advocacy efforts speak to the overdetermined nature of Company monopoly in early-eighteenth-
century France—the meaning of which was constantly reworked to offer new perspectives on 
trade, society, and political order. 
The anonymous mémoire Si c’est l’intérêt de l’Etat que la Compagnie des Indes soit 
composée d’actionnaires ou qu’elle soit rendue royale, ou bien qu’elle soit donnée à une société 
de marchands reveals the broader implications of debates over corporate monopoly.109 Here the 
author considered two popular positions regarding the Company following Law’s bubble: the 
claim that the Company should be managed completely by the crown, and the argument that the 
Company should be dissolved and its trading privileges divided among various private 
commercial societies. After examining both perspectives, the essayist concluded that France 
could only hope to turn a profit in overseas trade if the Company retained its structure and 
trading rights. He offered a detailed description of commercial practice in India, and expounded 
on the difficulty of finding the right balance between regulation and autonomy needed to conduct 
long-distance commerce. He likewise lauded the Company’s investment structure, which 
committed a diverse set of shareholders to the expansion of overseas commerce, as well as its 
ability to mobilize royal credit for overseas expeditions. “In the hands of a capable leader,” he 
concluded, the Company “could do no wrong.”110  
The issue, for this memoirist, was to ensure that trade continued to be managed by the 
“capable” leadership of the Company, whose very office provided the credentials needed to 
conduct overseas commerce. He consequently examined the composition of other prominent 
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trading corporations in Europe, each of which enjoyed considerable independence from state 
officials. Juxtaposing the French Company with these other commercial institutions, the author 
insisted that the corporation should never be directly managed by the crown. A royal corporation 
would fall under the jurisdiction of the Chambre des comptes, the sovereign financial court of 
Paris; there the “shackles of protocol” would paralyze commercial enterprise. In this scenario, 
the Company would have to wait for the court’s permission to advance the sums needed for its 
annual trading operations.111 Since bureaucratic inertia would prevent the Chambre des comptes 
from giving consent in a timely manner, and the Company would be forced to rely on loans from 
the very same financiers who had destroyed the “System” to fund its commercial ventures. These 
unscrupulous men would lend the Company money at usurious rates of interest, profiting once 
again from the state’s misfortunes. Under crown management, trade would thus come “at a very 
dear price.”112 
A logical consequence of royal intervention into the Company was that the corporation 
would fall under the “dependency of the royal navy,” which already oversaw the defense and 
administration of parts of France’s colonial empire.113 Grounding his claims in the conventional 
belief that commerce and conquest were mutually exclusive practices, the essayist argued that 
placing the Company under the control of the navy would rob employees of the incentive to trade. 
“One could not hope,” the memoirist wrote, “that the officers of the king who would command 
the Company’s vessels in times of war would favor the needs of commerce.”114 Conditioned to 
prefer the pursuit of glory to that of commercial enterprise, these officials would instead abandon 
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their trading mission at the first “opportunity to showcase their valor and to acquire glory 
through combat.”115 While reiterating the argument that trade needed to be governed in order to 
be effective, the author diverged from Colbert and Law by portraying the Company as a source 
of sound commercial management. He thus insisted on the importance of the corporation as an 
intermediary institution that could pursue the crown’s trading goals of the state more effectively 
than the monarchy could on its own.  
Finally, the memoirist also considered claims that the Company should retrocede its 
trading rights to the private societies from which it had originally obtained them. These groups 
had become increasingly vocal after the collapse of the “System.” The aggrieved Malouin 
society, for instance, lobbied aggressively for the return of its commercial monopoly in India and 
China. Spearheaded by some of the city’s most influential shipbuilding and merchant families 
such as the Magons, this group petitioned patron within the Paris Parlement to pressure the 
monarchy into honoring its original contract.116 In response to this effort, the author once again 
turned to the problem of commercial efficiency. Private traders, he argued, were so blinded by 
the desire for short-term gains that they “see only the present”; these merchants possessed neither 
“the foresight nor sufficient funds” to practice overseas commerce.117 The memoirist contrasted 
the motives of these individual traders with those of Company’s shareholders, whom he depicted 
as selfless patriots. Even when they lacked mercantile “expertise,” stockholders supported the 
commercial interests of the nation by funding the efforts of experienced Company traders.118     
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 The author of the anonymous 1726 Mémoire pour la Compagnie des Indes echoed these 
claims, arguing that the retrocession of the Company’s trading privileges would destroy France’s 
commerce since “[individual] merchants only look after their own interests.”119 He likewise drew 
on the examples of the Dutch and the English, both of which had consolidated overseas 
commerce under large national corporations.120 Despite a tradition of entrepreneurialism and 
distaste for heavy-handed governance, neither country permitted free trade abroad. According to 
this writer, even “nations very jealous of their liberty” recognized that trade should be subject to 
some degree of regulation. When left alone, traders could not sustain the heavy losses that might 
occur in the early stages of a commercial enterprise, nor stay solvent over the several years it 
might take to turn a profit.121 A successful trading enterprise required the focus and structure of a 
large corporation, not the conflicting interests and insufficient capitalization of a few private 
merchants. Dozens of pro-Company mémoires written during the 1720s emphasized this same 
point, concentrating on the Company’s ability to float the capital needed to create new trading 
posts, negotiate with foreign dignitaries on behalf of the king, and defend French commercial 
interests. 
By promoting the Company as a commercial association, organized according to the 
practicalities of trade rather than the demands of public finance or the political projects of the 
absolutist state, these treatises also discredited the corporation’s critics. If the Company offered 
the most efficient model for foreign trade, the logic ran, those who denounced the institution 
must have done so out of either ignorance or self-interest. “It is difficult,” noted the author of one 
1726 treatise, “for those who have lost their fortunes through actions attributed to the Company 
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to examine this establishment calmly.”122 A 1720 mémoire made a similar claim, arguing that the 
“enraged” public lacked “the worldly knowledge” needed to judge the economic principles upon 
which the “System” and the Company were based.123 The Law affair thus compelled a diverse 
group of apologists—investors, members of the corporate directorate, and agents in the 
colonies—to redefine both the Company and the state of economic knowledge in France. Before 
an increasingly critical public, Company traders argued that they were specialists in commerce 
who operated according to their experience in foreign trade. In place of their relationship to the 
discredited economic policies of the crown, they grounded their authority in their mercantile 
credentials. 
Such views later resonated within several of the most prominent works on commercial 
science in the early eighteenth century. In two popular 1733 essays, the abbé de Saint-Pierre 
expounded on the economic, political, and social consequences of a well-run national trading 
company—all while cautioning against excessive intervention by the monarchy in foreign 
commerce. While Saint-Pierre believed that any expansion in trade would benefit France, he 
worried about the suitability of an absolutist government to the creation of any viable 
commercial system. Indeed, he argued that the French would have to alter many of their laws, 
political inclinations, and cultural practices in order to ensure the development of a trading 
society that could best exploit the “commerce of the Indies.”124 He thus proposed a string of 
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reforms intended to valorize trade among the French population: creating a company of noble 
cadets who would spent years learning about commerce and navigation at the Company’s 
headquarters in Lorient, thereby infusing a merchant corporation with noble blood;125 and 
restructuring the Company’s payment system so that directors received incentives for improving 
trade.126 These proposals, he insisted, would remove the social and political impediments that the 
absolutist state posed to the development of effective commercial practices, unifying the interests 
of individual merchants with those of France, and grounding Company policy in sound business 
practice. The celebrated French economic writer Jean-François Melon, who cut his teeth as 
secretary to John Law, made similar claims. In both technical works written about the 
administrative structure of the Company, and in his celebrated Essai politique sur le commerce 
(1734), Melon emphasized the importance of “liberty” in commercial operations—a freedom 
from the constrictive oversight of bureaucrats and ministers untutored in trade.127  
Law’s reputation wavered throughout the eighteenth century: he seemed at once to 
encapsulate both the shortsighted nature of absolutist economic policy and the innovative 
potential of public credit.128 The Company, though, survived both his fall from grace and his 
changing popular image. The continued support of the regency government, which had 
benefitted immensely from the consolidation of French debt under the “System” and entertained 
hopes of bringing John Law back to France once the clamor against him had settled, meant that 
the corporation retained the funding and political capital necessary to expand its commercial 
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operations throughout the 1720s. The integration of some of the Company’s most vocal critics 
into positions of administrative influence also muffled calls for its dissolution. While Pâris-
Duverney and other financiers who had opposed Law oversaw the corporation’s reform, many of 
the dispossessed members of the former Saint-Malo society became prominent investors and 
administrators.129  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter highlights the shifting agendas and ideological perspectives that shaped the 
early history of the Company. Although founded by a royal minister, supported through crown 
patronage, and tied to a commercial agenda worked out in Versailles, the corporation was never 
simply a state-building enterprise. From the political programs of Colbert to the polemics of 
post-System investors, many of the ideological justifications for corporate monopoly were 
worked out after the Company was founded. The corporation thus provided space for an array of 
competing interests and arguments—some of which supported the cause of crown centralization, 
some of which undercut the authority of the monarchy to oversee trade.   
From the very beginning, then, the Company represented a source of both controversy 
and conflict. Debates about the implications of crown-sponsored trade easily bled into larger 
questions about the composition and legitimacy of the absolutist state. These tensions would only 
grow as the French presence in India expanded. Just as Company apologists employed arguments 
about commercial utility to defend corporate privilege, so too would employees in India cite 
concerns over efficient trading practices to promote their authority over that of their handlers in 
Paris. The history of the Company thus cannot be divorced from the diverse interests, agendas, 
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and individuals that composed it. Built through the influence and intervention of the absolutist 
crown, the corporation provided a space from which to challenge and reinterpret its power.  
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CHAPTER 2: INTEREST, ABUSE, AND THE POLITICS OF COLONIAL TRADE  
 
The Company’s object is to favor and satisfy merchants, and deep down we cannot rely upon them 
to the enforce regulations against [those] merchants. 
—Mémoire from the Controller-General concerning Company smuggling 
 
Betrand-François Mahé de la Bourdonnais was one of the Company’s most polarizing 
employees. Born in 1699 in a Saint-Malo orphanage, he rose from humble origins to become the 
governor of Ile de France and Ile de Bourbon (the Mascarene Islands) in 1735. Along the way, 
he amassed a fortune through private trade, cultivated the patronage of powerful figures back in 
France, and made a number of well-placed enemies. To his admirers, La Bourdonnais was a 
model of private initiative; to his critics, he epitomized the corrupt nature of the Company’s 
administration. Whereas honest Company administrators in Paris “struggled to maintain a small 
carriage,” lamented the bibliophile Jean-François Mamet in a 1744 treatise, men like La 
Bourdonnais earned vast sums overseas.130 These employees exploited their offices, and their 
distance from supervisory authorities in France, for personal gain. They flouted the very 
regulations they were supposed to enforce, amassing great wealth through abusive practices. 
Distrust of La Bourdonnais and his motives would hound him throughout his career. In 1740, 
only a few years into his governorship of Ile de France and Ile Bourdon, he would complain that 
“the ministers, the Company, the public—in a word the entire world seemed to regard me with 
suspicion.”131  
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Misgivings about La Bourdonnais fueled criticism of the ambitious set of reforms that he 
enacted as governor. These reforms, and the opposition against them, are worth examining at 
length for what they tell us about the tensions plaguing Company commerce and politics. When 
La Bourdonnais took power in 1735, the Mascarene Islands were subject to a draconian set of 
commercial regulations: prohibited from trading outside the isles, inhabitants were forced to buy 
food, supplies, and slaves directly from the Company. Local industry and agriculture stagnated 
as the Company charged a mark-up of up to 150% on goods sold to the islands.132 After taking 
office in 1735, La Bourdonnais worked tirelessly to reinvigorate this flagging economy. The 
governor bolstered local food supplies by encouraging planters to cultivate rice, grain, and 
manioc alongside cash crops like coffee. He improved the islands’ infrastructure by raising 
bridges, constructing ships, and improving port facilities.133 And, most notably, he began a 
contentious campaign to overturn the Company’s injunction on commerce in Ile de France and 
Ile Bourbon. La Bourdonnais sent frequent petitions to France and, when recalled to Paris in 
1739, pled his case in person to the Controller-General, Philibert Orry—his long-time patron.  
 In his appeals, La Bourdonnais emphasized the unjust nature of the Company’s 
monopoly on goods sold to the islands. Exclusionary trading practices, he argued, must be 
imposed sensibly to ensure shared prosperity: “If one charges the isles with only buying from the 
Company, by all the laws of justice it [the Company] should supply them with all that they want 
to buy.”134 Rather than providing goods at reasonable rate, however, the Company charged 
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exorbitant prices that reduced the populace to penury. Arbitrary regulations exacerbated the 
abject conditions on the isles. Company officials condemned attempts to supplement the islands’ 
meager food supplies through private trade as “illicit and fraudulent commerce”— profiting from 
the misery of the local population by misapplying ordinances against contraband.135 As a remedy 
for this situation, La Bourdonnais proposed an alternative vision for island commerce based on 
mutual interest and reciprocal gain. He launched a small expedition from Ile Bourbon to Persia in 
1737 to illustrate the profitability of commerce in the Mascarenes, and implored the Company to 
exploit the weak Portuguese presence in eastern Africa to establish a slave trade in 
Mozambique.136 The governor hoped to transform Ile de France into the central French entrepôt 
in the Indian Ocean. Doubling as both a settler colony and a trading hub, the island would fuel 
commercial growth in the same way that Batavia did for the Dutch. It would also serve as a 
resupply station for French ships, a refuge for Company vessels during the monsoon season, and 
a treatment center for sick sailors.137  
 La Bourdonnais’s pleas did not fall on deaf ears. Orry approved a six-year (1742 to1748) 
suspension of the Company’s monopoly in Ile Bourbon and Ile de France. Obstacles to this free 
trade experiment, though, soon appeared. France’s entry into the War of the Austrian Succession 
seriously damaged its commercial interests in the Indian Ocean, and the Mascarene trade never 
turned the profits that La Bourdonnais predicted.138 Company politics further hindered La 
Bourdonnais’s plans. The Company’s directors in Paris feared that free trade on Ile de France 
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and Ile Bourbon would hinder France’s other commercial ventures in the Indian Ocean.139 Indeed, 
many believed that La Bourdonnais’s proposal was little more than a thinly veiled attempt to 
secure personal profits in the name of Company service.   
 The suspicious circumstances behind La Bourdonnais’s fortune added weight to these 
concerns. Jacques D’Eprémesnil, a prominent employee, believed that the governor’s policies 
were motivated entirely by self-interest. La Bourdonnais’s improvements to the infrastructure of 
Ile de France, he claimed, went against the “wishes of the Company” and “would never serve a 
use.”140 Charles Godehau, then a director in Paris, was more direct: “What can you say about the 
commercial liberty granted to the Isles? I do not think that one could find a better means for our 
man [La Bourdonnais] to make money without exposing himself to any blame.”141 In another 
letter written a week later, Godehau cautioned that the governor’s policies would bring about the 
“ruin” of the Company.142 Even allies like Benoît Dumas, the governor of Pondichéry, remained 
skeptical. Dumas worried about the feasibility of La Bourdonnais’s commercial schemes and 
expressed doubts that free trade would actually benefit the Company.143 La Bourdonnais was 
well connected, but so were the opponents to his plan; their continued resistance eroded 
ministerial support for his experiment. 
 La Bourdonnais’s failed project continues to attract debate. Whereas some scholars 
question both La Bourdonnais’s motives and the profitability of his schemes, others bemoan the 
Company’s rejection of his proposals. To these apologists, the failure of the free trade 
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experiment on Ile de France and Ile de Bourbon reveals many of the deficiencies that would 
ultimately doom the Company: rampant jealously among employees, a shortsighted 
administration in Paris, and an institution-wide aversion to innovation.144 La Bourdonnais helped 
create this narrative through a string of mémoires, depicting himself as a tragic figure beset by 
enemies ignorant of the Company’s true commercial needs. While self-serving, this account 
nonetheless highlights the contradictions that arose through the Company’s commercial activities. 
The Company’s monopoly was intended to facilitate the needs of both Company and crown by 
keeping overseas commerce centralized, equitable, and concentrated on a specific set of 
commodities. In practice, however, this focus often limited the Company’s ability to adapt to 
local political and economic conditions. The Company’s directors in France vacillated on trading 
policy—at times supporting the type of private enterprising that had made La Bourdonnais 
wealthy, at other times condemning it. They bemoaned the Company’s lack of credit among 
merchants and regional powerbrokers on the Indian subcontinent, all the while remaining 
suspicious of those employees whose wealth and connections could elevate the reputation of 
French commerce there. Company politics often played as important a role as financial need in 
determining the corporate policy. La Bourdonnais’s famous line, “I conduct my own business 
according to my knowledge, and that of the company according to its instructions,” was an 
exaggeration meant to reconcile his shortcomings as an administrator with his success as a 
                                                
144 French historians from the Third Republic have offered especially sympathetic revisionist narratives—their goal 
often being to legitimize France’s colonial activities in the nineteenth century by showing that the French had a long 
and successful tradition of colonial administration, and that the failures of France’s eighteenth-century empire had 
more to do with the social and political failings of the Old Regime than any deeper French dispositions against 
overseas trade and settlement. For such treatments see Adrien D’Epinay, Renseignements pour servir à l’histoire de 
l’ile de France (Ile Maurice: Nouvelle Imprimerie Dupuy, 1890), 96-98, and Georges Azéma, Histoire de l’Ile 
Bourbon, depuis 1643 jusqu’au 20 Décembre 1848 (Paris: Henri Plon, 1859), 64. For a summary of this 
historiographical tendency see Virginia Thompson, Dupleix and His Letters (1742-1754) (New York: Robert O. 
Ballou, 1933), 1-3.   
64 
private trader.145 Yet it also hints at the tense interplay between public finance and private 
interest, hierarchy and local initiative that infused the Company’s trading efforts. 
     This chapter examines the strains that developed from these commercial operations. 
Before the dust from fallout of the Mississippi Bubble had even settled, the challenges of 
governing and trading in the Indian Ocean exposed fundamental tensions within the Company’s 
policies and institutional structure. Central to these anxieties was a perceived disconnect between 
sanctioned Company practice and actual economic and political conditions on the subcontinent. 
Both within and without Company ranks, commentators questioned not only the efficiency of the 
corporation’s activities, but the deeper ideological foundations on which they were premised. 
Such concerns paralleled, referenced, and ultimately reframed key themes within early-modern 
political economy: from speculation about the nature of wealth to fears about the degenerative 
effects of luxury, and from prevailing assumptions about the relationship between corruption and 
virtue to suspicions about the utility of patrimonial tradition. Conflicts over Company practice in 
India thus gave way to broader questions about how the corporation fit within the political and 
social space of the Old Regime. 
 I focus in particular on three of the most divisive issues facing the Company as it 
expanded its commercial interests and political presence in India: the terms of the corporation’s 
monopoly, the balance between commercial regulation and free-trade initiatives, and the shifting 
boundaries between licit and illicit behavior among colonial employees. These institutional 
problems often overlapped, and remained a source of intense contestation until the dissolution of 
the Company in the 1760s. As La Bourdonnais’s arguments suggest, Company activities seemed 
to revolve around mutually exclusive imperatives. The corporation settled and managed colonial 
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populations while imposing extortionate monopolies on them; its employees labored to integrate 
themselves into local markets while honoring dictates hammered out in Paris; and its leaders 
sought to streamline its administration at the same time as they engaged in nepotism, favoritism, 
and other abusive practices. The struggle to reconcile these competing impulses within a 
harmonious colonial system remained a constant source of anxiety for the Company. Over time, 
these tensions raised doubts about whether Company activity could ever prove consistent with 
established notions of the public good.    
 
A Centralized and Directed Trade 
Within the commercial lexicon of the eighteenth century, few concepts inspired as much 
ambivalence as that of monopoly. Works of French jurisprudence typically used the term to 
describe abuses in commerce and manufacturing, equating monopoles with hoarding and price 
gouging. In 1721, for instance, a former director of the St. Malo-based Compagnie royale de la 
Chine was accused of being a “monopoleur” for secreting large quantities of “tea,” “porcelain,” 
“food,” and “clothing” in an Augustinian monastery.146 By the highpoint of the Enlightenment, 
monopoly had become synonymous with state-enforced inequality, conjuring images of 
exclusionary guild practices and arbitrary privileges enforced through royal fiat. As Anoush 
Terjanian has shown, the domestic and commercial implications of the term gradually aligned 
over the course of the eighteenth century to signal a blatant abuse of political power—regardless 
of the specific commodity being protected.147    
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Yet monopoly—whether in the form of corporate privilege or exclusive trading rights—
was also understood to perform important economic, social, and political functions. For the 
guilds and corporations that comprised the urban landscape of the Old Regime, the control of 
labor and production was seen as vital to the production of quality merchandise. If monopolies 
stifled competition, they also stood as a “form of rationalization” that offered a standard metric 
of quality for finished goods and limited volatile shifts in the market.148 As in England and the 
United Provinces, the ideological justifications for monopoly came from a long tradition of 
corporate government based on feudal contract.149 Whether in the form of a municipal 
constitution, university charter, or commercial privilege, Old Regime monopoly not only 
provided special rights and legal exceptions, but also represented a type of political jurisdiction. 
While controlling products and labor, they also managed people and places, linking them 
together in a hierarchical chain of being culminating in the divine power of the monarch. 
As La Bourdonnais’s complaints from the beginning of this chapter suggest, the balance 
between the productive and abusive qualities of Company monopoly was often a matter of 
context. Overseas trade stretched traditional justifications of monopoly to the breaking point, as 
geography, circumstance, and personal politics impacted the perceived equity of corporate 
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regulation. This problem was noted not only by Company insiders, but also by prominent French 
economic writers. Jean-François Melon, for instance, made the shifting implications of 
commercial monopoly a central feature of his celebrated 1734 treatise: the Essai politique sur le 
commerce. Melon focused in particular on the question of how to enforce monopolies within 
different colonial contexts. Like La Bourdonnais, he insisted that monopoles needed to be 
applied with “gentleness” and “equity” to overseas colonies—to be calibrated according to their 
specific political and economic circumstances.150 The Essai politique thus contrasted the impact 
of exclusive commercial rights on a city like Pondichéry, where the Company maintained a small 
population of employees, held few territorial ambitions, and relied heavily upon local merchants, 
with the corporation’s settler colony of Louisiana.151 Whereas in India monopoly offered much 
needed protection in a volatile foreign market, in North America it reduced colonists to penury 
and “servitude” by restricting opportunities for economic growth.152    
For Melon, monopoly was a Janus-faced political instrument. One the one hand, the 
regulations provided by the Company’s charter checked the selfish impulses of “human 
nature.”153 On the other hand, they rendered merchants “idle” by removing competition and 
shielding abusive practices under “the shelter of the law.”154 Overseas trade reproduced—and 
ultimately amplified—the asymmetries of France’s feudal system. The Company’s monopoly 
may have consolidated different territories and commodities under a rationalized administration, 
but it also fostered dependent markets, invidious categories of subjecthood, and exclusionary 
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practices. Meant to facilitate the “common good” by linking subjects around the world together 
under Company and, ultimately, crown authority, monopoly gave rise to competing interests that 
were not easily reconciled. In 1730, for example, a Nantais priest petitioned the crown in despair, 
noting that the Company’s exclusive control of the Guinea slave trade had robbed his 
parishioners of their livelihood. As his descriptions of a community emptied of “communicants” 
and devoid of “commerce” suggest, the advantages generated by corporate privilege ultimately 
came at the expense of others.155 Under Company monopoly, public interest and parochial 
agendas sat uncomfortably beside each other.   
In both France and India, the defense of monopoly rested mostly on its capacity to police 
employees and bolster the regulatory powers of the crown. Launched at the behest of the regent, 
Pâris-Duverney’s reforms streamlined the Company’s bureaucracy and punished the most blatant 
instances of corruption. These changes placed the Controller-General at the head of the corporate 
administration, and created the position of conseillers de roi, an independent office that served as 
the king’s personal representative to the Company. According to one shareholder in 1728, this 
combined administration “remedied many abuses and established a surer and more exact 
government that made [the Company’s] commerce more useful.”156 As this investor noted, the 
Company shipped goods with greater regularity in the aftermath of the reforms, and also 
expanded its commercial infrastructure by improving its factory-towns in India and establishing 
a resupply station in the Mascarene Islands.157 The crown’s continued commitment to the 
Company also helped offset poor returns in the early 1720s, especially after the king agreed to 
renew the corporation’s monopoly on tobacco customs. Only a few years after the collapse of the 
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“System,” the Company’s previously moribund Asian and Guinean trade was, for the first time, 
profitable enough to cover all of its annual operating costs, bringing in nearly 3,000,000 livres in 
1727.158 
Overseas, the Company’s connection with the crown and its resources helped bring it 
credibility among native lenders. One 1728 mémoire lauded the crown for “remedying abuse,” 
maintaining an “efficient administration,” and guaranteeing the regular “returns of its vessels.”159 
Company agents often measured commercial success through the multi-layered concept of 
credit; this term referred both to the status French merchants enjoyed among indigenous 
suppliers and buyers and, as a consequence of this reputation, the Company’s ability tap into 
local money markets. Crown management improved French credit by ensuring a regular demand 
of goods from Europe, sizeable infusions of bullion, and improvements in the Company’s 
infrastructure. In a 1727 report commissioned by the then governor of Pondichéry, Pierre-
Christophe Lenoir, Joseph Dupleix (a future governor himself) wrote that one of the new 
building projects supported by this funding, the city’s new ring of walls, had “reduced fraud,” 
put the “local inhabitants at rest,” “augmented the Company’s farms,” and sowed “confidence” 
among resident Indian merchants. As a result, the new fortifications contributed to a revenue 
increase of 20,000 pagodas over the previous three years.160 With greater infusions of bullion, 
Company agents also gained the favor of local officials such as Imam Sahib, an influential 
military official in the court of the Nawab of Arcot161  
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Yet the crown’s role in the Company’s commercial operations also raised serious 
concerns. Even employees who supported the basic premises of crown-sponsored monopoly still 
objected to the monarchy’s management of corporate affairs. In France, the complaints mostly 
concerned the bureaucratic waste generated by royal administrators. “It is surprising,” wrote a M. 
Ramont in a 1730 treatise, “that for a business like the Compagnie des Indes, there are four 
inspectors, nine directors of commerce” and an “extraordinary quantity of useless commissioners” 
who, together, create “unnecessary expenses and contribute steadily to the ruin of the 
Company.”162 Jacques Deshayes, a director from 1723 to 1730, voiced similar concerns. 
According to him, the “Company could easily be managed in Paris by three or four directors and 
five or six commissioners and, consequently, incur much lower administrative costs.”163 As 
critics of the Company often argued in the wake of the Mississippi Bubble, unscrupulous 
ministers exploited this excessive bureaucracy to award positions and contracts to their favorites. 
The crown’s involvement in the Company reduced efficiency and provided license for the very 
same abusive practices that royal officials were supposed to police. 	  A series of administrative reforms launched in 1730 by the new Controller-General, 
Philibert Orry, addressed some of these objections by reducing the size of many the Company’s 
offices.164 More serious resistance, though, came from those involved directly in Company 
trading operations. Among these merchants and administrators, opposition focused not just on 
specific problems such as a bloated bureaucracy, but also on the limited commercial knowledge 
of the Company’s directors, royal handlers, and the clients they appointed to oversee trading 
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operations in India. Dupleix, for instance, complained that the Company granted power to 
royally appointed governors “of mediocre experience” while ignoring Pondichéry’s conseil 
supérieur, which possessed “greater or equal” expertise in commerce and colonial 
administration.165 A treatise written to the Controller-General from Nantes in 1726 echoed this 
claim, lamenting the influence of crown officials who lacked proficiency in commercial matters, 
and who crafted policy according to the politics of the court.166  
Unsurprisingly, a sense of aggravation pervades much of the early correspondence 
between the Company and the conseil supérieur in Pondichéry. Despite positive returns from 
India in the late 1720s, the French struggled to generate consistent profits outside the Company 
settlement of Chandernagor in Bengal. Among the councilors’ chief complaints was a lack of 
accountability by their corporate superiors and the insufficiency of funds available for commerce. 
Take one letter written by members of the Pondichéry council in response to ongoing criticisms 
by the Parisian directors about the poor quality of textiles coming from India: “the reasons are 
not difficult to know…the lack of funds here forces us to do in a few days [placing orders for 
goods] what other nations do in the course of a year…if we had more money in advance, we 
could commission better weavers.”167 The conseil complained frequently about commercial 
strategies hammered out in Paris, which concentrated on sending a small number of goods 
annually from India to France rather than experimenting with the potentially lucrative “country” 
or intra-Asian trade.168 Part of the councilors’ criticism stemmed from their desire to profit 
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individually from this type of commerce, but their complaints nonetheless highlight a key 
drawback of the Company’s centralized administration. From a distant headquarters, the 
Company struggled to adjust to the challenges and opportunities created by a foreign market. 
 That conseils of the Company’s other comptoirs registered a similar set of grievances 
against the councilors of Pondichéry—who declaimed against the heavy handedness and 
ignorance of the Parisian directors but then demanded obedience from the rest of the French 
Indian settlements while possessing limited knowledge of conditions within them—speaks 
further to this tension between regulation and commercial growth.169 Employees in the colonies 
complained about the despotic administration of their immediate superiors; these administrators 
in turn criticized the shortsighted and oppressive management of the directors in Paris and their 
royal handlers. The Company’s chronic shortages of shipping and money added fuel to the 
critical fire, reminding detractors that crown supervision did little to improve commercial 
efficiency.  
 These practical failings informed a powerful ideological critique concerning the equity of 
crown rule. According to Melon, the abbé de Saint-Pierre, and a string of other economic writers, 
deficiencies in Company trading practice reflected the deeper inadequacies of absolutist 
government. Compared to republics and moderate monarchies (as in England and the United 
Provinces), absolutist kings struggled to generate public confidence and cultivate commercial 
expertise. An enduring question of early-modern political economy was how the constituent 
elements of a given society—its laws, practices, institutions, and habits—fit together as a 
coherent whole. From this perspective, the shortcomings of the Company’s monopoly were part 
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of a systemic series of faults. Corporate regulation not only impeded commerce, it interfered 
with sound government and disrupted the interlocking set of interests on which the monarchy 
built its empire. While projecting royal authority to new lands and markets, Company monopoly 
also diminished the crown’s sovereign reach by producing new tyrannies overseas. 
Monopoly thus stood, at once, as a viscous economic practice and a regulatory instrument 
that policed the morals of corporate employees, an exclusive commercial license and a form of 
indenture to the crown. Questions abounded over this confused bundle of juridical, institutional, 
political, and moral definitions: Did exclusive trading rights curb corruption, or encourage it? 
Did Company privilege facilitate commercial operations abroad, or hinder trade by shackling the 
Company to the dictates of inexperienced royal officials? Did monopoly facilitate the public 
good, or merely support a specific set of partisan interests? The reinforcing of a top-heavy 
command structure, with added regulatory powers and an emphasis on the accountability of 
employees, was one of the Company’s most significant post-“System” reforms. Yet for all the 
benefits created by institutional restructuring, this emphasis on a centralized and hierarchical 
administration created enduring problems in both France and the subcontinent.  
 
Profit-Seeking and Public Interest 
 
Located on India’s western or Malabar Coast, the French settlement at Mahé dealt 
primarily in coral, spices, and pepper. Company representatives established the comptoir in 1721 
through an agreement signed with the Bayanour of Bargaret, ruler of the small princely state of 
Kadattanad, which permitted them to trade on his land. The machinations of Robert Adam, the 
British governor in nearby Tellicherry, however, delayed Company attempts to settle in the 
region. Eager to prevent French encroachment on the Malabar pepper trade, Adam incited a civil 
war in Kadattanad, attacked Company outposts around Mahé, and pushed the Bayanour to 
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abrogate his agreement. A French squadron led by Mahé de la Bourdonnais eventually relieved 
the settlement in 1725, landing a force of 250 soldiers and 100 sailors.170 The damage to the 
town, though, had been done; years of conflict frustrated French trading efforts in the region, 
saddling the settlement with a considerable debt.           
Mahé was subject to a constant strain, torn between alluring commercial prospects and 
the material realities that constrained them. When the French established the comptoir in 1721, 
pepper was in high demand both in Europe and along regional trading circuits in the India Ocean. 
Indeed, the price of this commodity rose by 50% between 1722 and 1739.171 The Company 
required Mahé’s employees to meet an annual quota for pepper, as well as the other goods 
available in the settlement. Yet regional conflicts and the costs of Mahé’s garrison depleted the 
funds set aside by the Company for these purchases. As one specialist notes, “it was money, 
always money” that proved the limiting factor in the comptoir’s commercial growth.172 The 
constant lack of funding forced town administrators to rely on independent French traders 
operating along the Malabar Coast to develop Company commerce in the region. These 
merchants bought surplus pepper from the cash-strapped Company merchants to sell within local 
markets. Necessity thus created the conditions for a thriving private trade—one in which 
Company employees, who faced a shifting set of prohibitions against independent commercial 
activity, often engaged.  
Private trade proved integral to European commercial operations in India. In the 
seventeenth century, the English East India Company condemned independent merchants as 
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“interlopers,” and sought royal sanction to punish them.173 Over time, however, the corporation 
relaxed these restrictions, allowing employees to pursue individual trading commitments 
throughout the Indian Ocean and Asia. As Emily Erickson argues, these efforts not only reduced 
the Company’s costs, but also improved its access to local capital and its ability to navigate 
regional markets.174 The French, for their part, depended on private trade to sustain their less 
profitable settlements. Prominent employees like Pierre Duvalaer, who eventually served as a 
director in Paris, made their start as independent merchants. Company agents were also allowed 
to engage in private commerce, though this license was occasionally revoked or reduced during 
the 1720s and 1730s. Even when they restricted this commerce, however, many of the 
Company’s top administrators secretly encouraged it by sending money and promising favor to 
employees who traded on their behalf.  
French merchants plied a variety of regional routes, trading in coastal settlements along 
the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, and the Straits of Malacca, and sending shipments 
as far as China and the Philippines. This “country” trade, so-called because it concentrated on 
markets in Asia and the Indian Ocean rather than on the export of goods to France, yielded 
excellent returns in the 1720s. In the late 1730s and early 1740s, however, a civil war among the 
Safavid rulers of Persia, and on ongoing drought and famine in India on the Coromandel Coast, 
reduced the profitability of these routes.175 Still, for cash-strapped employees in settlements like 
Mahé, private trade remained an effective solution to recurring fiscal crises. Yearly funds sent 
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from France to Mahé often arrived late—or sometimes not at all. The large profits generated by 
the “country” trade, by contrast, could be used immediately to purchase more pepper. 
Policymakers in Paris weighed the benefits of this commercial activity with the various 
challenges it created—struggling, in the process, to adopt a consistent position. After all, the 
demands of these local trading networks were almost always in tension with the Company’s 
broader commercial agenda. In Mahé, the “country” trade facilitated the development of Mahé’s 
pepper industry, but it also diverted commodities earmarked for France to more lucrative 
regional markets.  
The town’s 1739 pepper scandal underscores this tension. Nearly insolvent after its 1725 
war with the Bayanour, town officials commissioned private merchants to buy pepper on the 
Company’s behalf. Although Mahé had enough money to purchase this commodity on its own 
after 1728, the town’s employees continued to rely on private traders and their lucrative regional 
connections. Instead of commissioning independent traders to float the capital for Company 
pepper quotas, these officials began to sell surplus quantities to these merchants at an 8% 
surcharge, investing the profits in the town’s infrastructure. Throughout the 1730s, private 
societies such as Bonaventure Louet’s Société de Mahé flourished, exploiting the high local 
demand for pepper—and their easy access to discounted sources of the commodity—to expand 
their role in the “country” trade. Even with its mark-up, the Company’s prices for these 
middlemen were roughly 15% cheaper than those of the open market.176 Private traders thus 
eagerly purchased Mahé’s pepper surplus. 
Initially, this arrangement seemed to meet the needs of all the parties involved. The 
Company received regular infusions of specie, while private merchants gained cheap and easy 
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access to the region’s pepper.177 Such a compromise, however, proved untenable in the long run. 
The division between private and Company commerce, unclear in the best of circumstances, 
became particularly muddled in Mahé as many of its councilors and employees began investing 
in societies such as Louet’s. As more members of the Company became involved in private trade, 
the comptoir stopped meeting its pepper quotas—all this despite the fact that independent 
merchants operating out of Mahé continued sending private expeditions to Mocha, Basra, and 
China during the same period.178 
            Over time, the conseil supérieur in Pondichéry grew suspicious of the commitment of the 
comptoir’s employees to the Company’s trading interests, blaming “the poor administration of 
[Mahé’s] council” for the years of diminishing pepper returns.179 Tensions came to a head in 
April 1739, when several key figures in the comptoir’s administration—Bunel, who served as a 
councilor, as well as Louet and another employee, Saint-Martin—replaced a ship transporting 
private freight to the port of Mocha, L’Heureux, with a Company vessel, La Marie Joseph, 
which was carrying “equipment” to the French outpost at Pegu in Persia. While initially 
perplexed over why Bunel and his accomplices had switched the ships, the conseil supérieur 
quickly guessed the reason: whereas La Marie Joseph was in “good condition” and “well 
crewed,” L’Heureux was “leaky,” and its sailors “completely exhausted” after a fifteen-month 
voyage.180 Bunel and his associates ensured the safety of their goods by placing them in the most 
seaworthy vessel available in Mahé. They had openly neglected their obligations to the Company 
in favor of private enterprise, seemingly confirming the conseil superieur’s fear that officials in 
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Mahé had been reselling Company pepper through the city’s private societies. 
The councilors in Pondichéry responded to these transgressions by dismissing the 
entire administrative council of Mahé and placing Bunel, Louet, and Saint-Martin under house 
arrest in mid April. Not all of the councilors, however, accepted their punishment gracefully. 
Bunel fled his home on the night of the sixteenth or seventeenth, “leaving no trace by sea or land.” 
Suspicions of complicity immediately fell on his erstwhile accomplice, Louet, who lived so close 
next door that “it seemed impossible that” he or “several of his servants could not have seen his 
movements by the light of the moon.”181 It was not until 3 May that Bunel was found hiding in 
the house of a Company gunner, where he was promptly rearrested and taken to the fort of 
Mahé.182 He would eventually be recalled to France. Louet would return to Europe to plead his 
case as well. Better connected employees like George Duval de Leyrit, the future governor of 
Pondichéry, were quickly forgiven of any crimes and allowed to return to Mahé.183 As was 
frequently the case in Company courts, sentencing varied according to the degree of influence 
that an employee commanded. 
While the Company’s punishment of individual crime varied, its reaction to the Mahé 
affair itself was unwaveringly severe. The directors in Paris used the incident as an excuse to 
launch into a general denunciation of private commerce. In their correspondence with 
Pondichéry, they called officials on the conseil superieur “equally reprehensible [as the 
employees in Mahé] for knowing of similar incidences and not reporting them to the 
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Company.”184 Having long protested against violations of Company trading policies by 
employees overseas, the Paris directors were quick to use the scandal as a pretext for denouncing 
the corruption, abuse, and “low regard for the interests of the Company” that seemed to 
characterize French commercial activity throughout India.185  
If this stern rebuke had been the end of the affair, the 1739 scandal would merely 
represent one sensationalized example in a long line of disagreements over the trading ambitions 
of Company employees. The pepper crisis, though, continued to inspire contentious debate for 
several decades. While the directors seethed and the councilors in Pondichéry demurred, 
Company employees took it upon themselves to judge the implications of the Mahé scandal. 
Jacques d’Eprémesnil—the onetime head of the Company’s council in Madras after the French 
conquest of the city—offered perhaps the most vocal reaction to the affair in his 1755 Sur le 
Crédit de la Nation dans l’Inde, where he lamented the long-term consequences of the 
Company’s reaction to the incident. The Company’s directors, he argued, failed to calibrate their 
trading policies according to the diverse political and economic circumstances within each of the 
comptoirs.186  
            The incident in Mahé turned from an extreme and public case of abuse by colonial 
officials to a more general indictment of arbitrary regulation and the Company’s limited 
commercial vision. According to d’Eprémesnil, the directors’ response introduced the disastrous 
notion “that the Company would look with disfavor on all employees who enriched themselves 
by legitimate means.”187 In Pondichéry, members of the council used the circumstances 
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surrounding the affair as evidence that the Paris directors knew little about the actual practice of 
trade. While continuing to blame employees in Mahé for neglecting their duties in the pursuit of 
“private interests,” the councilors blasted the Company for imposing heavy duties on goods 
entering the Malabar Coast, which prevented ships from Basra, China, and Macao from selling 
their wares in the French port.188 According to the council, unjust Company prohibitions had 
pushed the employees in Mahé down a destructive path by impeding the commercial 
development of the comptoir.189  
D’Eprémesnil elaborated on this claim in his 1755 treatise. Like the Pondichéry 
councilors, he argued that the Mahé scandal was symptomatic of a more general problem: the 
failure of Company directors to understand market conditions on the subcontinent. 
Administrators in Paris grumbled about the Company’s lack of profitability while at the same 
time condemning men like Louet, who in his “long stay at Mahé had acquired a perfect 
knowledge of the language, customs and commerce of the country”190—attributes necessary for 
commercial success. D’Eprémesnil argued that the development of a robust private trade was the 
most assured way of acquiring credit among indigenous lenders in the French-occupied regions 
of the subcontinent. He saw in the Mahé affair a perfect example of how the Company 
mismanaged its affairs. Company directors ignored the pleas of employees in India while 
allowing misplaced suspicion, imperfect understandings of commercial science, and political 
circumstances in France to dictate their policies. 
            To be sure, d’Eprémesnil’s account overlooked key details about the Mahé affair, 
including the seemingly clear complicity of Bunel, Louet, and Saint-Martin in defrauding the 
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Company. There were good reasons for such an omission. D’Eprémensil had begun his career in 
India as a private trader, and his brother, Georges de Leyrit, was heavily implicated in the pepper 
scandal. The entire focus of d’Eprémesnil’s essay was on the failure of the Company’s efforts to 
support credit-acquiring ventures in India, and his emphasis on the economic fallout from the 
Mahé controversy strengthened his overarching claims. Nonetheless, d’Eprémesnil’s 
interpretation of this incident highlights a problem that had become obvious to employees early 
in the Company’s trading operations in India. The issue of private trade by Company employees 
represented a significant stumbling block in relations between those undertaking commerce in 
India and those regulating it in France. What on the one side constituted innovation and local 
initiative seemed to the other like self-interested abuse. These divergent perspectives reflected a 
fundamental disagreement within the Company over the compatibility of profit seeking and 
private enterprise with the obligations of public service. 
Unlike its English rivals, the French Company lacked the institutional framework to 
incorporate and control private trading interests. The Compagnie des Indes was not a joint-stock 
corporation run by shareholders; and as we have seen, merchants had little say over policy 
decisions made by the crown and the Company’s directors.191 At some points, the Company 
assumed direct control of all commerce in India; at others, it delegated the “country” trade 
entirely to private merchants. Reversals in policy occurred quickly: “nothing,” argued the 
celebrated scholar of the Company Alfred Martineau, “was more capricious” than the 
Company’s approach to private commerce.192 While the Paris directors decided to extricate the 
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Company from “country” trade and relegate it to independent merchants in 1722, they 
abandoned this proposal in 1724 at the behest of the conseil supérieur of Pondichéry. 
Compounding the confusion was the fact that private traders often could not succeed without the 
Company’s investment capital. The Company’s renewed commitment to the “country” trade in 
1724 represented a response to this problem: the Pondichéry Council feared that commerce 
would wither without the small annual investment of 10,000 pagodas that the Company allowed 
its employees to commit to intra-Asian trade. The 1730s saw a similar trend, with the Company 
withdrawing from local trading obligations in 1734 only to return to it with new vigor in 1737.193 
Throughout this period, and beyond, Company employees continued to trade on their own—a 
factor that only exacerbated the directors’ struggles to craft effective commercial policy.  
 Private trade was problematic because it introduced the specter of destructive personal 
interests into the Company’s commercial operations. The renowned French Sanskirt scholar 
Anquetil Duperron described this problem in his widely read travel journal. Here he complained 
that the Company’s employees “were rarely concerned with their nation, ” and that they sought 
only to improve their station by acquiring wealth. When frustrated in their designs, they either 
deserted or descended into “idleness.”194 Mamet was also critical of private trade and its 
implications in his history of the Company, where he dismissed free enterprise as “the spirit of 
interest, avidity, and the desire to make an immense profit during a short period of time.”195 Both 
opponents and defenders of the Company worried about the corrosive effects of pecuniary 
interest on employees stationed abroad. Even as private trade promised to improve liquidity in 
                                                
193 Manning, Fortunes à faire, 28. 
194 Anquetil Duperron, Voyage en Inde: Relation de Voyage en préliminaire à la traduction du Zend-Avesta, 1754-
1762 (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1997), 90.  
195 BNF, MF 14.931, Mamet, Idée de la Compagnie des Indes. 
83 
France’s beleaguered Indian settlements, it also threatened to lure Company agents into corrupt 
and self-serving practices.  
 In France, trade and the economic interests associated with it inspired ambivalence. As 
John Shovlin has shown in his study of mid-eighteenth-century works of political economy, 
many among France’s middling nobility were repelled by commercial self-interest, equating the 
unrestricted pursuit of profit with the covetous actions of crown financiers and other 
plutocrats.196 Everyday people traded, conducted business, and established elaborate networks of 
credit. But French intellectual culture remained in many ways rooted in a humanist worldview 
that rejected materialism in favor of glory and abstemious virtue.197 In the 1730s, however, 
France also experienced an upsurge in Anglophilic literature defending trade and its effects. 
Voltaire praised commerce in his 1734 Letters on England, arguing that merchants enriched the 
nation, safeguarded the liberties of the British nation, and improved the human condition by 
moving necessary goods to new markets.198 From Montesquieu to later theorists like the Gournay 
Circle and physiocrats, a growing segment of eighteenth-century French writers embraced 
commerce as a means of social and moral improvement.  
Within the Company, concerns over the “country” trade centered both on the moral 
ramifications of private interest and on the more immediate problems of commercial efficiency 
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and employee satisfaction. As Duvalaer wrote after his tenure as a private trader, “Nothing is 
better able to increase the zeal of employees for the service of the Company than the small profit 
that they can find in the private commerce permitted to them.”199 While the allure of profits 
could override employee’s loyalty to both the Company and the state, it could also reinforce 
these commitments. Even Mamet, who so criticized the avarice of Company employees, saw the 
motivational problems that could occur by eliminating opportunities for private wealth: “What 
came of that maxim of legislation sent to the comptoirs a few years ago, that is, that employees 
of the company should abandon any idea of making a profit? Who would not feel the turpitude 
and dangerous consequences of the promulgation of a similar law?”200 
 While weighing the productive benefits and moral risks of unrestricted private trade in 
India, Company administrators also faced more practical concerns. If the Company allowed its 
employees to trade privately, how would it regulate such operations to ensure that they proved 
beneficial rather than detrimental to Company operations? The frustration arising from its system 
of pacotilles and ports-permis speaks to this challenge. Derived from Spanish, a pacotille was, 
according to Savary des Bruslons, “a certain weight, volume, or quantity merchandise permitted 
to officers, sailors, and crewmen to trade for their own accounts.” Separate from the regular 
cargo of a ship, it was theoretically regulated by a “verbal agreement” with the ship owner, 
though in practice the Company set standard limits on private freight.201 The Company first 
permitted the use of pacotilles in 1722, imagining they would subsidize the low salaries it paid to 
its employees. Almost from the beginning, however, this arrangement served as a catalyst for 
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illicit trade.202 In June 1726, the Company responded to the ongoing threat of smuggling by 
arranging a reward system for informants who denounced employees using their pacotilles to sell 
contraband, awarding them a quarter of the value of any merchandise confiscated as a result of 
the information they provided.203 After two captains, Le Brun de la Franquerie and Briand de la 
Feuilée, were convicted of fraud in Rennes in 1733, it tightened its guidelines. The Company 
replaced the pacotilles with the more standardized port-permis and limited the amount of 
sanctioned freight to 165 piastres for officers, 12 for sailors, 6 for novices, and 2 for apprentice 
sailors.204  
The 1733 regulation reflected the Company’s twin goals of supervising private commerce 
and using profits to generate loyalty among its employees. Before this reform, it was up to the 
individual sailor or officer to negotiate the sale of pacotilles; after 1733 employees received a 
fixed sum determined by the amount of cargo they were permitted to carry by rank.205 Yet while 
these guidelines guaranteed individual profits, they did little to halt the flow of smuggled goods. 
Given the hidden nature of the contraband trade, it is difficult to tell exactly how much money 
the Company lost through the misuse of the port-permis system. Considering the great distances 
involved in its trade, the ease of manipulating ship manifests, and the complicity of port officials 
in offloading contraband, though, abuse likely abounded. Unscrupulous captains and officers 
appropriated the cargos allotted to their sailors to sell more of their own goods, as one extract 
from 1749 complained.206 They offloaded their private cargo onto fishing ships six or seven 
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miles out to sea, thereby avoiding inspection in a French port,207 or sold excess merchandise 
within restricted zones such as the Mascarene Islands. As Michael Kwass has shown, an “illicit 
economy” based on the smuggling of tobacco, calicoes, and other New World and Asian 
commodities blossomed in France in the eighteenth century. Traffickers were organized, armed, 
and closely connected to Company agents.208 
Against these abusive practices, the Company had limited recourse. It could, for instance, 
reduce the amount of cargo permitted by the port-permis regulations, as it did on 31 August 
1745,209 or streamline the system by eliminating certain exceptions and qualifications.210 Neither 
approach, however, offset the Company’s limited enforcement ability, especially against ships at 
sea. In the most extreme cases, officials in France would refuse to honor the sale of any port-
permis, as they did in response to the rampant “falsification and theft” that took place on two of 
its ships returning from China in 1760.211 This measure, however, also nullified the potential 
benefits of the port-permis system, and seems to have been rarely employed.   
Whether discussed in debates about cargo dispensations or on the proper way of 
conducting intra-Asian commerce, the concept of private trade provoked basic questions about 
the Company’s institutional structure and agenda. Personal enterprise both reinforced and 
weakened the monopolistic principles on which the Company was founded. Even ardent 
advocates of free trade in the 1720s and 1730s recognized the need for a centralized commercial 
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authority that could quickly infuse the colonial market with capital. At the same time, a number 
of merchants and administrators argued that a uniform system of exclusive trading rights could 
hamper rather than encourage Company commerce. While monopolistic commercial practices 
proved suitable for the Indian subcontinent, for instance, they were impractical in a different 
context like the Mascarene Islands. By engaging in “country” trade, moreover, Company 
merchants often found themselves trucking in unusual goods that, to quote director Pierre 
Duvalaer, were “unsuited for Europeans.”212 As employees adapted to the market rhythm of 
commodities as banal as rice and as exotic as elephants, the limitations of commercial strategies 
created in Paris became more apparent. Finally, the pressures of colonial commerce also exposed 
the inadequacy of the Company’s institutional safeguards.  The Company struggled to enforce 
prohibitions—on smuggling, profiteering, or peculation—both on trading ships and in its far-
flung entrepôts.  
Debates over private commerce drew attention to a fundamental question: who, or what, 
should govern trade in India? In this confused climate, little was clear about the Company’s 
proper course of action. Should merchants in India adapt to commercial circumstances in an 
attempt to make a profit? Should they adhere rigorously to regulations and a conception of the 
public good handed down by the crown, even if these proved detrimental trade? Company 
employees, colonial administrators, and royal officials failed to arrive at a consensus about these 
questions. As a result, they also struggled to develop a common perspective on the effectiveness 
of the Company’s commercial efforts, and on its ability to serve the needs of the state. 
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The Ambiguities of “Abuse” 
 
In a posthumously published memoir advocating the creation of a series of literary 
societies that would discuss trade, Jacques d’Eprémesnil examined the prevalence of abuse in 
commercial enterprise. His take on this issue was rather unusual. Rather than attempt to 
distinguish sound commercial practices from abusive ones, he argued that it was instead better to 
determine when abuse served a productive role and when it did not. According to him, abuse fell 
into two categories: the “harmful” and the “useful.” By his definitions, “The harmful instances 
are those that interfere with the course of affairs and spoil finances. Useful instances, by contrast, 
are those that encourage the course of affairs without negatively impacting finances.”213 For 
d’Eprémesnil, the task of any political leader was to distinguish between these two types of 
abuse, and to encourage the positive while suppressing the negative; doing so, he claimed, would 
lead to “immense advantages” in the “handling of affairs”214  
D’Eprémesnil set out to bridge the gap between commercial practice and commercial 
theory, to show that trading activities should be judged by how they impacted the bottom line—
and the broader political goals of the state—rather than by whether or not they adhered to 
specific regulations. Such an argument was a logical follow-up to his commentary on the Mahé 
affair, where he criticized the Company’s directors for condemning private trade without 
considering its potential merits. As with his treatment of this incident, D’Eprémesnil glossed 
over potential problems and counterarguments. While he expounded clearly on the benefits of 
this type of regulatory dichotomizing, he offered little real advice on how to put it into practice. 
D’Eprémesnil may not have been completely convinced of his own argument, or at least fearful 
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of its reception: he crossed out this section on abuse in one of his drafts.215 Yet for both its 
limitations and the misgivings it possibly inspired, d’Eprémesnil’s argument got to the very heart 
of the ongoing disagreements between the powers regulating Company trade in Paris and those 
responsible for conducting it in India.  
For employees and administrators in the colonies, questions of usefulness and efficiency 
factored heavily in deciding what guidelines to follow and which ones to ignore. Since these 
concepts proved difficult to define, though, they often sparked conflict; what was represented as 
efficient policy in one context might be seen as harmful practice from another. This problem was 
especially pronounced in the Company’s trading operations, where the lines between political, 
economic, and military concerns often blurred. Company officials often disagreed on what 
activities facilitated the needs of the corporation and what constituted harmful practices, a 
problem with both practical and deeper ideological implications. This ambivalence lent itself to 
ambiguous policy and hesitant administration. 
 Scholars have at times overstated the revolutionary nature of European commerce in the 
late seventeenth and eighteenth century; merchants in the Middle East, Asia, and Italian city-
states anticipated many of the period’s key innovations, such as the evolution of credit-based 
economies, by several centuries.216 Still, this era bore witness to significant changes to economic 
knowledge, popular attitudes toward trade, and the level of state participation in commercial 
ventures. As we have seen in the anxious theorizing of the Regency years, these shifts created a 
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sense of crisis across Europe. According to Amalia Kessler, the eighteenth century witnessed a 
reconceptualization of commerce within the popular imaginary; among French nobles, economic 
writers, and Enlightenment thinkers, a growing obsession with profit replaced earlier visions of 
commerce as a virtuous and equitable exchange. Long despised activities such as fraud and 
speculation were reinterpreted as regrettable but necessary byproducts of this commercial 
revolution—or perhaps even the engines of financial growth.217 In France, popular culture 
struggled to keep pace with, and offer a consistent way of assessing, economic change. 
Company commerce further exposed the inadequacy of existing economic frameworks. 
Across Europe, commercial theorists, ministers, and jurists struggled not only to determine the 
consequences of monopolistic practices and the untrammeled pursuit of private, but also to 
define the nature of wealth itself. Company debates turned frequently on this problem, and the 
questions it sparked. Was wealth calculable—something that could be measured in yearly returns, 
or quantified by the Company’s ability to meet its annual obligations to shareholders? Was it a 
reflection of population and cultural capital? Or was it a marker of political power, embodied in 
the influence and authority of the French king. Distance and poor communication added to the 
confusion: critics in both France and the Company’s outposts often judged policy based on 
inadequate information, and personal agendas and antagonisms shaped basic assumptions about 
wealth, profit, and commercial success. The practical concerns posed by the Company’s unclear 
agenda, ambiguous relationship with the state, and far-flung trading interests only fueled French 
misgivings about—and misunderstandings of—commercial development in the eighteenth 
century. 
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In this uncertain climate, there was no easy consensus on what was good or, to borrow 
d’Eprémesnil’s metric, “useful.” Consider the speculative practices that infused Company 
investment. The collapse of Law’s system led to a widespread denunciation of speculation 
(agiotage). Some critics linked speculative activity to France’s despised class of court financiers, 
whose influence had risen after the War of the Spanish Succession crippled the French economy. 
Others, such as the financier Nicolas Dutot, refocused this criticism toward the crown and its 
harmful manipulation of the French currency.218 In either case, concerns over speculation tapped 
into a broader set of political and social anxieties. Alongside fear and condemnation, however, 
sat a countercurrent of arguments that focused on the potential benefits that speculative activity 
could offer to society. The debate between opponents and supporters of speculation touched 
directly on the large-scale, credit-based transactions on which Company commerce was built.  
Defenders of speculative activity argued that it posed only a small threat to the interests 
of either the Company or the state. As one memoirist pointed out in the anonymously authored 
Mémoire sur les Causes du Discrédit fait en Mai 1726, “What harm does speculation really 
cause the state? It occurs between a certain number of adventurers who often trick one another; 
gains and losses flow back and forth between them, all of which is of little concern to the rest of 
the world.”219 Speculators got what they deserved, and the broader financial community suffered 
little for it. Moreover, their efforts proved fundamental to the advancement of commerce. 
Speculation was common to all trade, as were duplicity and bad faith. “The value of a 
commodity is fixed by the buyer. If there are no buyers, it has no value; one needs both buyers 
for whom the commodity has value, and whose intention is to diminish the price of things, just as 
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the intention of the seller is to augment them.” As the author saw it, “one congratulates oneself, 
and is complimented, for having the skills to buy the commodities of some unfortunate at a low 
price, as is another who uses trickery and lying to sell goods at a high price; this is the criminal 
element in all of commerce.”220 
 To others, speculation was not even a regrettable byproduct of commercial development. 
Rather, it was a positive force of political and economic change. “Far from prohibiting 
speculation,” wrote the author of a treatise advocating Company reform to the Regent, “it should 
be tolerated and even protected. It is an easy means of reestablishing circulation [of money and 
credit], increasing the power of the king, and putting the Company in a position to raise or lower 
public funds as it deems necessary.”221 To post-System contemporaries, speculation conjured 
images not only of unscrupulous plutocrats lining their pockets at the expense of the public, but 
also of the state haplessly manipulating currencies. Yet for all those disillusioned by the failures 
of Law’s Company, many others were convinced that speculative activity was the most assured 
means of spurring financial growth. Melon for one remained a particularly vocal advocate of 
currency manipulation and a speculation-fuelled economy.222 
 A similar degree of ambivalence surrounded the patronage practices followed by 
Company employees. These seemed at once to constitute both an abusive tradition and a set of 
acts that facilitated the goals of efficient governance. As was the case with many institutions in 
the Old Regime, patronage was central to the administrative and commercial hierarchies of the 
Company. The sons of directors and other prominent members of the Company were fast-tracked 
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to administrative positions, and employees engaged in a complicated set of political and 
commercial alliances. Powerbrokers in France relied on clients in India to look over their private 
trading interests, while employees in the colonies trusted in benefactors back home to care for 
their families and intercede on their behalf. The activities of François Castanier, one of the 
Company’s directors in Paris, exemplified this practice. Castanier employed a variety of 
prominent clients to trade on his behalf in India, including both Le Brun de la Franquerie, whose 
abuse of Company regulations had led to the overhaul of the pacotilles system in 1733, and 
Joseph Dupleix.223  
At times, this type of practice created institutional friction. The interests of family and 
patron-client networks were jealously protected, and often formed the basis of broader political 
alliances that encompassed the entire administration of a given comptoir. Different patronage 
groups did not always cooperate, leading to a breakdown of communication between various 
French outposts. Patronage practices also generated personal rivalries, as Jacques d’Eprémesnil 
discovered when he married the stepdaughter of Joseph Dupleix. This marriage, which created a 
potential clash between d’Eprémesnil’s obligations to his family and to his new father-in-law, 
drew the ire of d’Eprémesnil’s father, who wrote his son out of his will.224 Such animosity could 
interfere with the shipment of goods, the adjudication of disputes, and the adoption of new policy.   
Moreover, the politics of patronage impeded advancement by merit—as employees in 
India frequently complained225—and shielded incompetent or corrupt employees from Company 
justice. Such was the case of one Sieur Martin, who secured a position in Mahé through a 
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recommendation written by the Duchesse of Orléans in 1755.226 Arrested in 1757 for attempting 
to “go over to the English at Tellichery,” he was then released and escaped to the Danish outpost 
at Calicut, where he once again attempted to join the English. Despite Martin’s intentions of 
switching sides, upon reaching Tellichery he was captured, held as a “prisoner of war,” and then 
paroled. Noting that the conduct of Martin and his accomplice “merited that he return them to 
France,” Duval de Leyrit, the then governor of Pondichéry, demurred out of respect for “the 
interest that the Duchess de Orléans had shown toward Sieur Martin.” Instead he sent Martin to 
Ile de France, a new setting that he hoped would restrain his “vagabond humor.”227 He left it up 
to the governor there to “give him employment.”228 
Yet patronage practices also generated certain advantages for the Company. Client 
networks stimulated economic activity on the subcontinent. A well-connected official could use 
his connections and position to move goods and acquire credit, thus offsetting the Company’s 
chronic shortage of capital and shipping.229 On the administrative side, the advancement of 
individuals based on family or personal connections was, paradoxically, one of the most assured 
means of finding skilled and experienced employees. As Philippe Haudrère has argued, nepotism 
afforded stability: certain families held positions of influence for decades, and the long exposure 
that the children of Company officials received to both trade and colonial administration allowed 
for the relatively efficient management of company affairs despite the great distance between 
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India and France.230 Contemporaries seemed to have been of a similar opinion. Defending 
himself against accusations of mismanagement by Dupleix in 1754, Charles Godehau, who was 
then serving as governor of Pondichéry, viewed his appointment through family connections as a 
point of pride, arguing that as “the son of one of the members of this Company, I was raised in 
such a manner as to be useful to it.”231   
Here was a theme common to institutions of the Old Regime. In the schizophrenic value 
system of eighteenth-century France, merit and privilege sat side by side in an uneasy 
relationship. The crown tolerated practices such as nepotism, favoritism, and patronage in 
intermediary bodies such as guilds and tax farms in order to ensure the support of these 
organizations.232 These activities proliferated because of the structural weakness of the monarchy. 
The Company faced a similar situation: since it could not perform its daily administrative or 
commercial functions without the support of influential powerbrokers in both France and India, it 
afforded these men considerable latitude in advancing the interests of family and friends. Yet the 
Company’s position on patronage, and the questions that it provoked, represented more than just 
a negotiated response to institutional inadequacies. Corporate patronage created so many 
paradoxes because it also reflected the more specific problem of running a transnational 
corporation with conflicting political and commercial goals. In such an ambiguous situation, few 
agreed on what was useful, what promoted trade, and what actually constituted “abuse.” 
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The ambivalence surrounding specific activities such as speculation and patronage 
illustrate the more general moral concerns generated by the Company trade. Questions about 
productivity, utility, and the common good were not just theoretical concerns played out in the 
abstract by contemporary moral philosophers and political economists; rather they were 
fundamental problems on which the commercial and administrative practices of the Company 
turned. The Company’s inconsistent attitude toward concepts such as free trade, individual profit, 
and good governance reflected these concerns. Distance and the unclear nature of the Company’s 
institutional agenda only added to the confusion. If the Company’s mission was to ensure the 
regular return of goods to France, should it tolerate illicit commercial activities if they in fact 
promoted local trade, increased the confidence of Indian investors, and offset its chronic shortage 
in bullion on the subcontinent? Alternatively, if it was to function instead as a tightly regulated 
instrument of state finance and debt consolidation, should it expand its bureaucracy and institute 
new prohibitions, sacrificing trade for the transparency and centralization that these processes 
would supposedly generate? Such uncertainty did little to allay contemporary misgivings about 
commerce. When critics could not agree on the effectiveness of certain commercial activities—
nor even on what the ultimate aims of those activities were—Company trade became suspect in 
general.   
 
Conclusion 
 The Company’s confusing relationship with the state, and its overlapping and often 
conflicting institutional agenda, created a series of contradictions. Commercial operations were 
at once centripetal and administrated locally, subject to a strict set of monopolies and driven by 
concerns for profit. The Company’s experience with overseas commerce further aggravated these 
tensions. So too did internal rivalries and the distortion of information by the distances involved 
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in trade. There was no consensus on what represented proper commercial activities—and on the 
moral legitimacy and utility of certain Company operations. Nor was there an agreement as to 
what exactly constituted public interest within the French kingdom. The Company’s trading 
efforts confounded any clear distinctions between free trade and monopolism, centralization and 
the advocacy for local autonomy. The problems posed by its commercial experiences, and the 
lack of a clear solution to them, reshaped popular perceptions of the Company. Between the 
1740s and 1760s, these tensions would play themselves out over a series of public scandals. 
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CHAPTER 3: “I DON’T SELL HONOR”: EMPIRE, AMBITION, AND THE MADRAS 
IMBROGLIO 
 
Have I not said that God will visit with His Judgments those who disobey me? 
—Joseph Dupleix 
 
Prison had broken Bertrand François Mahé de la Bourdonnais, the former governor of 
Iles de France and Bourbon. Thrown into the Bastille in early 1748 on charges of corruption and 
treason, he descended into a months’ long depression—unable even to stir himself from bed. 
Under such conditions, his health quickly deteriorated. According to one report, La Bourdonnais 
suffered three strokes and lost all his teeth within the span of a few years.233 Broken and 
disgraced, he seemed destined for a premature death—a sad end to a career that, until recently, 
had been marked by fame, glory, and good fortune.    
 Yet despair bred unexpected resilience. In October, La Bourdonnais roused from his 
melancholy determined to defend himself against his charges. Using tissue fortified with rice 
water for paper, coffee grounds and soot for ink, and a sharpened coin that he jammed into a 
stick for a pen, he proceeded to write several hundred pages of notes.234 After twenty-six months, 
La Bourdonnais commissioned an attorney, Pierre de Gennes, to transform this narrative into a 
legal petition, which he published as a three-volume factum in 1751. Circulated widely in Paris, 
this mémoire judiciaire became an immediate hit, drawing sympathy and powerful supporters to 
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his cause. Within days, the forgotten La Bourdonnais had become a cause célèbre. Within weeks, 
a special judicial committee constituted by the king had cleared him of all charges. 
 La Bourdonnais’s story is one of grit, determination, and legal brinksmanship. It is also a 
reminder about the contested understandings of sovereignty and authority that infused the French 
colonial project in India. La Bourdonnais’s incarceration was the consequence of a longstanding 
dispute with Joseph Dupleix, the governor of Pondichéry, over the treatment of the captured 
British settlement at Madras. After seizing the city in a 1746 siege, La Bourdonnais offered to 
ransom it back to the British. This decision drew the ire of Dupleix, who claimed final authority 
over Madras as the Company’s chief representative on the subcontinent. The two subsequently 
engaged a protracted feud fueled by malicious gossip, backroom dealing, and the growing threat 
of civil war. La Bourdonnais’s incarceration and his public plea for justice were the culmination 
of this bitter tug-of-war over precedence and legal right in the Company’s settlements. His 
judicial brief not only outlined the tragic circumstances of his imprisonment, but also offered a 
vision for colonial authority that justified his actions in Madras. 
 This chapter uses the dispute between Dupleix and La Bourdonnais to explore how 
Company conflict redefined the legal limits of royal sovereignty in the eighteenth century. More 
specifically, it examines how a personal dispute premised on parochial agendas contributed to 
the consolidation of power and rationalization of colonial territory within the Company’s 
overseas settlements. Recent studies of early-modern colonialism have stressed the porous nature 
of imperial authority, seeing empires as a contested political construction full of quasi-sovereign 
territories, competing legal traditions, and improvised regulatory mechanisms.235 The ongoing 
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attempts by Company officials to develop greater administrative and commercial autonomy 
within the comptoirs seem to confirm this trend. Yet as the wrangling over Madras reminds us, 
“pluralism and centralism did not simply square off as antagonists” within imperial politics.236 
Even as employees relied on legal exception and privilege as forms of colonial power, they built 
up crown sovereignty as an overriding source of authority. As this chapter shows, the very 
impulses that divided Company authorities and territory also acted as powerful tools for 
centralization, spurring rival administrators to imagine new ways in which royal power could 
project into the colonial sphere.   
 Such infighting also highlights the contingent relationship between national sovereignty 
and imperial authority in eighteenth-century France. Scholars have long acknowledged the role 
of European colonial conflict in establishing the intellectual foundations for a common system of 
international law. A patchwork of natural law theory and ad hoc diplomatic practices, this legal 
framework is often seen as a reflection of preexisting ideas of national sovereignty established in 
the seventeenth century through the treaty of Westphalia; in order for a law of nations to exist, 
the idea of a nation as a territorially-bound sovereign entity had first to be established. As this 
chapter suggests, however, European powers did not simply project a preformed conception of 
national sovereignty into the colonial sphere.237 For the Company, both imperial interaction and 
local intrigue—all of it played out far beyond the conventional boundaries of crown power—
ultimately redefined the limits of crown power. Rather than simply carrying royal law with them 
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to distant colonial settlements, employees like Dupleix and La Bourdonnais also exported a new 
sovereign framework back to Europe. Their arguments would not only help to facilitate their 
individual agendas, but also to change the relationship between the monarchy and the Company 
chartered to serve it.    
 
The Siege 
 
The conflict leading up to the French seizure of Madras began in Europe as the War of 
the Austrian Succession, but it soon took on the qualities of a distinctly colonial affair. In July 
1745, a British fleet under the command of Commodore Barnett arrived in the Bay of Bengal and 
began harassing French shipping. Although Britain and France had been at war in Europe for 
nearly two years by this point, Company officials in India found themselves unprepared to deal 
with this new development. In 1741, La Bourdonnais lobbied the naval minister, Maurepas, to 
provide him with a small squadron to police the waters around the French settlements. But after a 
brief engagement in 1742 against the Bayanor of Bargaret, an Indian prince threatening the 
Company’s settlement at Mahé, Maurepas demanded he return the ships to France, citing the 
prohibitive cost of maintaining a war fleet in the Indian Ocean.238 With no warships to protect 
French shipping, the British struck in quick succession, seizing several merchantmen at the 
mouth of the Ganges. Their fleet “infested the oceans” complained one Company solider, “and 
desolated our commerce.”239  
These circumstances are worth examining in detail, as they illustrate the conflicting legal 
assumptions that framed the dispute over Madras. Recent scholarship on early-modern French 
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empire stresses the divisive and unstable nature of France’s overseas expansion: settlers in North 
America invoked seigneurial rights and feudal custom to undermine royal power in the New 
World, while Company merchants clashed with Jesuit missionaries in Asia over how to manage 
indigenous populations of non-Christians.240 New studies of early-modern trading companies 
further highlight the competing agendas and shifting trajectories that underlay the French 
imperial project. These works emphasize the amphibian circumstances of corporate governments, 
which often redefined their political status to gain leverage in diplomacy and military operations. 
As Philip Stern argues, trading corporations “modulated between positions of deference and 
defiance,” casting themselves alternatively as merchant and sovereign.241 In India, European 
affairs were often premised upon changing claims of jurisdiction, obligation, and identity—all of 
which facilitated the normal tasks of trading and treaty making. 
Consider, for example, Dupleix’s attempt to broker a preemptive peace with the British 
before the arrival of Barnett’s fleet. In 1745, the governor sent envoys to Madras with a proposal 
that the two companies remain neutral while war raged in Europe, operating as merchants rather 
than as political agents of their respective crowns. The British Company agreed to these terms, 
but quickly reneged on them after their war fleet arrived. When the French envoys accused them 
of double-dealing, their British counterparts replied that the neutrality pact only extended 
between the two companies. Since Barnett’s ships were from the royal navy, they were not 
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subject to any such restrictions.242 By emphasizing the distinctions between corporate and state 
diplomacy, the British envoys developed a legal framework that enabled them to conduct war 
against the Company settlements while also purporting to maintain peaceful relations among the 
colonial powers on the subcontinent.  
The British argument betrays a cynical and convenient logic, but it was rooted in an 
ongoing European debate over the freedom of sea-lanes and the enforcement of sovereignty 
outside national borders. Since the early seventeenth century, European jurists like Gentili and 
Grotius had labored to develop a viable framework for inter-imperial interaction—one that 
balanced exclusive claims of ownership over colonies in the New World and Indian Ocean with 
the desire to maintain open trade routes and share the burden of policing the oceans against 
piracy. An eclectic blend of Protestant theology and reason-of-state doctrine, natural law and 
established colonial legal practice, this incipient “law of nations” was cited both to police 
European activity within the colonial sphere and to adjudicate developments like the capture of 
enemy ships within foreign waters.243 For both the British and the French, inter-imperial conflict 
provided a framework in which imperial agents worked out the limits of national sovereignty—
negotiating the conditions of peace and war in reference to an emerging script of international 
legal regulation.244 The obligations between states and the intermediaries operating in their name 
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were thus constantly reframed over the eighteenth century, hammered out in the course of real-
world entanglements overseas.  
In response to Britain’s continued aggression, Dupleix looked for help among the 
regional princes on the Coromandel Coast, an action that further highlights the shifting legal 
foundations of the Company settlement in India. Operating through a network of native 
intermediaries (vakils), the governor laid down his grievances before Anwar-ud-din, the Nawab 
of Arcot, on whose land both Madras and Pondichéry were situated.245 While Dupleix 
approached the British on equal terms—as the representative of a business with little interest in 
prosecuting a European war in India—he came to the Nawab as a supplicant. According to 
Ananda Ranga Pillai, Dupleix’s Tamil translator, the governor cast both companies as 
feudatories to Arcot, dependent on the Nawab to police his territory and prevent the outbreak of 
violence.246 In response to these entreaties, the Nawab sent two letters to the councils of Madras 
and Pondichéry: one prohibited violence along the Coromandel Coast, while the other granted 
Mughal passes to French trading ships to prevent their seizure. The British, meanwhile, relied 
upon a similar rebranding strategy to sidestep this injunction. Whereas Dupleix positioned the 
Company as a subordinate to the Nawab and the imperial court in Delhi, British envoys from 
Madras argued that Mughal charter granted autonomy to both them and the French.247 The 
representatives further justified the capture of French ships by referencing European prize law 
conventions, which permitted the British to hunt down enemy ships in foreign waters. In the face 
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of these claims, the Nawab relaxed his earlier restrictions, forbidding the British from attacking 
Pondichéry directly, but permitting them to capture merchant vessels at sea.248 
Both companies thus drew upon a range of seemingly mutually exclusive legal and 
political arguments—simultaneously expanding and diminishing their jurisdictional claims. Like 
Dupleix, the British Company depicted itself as an autonomous corporation in its correspondence 
with the French; the Company made and broke treaties independent of Parliament, and was 
therefore unable to rein in Barnett’s royal fleet. To the Nawab, by contrast, the Madras envoys 
cast themselves as the subjects of the British crown. They were settlers granted territorial rights 
through charter, enforcing their own jurisdiction and importing their own customs to India. The 
French employed a similar strategy. In their exchanges with the Nawab, they portrayed 
themselves as loyal supplicants; to the British, they were economic competitors, non-combatants 
concerned only with the bottom line; and to authorities back in France, they were loyal subjects 
entitled to the full protection of the crown against an encroaching enemy. Flexible identity 
politics—and the porous legal culture upon which they were founded—facilitated the diplomatic 
agenda of both corporations.  
The conflict between Britain and France thus fostered a range of creative arguments 
about Company sovereignty. While asserting their loyalty to the crown, Company administrators 
also insisted upon the authority of inter-imperial legal conventions, situating royal decree 
alongside Mughal farmans, regional trade settlements, and natural law in constructing the 
guidelines for corporate practice overseas. In times of war, the French settlements in India often 
insisted that they were “beyond the line”—cut off from both the support of the metropole and the 
obligations it imposed on them, and thus subject to different sources of legal authority. The idea 
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of a frontier was open to interpretation, dependent not only on material factors such as geography 
and distance, but also on the performance of certain contractual arrangements such as the defense 
of a vulnerable outpost by royal forces.249 An 11 February 1745 letter from the Pondichéry 
council, for example, pleaded with the Paris directors for regular armed “convoys” from France, 
noting that the Company otherwise “lacked the means of protecting their goods” in India.250 A 
year later, with Barnett’s fleet sailing around the Bay of Bengal unmolested and shipments 
between France and the Indian Ocean all but cut-off, the councilors sounded a more frantic 
refrain: “Could it be any clearer,” they wrote in a February 1746 memorandum, “that we have 
been abandoned by Europe?”251  
According to administrators in Pondichéry, this notion of being cast aside by superior 
authorities in France justified a variety of extraordinary measures: the creation of a private 
merchant society, modeled on the lines of the recently censured trading collective in Mahé, to 
offset expenses through the expansion of “country” trade; the loosening of Company regulations 
that held the Pondichéry councilors personally accountable for all expenses in India over the 
annual limit of 400,000 rupees; and the granting of immunity for colonial employees for failing 
to fulfill their commercial obligations.252 Central to all of these petitions was the idea that royal 
authority was provisional rather than unconditional: the obligations of Company employees 
varied according to whether or not the Paris directors put them in a position to fulfill their duties. 
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Any breakdown in communication consequently altered the juridical status of a colonial 
settlement. 
The confusing circumstances leading up to the siege of Madras sheds light on how a 
personal conflict exploded into a more fundamental struggle over precedence and legal right 
within the colonial space. Notions of proper conduct, chain of command, and accountability were 
improvised in the process of settling and trading in India, not to mention tested and reinvented 
through the trying circumstances of colonial warfare. Power, in this context, depended as much 
on individual influence as it did on established procedure—on the ability to mobilize coalitions 
and build support, and thus render certain claims credible.253 Nowhere was this trend more 
apparent than in the relationship between Dupleix and La Bourdonnais immediately preceding 
the capture of Madras. Just as Company negotiators attempted to redefine Company sovereignty 
in the service of colonial diplomacy, so too did these two administrators employ a variety of 
different strategies to assert their authority over French operations in India.  
La Bourdonnais arrived in Pondichéry at the head of a relief force in July 1746, tasked 
with protecting the Company’s ships by the Controller-General, Philibert Orry. As governor of 
the Mascarene Islands, he had overseen the refitting of a French fleet intended to combat the 
British during much of the last year. Yet although his arrival dramatically improved Company 
fortunes in the Bay of the Bengal, it also created a tumultuous political climate in Pondichéry. 
Dupleix and la Bourdonnais shared a long history of conflict. Their first interaction seems to 
have been in the 1720s, when Dupleix brought La Bourdonnais before the Superior Council of 
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Pondichéry in a commercial dispute.254 The two freighted and owned ships together, and 
engaged in numerous business transactions in the decades preceding the capture of Madras. 
Ongoing contact bred familiarity, but also bitterness: in 1739, Dupleix charged La Bourdonnais 
an exorbitant commission for the purchase of a supply of cowries, while La Bourdonnais accused 
Dupleix of stealing his idea to establish a Company slave trade in Mozambique and passing it off 
as his own to the Paris directors.255 In Pondichéry, the two disagreed fundamentally over who 
had the right to oversee the Company’s military operations in India.  
As governor of the city, Dupleix saw himself as the supreme authority in the Company’s 
comptoirs. La Bourdonnais, by contrast, believed he was equivalent in status to Dupleix in 
political matters (both were governors), and his superior in local military operations (his orders 
came directly from the Controller-General). Both men relied upon conspicuous displays of 
power to convince others of their vision of authority. Dupleix, for instance, regularly provoked 
the status-conscious La Bourdonnais, announcing his arrival with a fifteen-gun salute rather than 
the more prestigious twenty-one, and insisting that La Bourdonnais meet him in Pondichéry’s 
administrative headquarters instead of welcoming him on the beach when he first arrived 
there.256 He assigned him an honor guard of twenty-four troops: the same number Dupleix 
provided for a subordinate commander, d’Auteil, when he sent him to treat with the British.257 
He also jailed an officer in the Pondichéry garrison for welcoming La Bourdonnais with a 
beating of field drums (the tambour aux champs)—a tradition reserved for the city’s governor. In 
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so doing, he hoped to push La Bourdonnais into pleading for the man’s release by forgoing all 
claims to this honorific greeting. In response, La Bourdonnais did nothing, implicitly reasserting 
his claim that he was of equal rank to Dupleix.258 
Petulant, bitter, and theatrical, this wrangling over precedence nonetheless proved 
fundamental to establishing authority in the comptoirs. Municipal governance in the colonial 
settlements was always highly personal.259 Each comptoir was overseen jointly by a governor 
and administrative council: the conseil supérieur in Pondichéry, and conseils provincaux in 
smaller settlements like Chandernagor, Mahé, and Karikal. In theory, this arrangement 
reinforced the hierarchical model of Company rule, distributing power according to seniority, 
and creating an orderly set of subordinate assemblies to enforce the dictates of the Paris directors. 
In practice, the councils were semi-autonomous nodes of patrimonial authority, staffed with their 
governor’s favorites and little inclined to cooperate with the competing patronage networks in 
the other comptoirs.260 Even in times of peace, municipal power revolved around the visible 
exercise of personal influence and power, from the wealth of individual governors to their ability 
to call on powerful patrons at court and in the Company directorate.261 Dupleix and La 
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Bourdonnais’s dealings prior to the siege illustrate how much authority in the colonial 
settlements relied on the “performance” of certain rituals and protocol.   
 As this chapter shows, the ongoing feud spurred Dupleix and La Bourdonnais to 
transform a political culture marked by pluralism and negotiated sovereignty into an explicit 
form of colonial authority. Their contest ultimately revolved around competing methods of 
codification.262 The two debated the facts on the ground, disputing the timing of certain events 
and the secrets divulged in backroom deals. They resorted to ad hominem attacks to cast 
suspicion on each other’s motives. But, more than anything, they both sought to situate the 
imbroglio over Madras within a clearly defined framework of colonial governance: to actualize a 
specific set of administrative protocols, to empower particular agents and institutions to enforce 
this vision, and to depict competing models of rule as impractical or immoral.  
 
Conceptualizing Madras 
For all the controversy it generated, the actual seizure of Madras was an anticlimactic 
affair. For months, Dupleix had pushed La Bourdonnais to attack the British settlement. In 
August, however, the admiral was stricken with tropical fever, and his refusal to delegate 
authority to a subordinate delayed the potential assault by several weeks. Fully recovered, La 
Bourdonnais finally set sail from Pondichéry on the night of 12 September.263 His force 
consisted of “nine warships,” “two mortar boats,” and 3,000 men. Seven days later, he made 
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landfall on the outskirts of the city, surrounding it by both land and sea. Both writers and 
historians have since romanticized the siege. The popular French author Judith Gautier, who 
envisioned France’s struggle against the English in India as a heroic lost cause, waxed poetic 
about the “the mysterious allure” of the Company ships, which were “silent as ghosts” and 
appeared “gigantic in the darkness” as they sailed toward Madras.264 In reality, though, the battle 
offered little in the way of gripping narrative. French forces drastically outnumbered the small 
and unprepared garrison of English and sepoy troops, to whom the futility of protracted 
resistance quickly became apparent. On 22 September, only three days into the battle, Madras 
capitulated.  
Yet while the siege lacked for drama, the terms of La Bourdonnais’s settlement soon 
inspired controversy. In exchange for the city’s timely surrender, the admiral unilaterally offered 
to ransom the city back to the British. Such leniency shocked the municipal council in 
Pondichéry, which claimed jurisdiction over Madras immediately after its capitulation. Dupleix 
had already made his own plans for the city, hoping to raze its fortifications and then deliver it to 
the Nawab of Arcot. Even if the Nawab ultimately sold Madras back to the English, as Dupleix 
and his councilors assumed, the destruction of the city’s military and trading infrastructure would 
seriously hinder England’s commercial activity in the region for years to come.265 To put this 
plan into action, Dupleix dispatched a group of councilors from Pondichéry to assume the reins 
of government in Madras at the end of September. La Bourdonnais, meanwhile, continued to 
insist on his right to dispose of the city on his own.266 He hammered out the final draft of his 
ransom treaty on 26 September. 
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Both men pressed their claims by building networks of local support. Dupleix created a 
provincial council to oversee the administration of Madras, staffing the assembly with favorites 
such as the head councilor Jacques d’Eprémesnil—his son-in-law—and his nephew, Jacques 
Friell. He also named a trusted subordinate, Louis Paradis, as commandant of the city. In 
Pondichéry, the governor won the battle of public opinion by holding an assembly of city 
notables on 30 September, creating popular resentment against La Bourdonnais among the 
settlement’s elite.267 La Bourdonnais, meanwhile, surrounded himself with his own clients, 
mostly officers from Iles de France and Bourbon. During the three weeks following the conquest 
of Madras, these competing tangles of supporters each claimed administrative precedence within 
the city.  
Over this period, political conditions within Madras changed at a dizzying pace. In late 
September, d’Eprémesnil and the other councilors sent to treat with La Bourdonnais fled Madras 
for nearby San Thome when it appeared that the admiral would not cooperate with them.268 They 
returned a few days later at the head of a more substantial force from Pondichéry. At times, La 
Bourdonnais appeared set on abrogating the ransom and leaving the city; at others, he reaffirmed 
his commitment to the treaty, claiming that he had already given his word to the English.269 Yet 
even as he engaged in such a dramatic show of brinksmanship, La Bourdonnais’s resolve was 
weakening. On 11 October, La Bourdonnais wrote to Dupleix that he would remain in the city 
until January, providing protection for the French settlements against the threat posed by a 
nearby English fleet. Natural disaster, however, forced La Bourdonnais to accelerate his 
timetable: a hurricane devastated his ships on the night of 13-14 October. Worn down by the 
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constant infighting, and hoping to salvage what remained of his fleet, La Bourdonnais agreed on 
18 October to give sole command of the city over to d’Eprémesnil, requesting in desperation that 
the council still respect the terms of his capitulation treaty. On 23 October, his fleet departed 
Madras under a twenty-one-gun salute,270 ironically receiving the honor in this moment of defeat 
that was denied to him when he first arrived in Pondichéry. 
Histories of the Madras siege tend to concentrate on the factional disputes surrounding it, 
emphasizing the acrimony and petty jealousies that engulfed the Company elite in India. The 
affair is thus depicted as little more than a personal contest between Dupleix and La 
Bourdonnais: the culmination of years of animosity between two larger-than-life personalities, 
and the prodrome of the internal dissension that would tear the Company apart over the 
following two decades.271 What is lost in this account is a sense of uncertain legal conditions that 
not only served as the source of their conflict, but also provided them with the opportunity to 
consolidate their authority through creative interpretation of the law. The conflict over Madras 
occurred not only as the result of a toxic partnership; it was also fueled by the uncertain 
configuration of power within the comptoirs. La Bourdonnais’s conquest of the city forced the 
French leadership in India to make definitive claims about the legal and political status of 
European settlements in India—and then to bolster these arguments through various institutional 
channels and networks of support in France.    
By its very nature, the conquest of Madras posed a fundamental challenge to the 
Company’s colonial administration. Past military engagements on the subcontinent offered the 
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French few lessons on how to dispose of captured cities, especially territory governed by other 
European powers. The 1741 conflict against the Bayanour of Bargaret, for example, was a 
limited contest that merely confirmed previously agreed-upon commercial and political rights 
along the Malabar Coast.272 French expansion was rare during the eighteenth century, as the 
Paris directors strictly forbade colonial administrators from meddling in local politics. The 
purchase of Karikal—a Coromandel port—by the Pondichéry governor Benoît Dumas from an 
Indian feudatory in 1738 represented the Company’s only significant territorial acquisition since 
the Mississippi Bubble; and even such a modest annexation generated harsh criticism in 
France.273 During the late seventeenth century, the French negotiated with the Dutch for the 
return of Pondichéry, which they had conquered in 1693. But these deliberations took place in 
Europe as part of the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick. Royal ambassadors, not Company administrators, 
oversaw the return of the city, framing their negotiations around dynastic politics in Europe and 
the geo-strategic imperatives of Versailles.274  
In short, the disposal of Madras demanded procedures for which there were few 
diplomatic or judicial precedents. Compounding these procedural challenges was the fact that 
1746 campaign took place on territory subject to overlapping sovereign claims: Madras’s leaders 
governed the city on behalf of both the British East India Company and the crown, all under the 
auspices of a charter first granted by the Vijayanagara Empire and later confirmed and expanded 
by feudatories of the Mughal throne.275 The problem facing both La Bourdonnais and Dupleix 
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was not just about who had a right to treat with the city in the wake of its conquest, but also how 
to define this newly conquered space. Was Madras a European city in a foreign land, subject to 
the same considerations given captured towns during sieges on the continent? An enemy 
warehouse whose goods could be confiscated and resold? Or sovereign territory leased out by 
charter, over which the Nawab of Arcot and Mughal emperor still exercised ultimate authority? 
The conflicting schemes of the two Company governors—and the jurisdictional claims that 
infused them—both hinged on the more fundamental issue of what the European settlements in 
India actually constituted. 
Consider La Bourdonnais’s rationale for ransoming Madras. The admiral maintained that 
his commission from Maurepas gave him license to defend the Company by any means 
necessary, but restricted him from occupying captured territory. His treatment of Madras 
reinforced this vision of his sovereign powers. As La Bourdonnais noted in a September letter to 
Dupleix, “Madras is certainly not a colony, but a conquest that I have made, thus no one has the 
right to rule here but me.”276 The terms of La Bourdonnais’s ransom supported this claim by 
treating Madras as a set of seizable assets, not a settlement to be occupied, policed, and governed. 
The capitulation treaty concerned only the movement of goods and property, requiring the 
British Company to pay a sum “1,100,000 pagodas” over a three-year period and forfeit all 
merchandise in the settlement to the French. The lone stipulation regarding the population of 
Madras concerned security for the ransom, demanding that the families of several city notables 
send hostages to Pondichéry to guarantee British payment.277 Such treatment reflected a common 
interpretation of sovereign claims in Mughal India, which saw European settlements more as a 
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series of financial arrangements—organized around trading rights, port fees, and commercial 
infrastructure—than enclaves of autonomous political authority.278    
During his time in the city, La Bourdonnais emphasized the expansive powers given to 
him as a military commander operating in enemy territory. In a claim redolent of Grotius’s 
argument concerning free navigation, he insisted upon the portability of the crown’s jurisdiction, 
which permitted him to police Company trading interests beyond French territorial limits. La 
Bourdonnais asserted his authority not only against Dupleix and the Pondichéry council, but also 
to indigenous leaders concerned about the Company’s intentions in Madras. Essential to his 
jurisdictional claims was the idea that the British harassment of French ships constituted a 
sufficient justification for pursuing combat against them. Defining the conditions of “just war” 
had been a central preoccupation of European jurists since the seventeenth century; the shifting 
meaning of this concept was not just an abstract problem to be worked out in theoretical works 
of jurisprudence, but a vital part of colonial diplomacy.279 In a letter written to the Nawab of 
Arcot soon after the city’s conquest, La Bourdonnais insisted that it “was a right of war” to 
pursue “my enemies even on your territory,” using this rationale to defend a conflict fought 
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outside French territory.280 Such unapologetic assertions of military privilege sat poorly with the 
Nawab, especially since Dupleix had only recently petitioned him to guarantee peace between 
the French and the British around his territory. They also promoted a highly personalized form of 
political authority, granting La Bourdonnais considerable latitude to construct policy in the 
interest of military need.    
Indeed, throughout his dealings with both the Pondichéry council and the notables of 
Madras, La Bourdonnais emphasized the importance of his name and his honor as markers of 
power in the captured city. As he insisted in one letter to Dupleix, he was “a slave to his 
word,”281 unable to adjust the terms of a capitulation which he had sworn to uphold. In the 
contested space of Madras, this recourse to honor and its obligations represented a powerful 
rhetorical tool, affirming ties of loyalty to the crown while providing legitimacy for a variety of 
political projects. As Jay Smith has argued, the meaning of honor became increasingly fluid over 
the course of eighteenth-century France: a traditional marker of exclusivity, hierarchy, and noble 
privilege, the concept gradually came to signify a more open-ended notion of meritorious service 
to the king. Nowhere was this transformation more apparent than in the military, where the 
concept of honor became synonymous with valor and personal glory—qualities that transcended 
social distinction.282 La Bourdonnais’s contention about the overriding importance of honor 
further illuminates this process, collapsing reputation and charisma into claims about the right to 
act on behalf of the crown. In the absence of agreed-upon laws and enforcement mechanisms, an 
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individual’s promises constituted a powerful form of political authority. Time and time again, La 
Bourdonnais insisted on the overriding importance of his “word” in deciding what was legally 
binding.        
 Within Pondichéry, meanwhile, Dupleix and his subordinate councilors developed an 
opposing set of claims regarding both the Company’s jurisdictional rights and the status of the 
conquered city. While d’Eprémesnil challenged La Bourdonnais’s authority on the ground, these 
officials bombarded him with letters denying his right to ransom the settlement. According to 
them, Madras had become sovereign French territory upon its capture. Whereas only months 
before the governor had openly questioned the conditions of Pondichéry’s obligations to 
negligent authorities in France, he now asserted his right to manage on the king’s behalf. The 
Council outlined this rationale in a letter written to La Bourdonnais on 25 September, insisting 
that “he should not ignore the intentions of the king and the Company in those places in India 
where the royal pavilion is planted.”283 The councilors relied upon established hierarchy and 
precedence to bolster their claims to Madras: by depicting themselves as direct representatives of 
the king in India, they argued that their authority overrode even the commission that La 
Bourdonnais had received from Maurepas—a set of orders that the admiral had, in any case, 
completely misinterpreted to justify his ransom.284 This argument left little room for competing 
assertions to power, or even for the idea that multiple networks of authority could coexist in 
colonial India. With the conquest of Madras, Dupleix and the council not only tried to assert their 
authority within the city, but also to frame this jurisdictional right as a self-evident claim. 
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 This effort extended beyond mere rhetoric. While the Pondichéry council remonstrated in 
a series of letters to La Bourdonnais, Dupleix relied upon his new provincial council to establish 
government in the city. This assembly reinforced Dupleix’s authority in several ways. First, its 
presence in Madras bolstered claims that colonial power stemmed from corporate hierarchy. The 
Madras council answered directly to the councilors and governor of Pondichéry, who in turn 
took orders from the corporate directorate and the Controller-General. This chain of command 
culminated in the person of the king, reinforcing the notion that Company administrators stood 
as his proxies on foreign shores. Second, by empowering this group of loyal men and sending 
them to Madras, the governor could monitor and interfere with La Bourdonnais’s attempts to 
conclude his separate peace with the British. Third, the creation of the council enabled Dupleix 
to transform his claims that Madras was a colony into a reality by improving and governing the 
captured city.285  
 Indeed, the council’s efforts to establish order in the city represented one of the 
governor’s chief claims to legitimate authority in Madras—one that he emphasized in his 
correspondence with the Company directors in Paris. Such efforts were grounded in traditional 
conceptions of territorial sovereignty in the colonial sphere, which insisted that land must be 
occupied, improved, and administered to support ownership claims. Once La Bourdonnais had 
been removed as a threat in the city, the council attempted to bring order in the city. Paradis, for 
instance, oversaw the seizure of all British arms and took a census of the population. He brought 
in new supplies of food and reopened Madras’s cisterns, and also restored discipline among the 
French garrison by “halting the brigandage and thefts to which impunity had accustomed 
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them.”286 One month later, the council successfully defended Madras against a series of attacks 
by the Nawab of Arcot, who had grown frustrated that the French had attacked the city despite 
his injunction against violence in his territory, and that Dupleix had not ceded the settlement to 
him as he had once promised. In its letters to the directorate in Paris, the Pondichéry council used 
these military encounters to emphasize how it held the city “in the name of the King and the 
Company.”287 Through these acts of civil management and defense, Dupleix reinforced the idea 
that Madras was not only an occupied territory, but also a governable space over which the 
Company held dominion.  
 Dupleix complemented his arguments about the scope of colonial governance with 
concrete examples of his ability to intermediate on behalf of the king. The council he created 
fought, adjudicated, and established regular bureaucratic procedures; it imposed order over a 
mixed population of British citizens, and Tamil, Armenian, and Portuguese traders. Dupleix 
sought not only to establish order over these non-subjects within the limits of Madras, but also to 
integrate them into the broader French colonial project. He demolished the buildings in Madras’s 
“black town,” the neighborhood where indigenous merchants, laborers, and bureaucrats lived, so 
as to coerce this population into relocating to Pondichéry.288 He ordered the repair and expansion 
of the city’s citadel so as to protect it from future attacks by either the British or the Nawab of 
Arcot. And he wrote a number of letters to the head of Madras’s Armenian population, Coja 
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Petrus, to entice them to move as well—an effort that ultimately proved unsuccessful.289 Just as 
the governor defined Madras as a sovereign space that could be administered on behalf of the 
king, so too did he identify its population as subjects to be governed, regulated, and transformed 
into an active and loyal citizenry. 
 The factional disputes between Dupleix and La Bourdonnais in Madras played out over 
only a few weeks. During that short period of time, both men crafted distinct but overlapping 
arguments about their rights to dispose of the city. Both offered expansive readings of their 
individual authority, but did so by promoting the overarching power of the king within the 
Company sphere. While privileging certain precedents within the history of French empire 
building—the established responsibilities of a fleet commander during times of war, the superior 
council’s governing authority—the two also relied on more informal measures to reinforce their 
claims. La Bourdonnais repeatedly threatened to leave India with his troops from Iles de France 
and Bourbon as well as the Pondichéry garrison, attempting to cow Dupleix while also 
demonstrating his authority as a military commander.290 Dupleix, meanwhile, made good on his 
claims that Madras had become sovereign French territory by creating a new municipal 
administration. Even as the two called on local networks of patrons and supporters to advance 
their specific agenda, the disposal of Madras was made to be a national problem, a question of 
the military imperatives and administrative rights of the French crown. Worked out on the 
ground to provide a rationale for these personal projects, such logic would ultimately serve as the 
foundation for sophisticated legal arguments concerning the Company and its imperial 
commitments. After the destruction of La Bourdonnais’s fleet compelled him to abandon his 
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initial claims to the city and return to Europe, both he and Dupleix were forced to appeal to a 
broader metropolitan audience to sanction their actions in Madras.     
 
The Emerging Scandal 
La Bourdonnais’s return to France was long, hazardous, and full of strange twists—a 
slow journey that highlights the importance of timing and circumstance in the exercise of 
colonial power. After several weeks of smooth sailing, La Bourdonnais encountered a massive 
storm near the Cape of Good Hope. In need of supplies and a safe harbor, he then detoured for 
the French colony of Martinique. There he acquired a Dutch passport and obtained passage on a 
vessel heading to the United Provinces. Poor weather, however, continued to frustrate La 
Bourdonnais’s plans. On 2 January 1748, a tempest in the English Channel forced his ship to 
dock in England, where La Bourdonnais was promptly identified and imprisoned. There his 
journey would take a new twist. In London, he enjoyed celebrity status, meeting with the royal 
family, members of the ministry, and directors of the British East India Company. A month later, 
he was released after swearing that he would not again take up arms against Britain 
La Bourdonnais’s odyssey paralleled another lengthy voyage: the transmission of official 
reports from the Superior Council of Pondichéry to the Company’s headquarters in Paris. Initial 
news of the siege reached France in the spring of 1747, circulating through Company and 
ministerial channels before slowly filtering out to the public. For instance, the May journal entry 
of the Duc de Luynes, a courtier whose journal offers an in-depth perspective on court life under 
Louis XV, described the conquest of Madras at length, but provided only a few details about the 
“quarrel” between Dupleix and La Bourdonnais.291 News travelled slowly, carried by word of 
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mouth on Company ships, and repeated and then retold in settlements along the way like Ile de 
France. By the time La Bourdonnais reached France, Dupleix’s correspondence to the Company 
had filled the gaps in the story with particularly incriminating evidence. The admiral soon found 
himself facing several well-placed enemies, including the king’s mistress, Madame de 
Pompadour, and Charles de Bacquencourt, a director of the General Farm. Whereas Pompadour 
acted out of spite—she detested La Bourdonnais’s two most prominent patrons, the Orry 
brothers—Bacquencourt operated out of family loyalty: he was Dupleix’s brother-in-law.292 
From these divergent motives came a common purpose. Pressured by their intrigue, the king 
ordered La Bourdonnais sent to the Bastille on charges of treason, providing neither conditions 
for his release nor an opportunity for him to answer the charges against him.  
In the drawn-out affair that followed, La Bourdonnais and Dupleix constructed formal 
legal arguments that both defended their individual conduct during the siege and pushed a 
specific configuration of power within the Company’s settlements. Over a period of several years, 
the two men crystallized ideas developed in the immediate aftermath of Madras’s surrender into 
uncompromising claims about colonial hierarchy and power. Their judicial clash is instructive 
not only for the attention it generated in France but for the way that their conflicting claims 
promoted royal sovereignty as the only proper form of authority within French colonial territory. 
Even as the two disputed how crown power was instantiated in India—who could act on behalf 
of the king, how royal decrees applied within the particular geographic and legal context of the 
Coromandel Coast—they each insisted on the crown’s overarching jurisdiction in the colonial 
sphere. Such claims promoted the arguments of each party while simultaneously repudiating any 
sense of personal interest in the disposition of Madras. 
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 Refined over several years of incarceration, La Bourdonnais’s 1751 mémoires mixed 
intrigue and Company policy, natural law and conspiracy theory to create a compelling defense 
of his actions. The admiral explained his generous terms as a matter of military expediency: a 
British fleet lurked nearby, and a protracted siege would leave his men vulnerable to a surprise 
attack. He also claimed that while his orders from Maurepas required him to disrupt British 
shipping, they had forbidden him from occupying and settling captured territory. More than 
anything, he emphasized the limited nature of Company sovereignty in India—a narrow 
jurisdiction that restricted both Dupleix’s power and the scope of corporate diplomacy. “One 
always imagines,” he reported in his mémoire, “that S. Dupleix is the governor of this immense 
land known as India; and from that false supposition, one concludes that S. la Bourdonnais was 
under the jurisdiction of S. Dupleix when he fought in India.”293 In contrast to this image of 
undifferentiated power, however, La Bourdonnais insisted that Company authority extended only 
as far as the five comptoirs. Madras, he therefore claimed, was “enemy territory,” “an English 
jurisdiction” over which the Pondichéry council could make no sovereign claims.294 Such 
arguments were not unique to La Bourdonnais or the Company. Over the course of the 
eighteenth century, European powers grew increasingly aggressive in asserting their rights to 
police violence outside their territorial boundaries—a process that ultimately redefined the 
meaning of national sovereignty across the continent.295 
 La Bourdonnais’s claim not only imposed limits on Dupleix’s ability to negotiate with 
the British; it also suggested that only certain types of diplomatic arrangements could 
appropriately be made with the captured city. In the absence of Company authority—and the 
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privileges it carried to colonize, trade, and negotiate—the French army in Madras had recourse to 
few legitimate options when disposing of conquered territory. As Louis-Charles Grant, a settler 
on Ile de France, insisted on his behalf, La Bourdonnais “could not conceive that M. Dupleix 
would assume to himself the character of a sovereign; and give to one nation those places which 
have been conquered from another.”296 While emphasizing how territorial boundaries 
fundamentally restricted the Company’s authority, La Bourdonnais also maintained that royal 
sovereignty could be delegated to agents tasked with performing certain missions on the king’s 
behalf. Such commissions did not suffer from any sort of geographical constraints, but they were 
fundamentally limited in scope. As La Bourdonnais reiterated in his mémoire, the orders he 
received from Maurepas entrusted him with the defense of the French settlements in India while 
expressly forbidding him from “seizing any enemy establishment or factory with the goal of 
occupying it.”297      
 Such claims were consistent with a longer history of jurisdictional negotiation over 
maritime space in early-modern Europe. During the seventeenth century, for example, the French 
admiralty attempted to usurp the traditional privileges of the parlements and municipal and 
seigneurial courts in coastal regions by redefining the boundaries between ocean and littoral 
space.298 They also reflected the changing juridical context of prize law in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, as legal scholars like Grotius and Gentili turned to the emerging field of 
natural law to justify the seizure of foreign ships, the policing of sea lanes, and the protection of 
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coastal settlements.299 La Bourdonnais drew on both of these traditions. He justified his actions 
in Madras through references to earlier French privateering operations, particularly the capture 
and subsequent resale of Rio de Janiero by the Malouin corsair Réné Duguay-Trouin in 1711.300 
And he cited Grotius to illustrate the capacious authority of a military commander in negotiating 
the surrender and ransoming of enemy cities.301 At once insisting upon both the limitations and 
license created by his royal commission, La Bourdonnais asserted his right to handle Madras as a 
justly seized prize. 
While establishing juridical precedence for his treatment of Madras, La Bourdonnais also 
questioned Dupleix’s motives in seeking to retain and occupy the city, dismissing his plans as 
little more than a project of personal aggrandizement.302 “The most precise orders from the king 
and the most important concerns for the Company,” he noted “were not capable of keeping 
Dupleix within the limits of his duty.”303 Throughout his account, La Bourdonnais painted 
Dupleix as a tyrant who created a culture of fear among his subordinates, and who used 
intimidation to compel others to disrupt the judicious treaty signed after the siege.304 He placed 
particular emphasis on the unscrupulous tactics that Dupleix and his clients used to discredit La 
Bourdonnais: spreading libelous stories before the notables of Pondichéry,305 attempting to incite 
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an insurrection among the soldiery of Madras,306 and forging a letter from the Company’s 
directors that instructed the admiral to follow the orders of the Pondichéry superior council.307 La 
Bourdonnais juxtaposed these accounts of Dupleix’s double-dealing with repeated claims about 
the justness of his own conduct, thereby infusing his actions with both legal authority and moral 
legitimacy.   
 While La Bourdonnais built and published his case, Dupleix remained in India. The 
French returned Madras to the British several years before the publication of La Bourdonnais’s 
mémoire judiciaire as part of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle, and by 1751 the governor had 
become embroiled in a new crisis. Acting without consulting his superiors in France, Dupleix 
engaged the Company in a set of succession conflicts along the Coromandel Coast—an ill-fated 
series of military entanglements that would earn him the censure of both the crown and the Paris 
directors. He was thus in no position to answer the charges leveled against him half a world away 
by La Bourdonnais. Instead, Dupleix’s family campaigned on his behalf, publishing two short 
mémoires in response to the admiral’s lengthy factum. These legal briefs built on the claims first 
developed by Dupleix and the Superior Council in their original report to the Company. Like La 
Bourdonnais, the governor’s family combined arguments about the reach of royal authority with 
numerous examples of how the admiral had sacrificed the crown’s interests in the pursuit of 
personal gain.      
 In their first mémoire, Dupleix’s family demonstrated how Company statutes had 
gradually augmented the power of the governor of Pondichéry in the years preceding the 
conquest of Madras. Citing a 1742 Company provision that gave him broad discretionary powers 
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in the “conservation of the forts, French establishments and comptoirs, and the commerce and 
glory of the nation,” they asserted the wide-ranging powers of both Dupleix and the Superior 
Council.308 The mémoire contrasted the legally guaranteed rights of these officials with the 
arbitrary, “supposedly absolute authority” of La Bourdonnais;309 while recognizing his power to 
command Company ships and soldiers on the sea, Dupleix’s family argued that he was entitled to 
little more than an advisory role when it came to planning land operations and administering the 
settlements during time of war. Like Dupleix’s dispatches to the Company, the brief paid 
particular attention to how the council’s authority applied within the geographical context of the 
Coromandel Coast. Not only was Madras a mere “30 leagues” from Pondichéry, noted the 
authors, but the “seizure” and “use” of the city was in the interest of the entire “French nation 
established in India”—a sovereign entity on whose behalf only the governor and council could 
rightfully act.310 La Bourdonnais’s claims to jurisdiction in Madras thus extended no further than 
the physical occupation of the “walls, fortifications, and the soil of the town.”311  
 The mémoire did not limit itself merely to discussing the legal foundations of Dupleix’s 
authority in India; it also highlighted how the Superior Council transformed Madras into a 
French colony. Dupleix’s family wrote at length about the factors that made the city into 
sovereign territory at the moment of its capitulation: “The royal pavilion is displayed on its 
walls; French troops have taken possession its fortifications and magazines; the French reign 
supreme there [les Français y disposent de tout en maître]; what better characterizes a French 
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establishment on the Coromandel Coast?”312 They also contrasted the council’s ongoing attempts 
to improve Madras with La Bourdonnais’s negligence during his time there. Whereas Dupleix 
and his councilors delegated power through a subordinate assembly, their first mémoire noted, 
La Bourdonnais insisted on disposing of the city “on his own.” While the governor demanded to 
see the “books” and take “inventory” in the city, the admiral gave the keys to the Madras’s 
treasury to his brother, keeping its accounts secret. Indeed, this lack of access to the city’s 
finances represented one of the primary criticisms in the second mémoire published by Dupleix’s 
family, which complained at length about the city’s missing great books and olas (palm-leaf 
parchments recording Tamil grants, political orders, and financial records).313 In each case, the 
supposed transparency of Dupleix’s administration buttressed his jurisdictional claims, providing 
evidence that he was not empowered to govern Madras on behalf of the king, but that he also 
administered this space properly.  
  Dupleix’s family used these claims to criticize La Bourdonnais for crafting policy meant 
to serve his private interests. An ongoing contention of the superior council was that the admiral 
had so readily agreed to ransom Madras because the British had offered him a bribe of 88,000 
rupees to do so. During the French occupation of the city, Dupleix obtained confessions from 
several leading English employees verifying this claim.314 An inquiry into the matter by British 
officials in 1752 also suggests that some money was exchanged.315 Dupleix likewise incarcerated 
and tried La Bourdonnais’s brother, Jacques Mahé de la Villebague, for reportedly pilfering the 
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British Company’s treasury when he was given the keys to its warehouse.316 While bemoaning 
La Bourdonnais’s attempts to “arrogate” the “authority” of Dupleix and the Superior Council, the 
governor’s family also noted his attempts to produce false witnesses to defend his and Mahé de 
la Villebague’s conduct in India. This “recourse to low artifice,” the family insisted, was 
consistent with his efforts throughout the Madras campaign to conceal corruption under a veneer 
of legitimacy.317 In each mémoire, Dupleix’s family emphasized both the illegitimacy of La 
Bourdonnais’s claims and the immoral agenda behind them. La Bourdonnais not only ignored 
proper procedure by ransoming Madras; he sacrificed the broader interests of both the Company 
and the crown in the pursuit of profit, implanting a tyrannical administration within newly 
acquired French territory to do so.  
 The publication of these successive legal briefs created a sensation throughout Paris in 
early 1751, even if few knew what to make of the conflicting accounts. Crowds formed outside 
La Bourdonnais’s home on the rue d’Enfer, while the king took a personal interest in his case.318 
The ambivalence of the Duc de Luynes provides a sense of both the excitement and confusion. 
Upon reading La Bourdonnais’s mémoire, he praised the admiral for his eloquent writing, which 
demonstrated convincingly that he had “acted within the bounds of the powers given to him, and 
that if he had extended them to their limit, he could have arrested those whom M. Dupleix sent to 
take possession of Madras.”319 After Dupleix’s family published their own factums a few weeks 
later, however, he reversed his position, admitting “that M. la Bourdonnais’s argument has been 
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effectively answered.”320 How the five-man committee interpreted these competing claims is 
unknown, since they did not publish their decision. But since La Bourdonnais was acquitted all 
crimes, his efforts must have convinced at least some of his judges of both his innocence and the 
merits of his interpretation of colonial jurisdiction.    
 More important than the circumstances of this verdict are the common threads within the 
arguments of both Dupleix and La Bourdonnais—the unifying interests and values that each 
promoted as hallmarks of imperial politics. Indra Mukhopadhyay argues that the high-profile 
cases of prominent Company employees created a broad interest in empire among the French 
reading public, immersing them for the first time in the tensions, hierarchies, and power 
dynamics of far-flung colonial outposts.321 As the Madras scandal suggests, these published trial 
briefs not only offered intimate accounts of the politics and intrigue within the Company’s 
settlements, but also descriptions of how royal authority was enacted within distinct geographies 
and spaces. Both La Bourdonnais and Dupleix attempted to transform a Company that had 
historically defended itself against crown encroachment into a distinctly state institution, making 
the corporation complicit in the monarchy’s efforts at empire building and national defense. The 
reactions to La Bourdonnais’s acquittal suggest the impact of this argument. Poems lauding La 
Bourdonnais’s accomplishments made the rounds of the salons, including an acrostic that 
proclaimed, “He would live forever in the hearts of Frenchmen.”322 Voltaire placed La 
Bourdonnais among the great heroes of France’s maritime past like Jean Bart and Abraham 
Duquesne.323 French scholars from the Third Republic built on this trend, reaffirming the place 
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of both Dupleix and La Bourdonnais as national icons in an effort to burnish France’s 
imperializing credentials in the nineteenth century.324     
 In short, while buttressing their claims to jurisdiction in Madras by extending the royal 
reach to India, the two men remade the Company into a centralized, subordinate, and 
fundamentally patriotic institution. Company officials in Paris did much the same thing. 
Desperate for funding in the 1740s, the corporate administration published a flurry of tracts 
designed to convince the crown of the services the Company performed on its behalf. As the 
director François Castanier emphatically declared in a 1746 address, “The Company is the state’s 
affair.”325 These efforts reveal an important shift in the relationship between the Company and 
the monarchy—a growing emphasis among administrators in both colonial and metropolitan 
offices on the unified interests of corporation, crown, and country. In past decades Company 
officials paid lip service to royal authority while promoting their rights to self-government; 
Dupleix’s maneuvering at the beginning of the Madras campaign illustrates the considerable 
latitude afforded to corporate administrators to fight, govern, and negotiate in India. The ironic 
consequence of this push for autonomy, however, was that it created conflicts that ultimately 
forced the Company to reaffirm the supervisory power of the monarchy within the colonial 
sphere.  
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Conclusion  
 The Madras imbroglio illustrates how the Company confronted the problems of empire as 
both a lived reality and an abstract bundle of rights, jurisdictions, and privileges. It charts not 
only the shifting nature of crown and corporate relationships, but also how imperial 
administrators laid claim to new organizing principles of overseas expansion. While Dupleix and 
La Bourdonnais disagreed on how royal sovereignty applied within the newly conquered space 
of Madras, both constructed a vision of empire oriented around a common moral compass: state 
service. Their arguments undercut the realities of French empire as a tangle of competing 
privileges, legal regimes, and rights to emphasize the obligations that bound all subjects to the 
monarchy, regardless of distance or juridical status. Their efforts also suggest a broader change 
in the way people talked about empire in the context of the Old Regime—a shift that 
encompassed not only Company officials, but also traders in the Atlantic ports, colonial 
administrators in Caribbean, and contemporary economic thinkers in Europe. As Paul Cheney 
has shown in his study of the exclusif (the exclusive trading rights to North American commerce 
enjoyed by Nantes, Bordeaux, La Rochelle, and Saint-Malo), merchants increasingly dressed 
parochial agendas in the garb of national economic interest, collapsing metropolitan ports and 
Atlantic settlements into a common imperial space. The physiocrats developed similar arguments 
about the relationship between France and its colonies in the 1760s and 1770s.326 More and more, 
empire was seen to occupy an integral—rather than incidental—place within French political 
culture and political economy.  
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   This episode also reveals an important paradox in the way that Company officials thought 
and wrote about French overseas enterprise. Dupleix and La Bourdonnais invoked different 
traditions of crown law in an effort to advance resolutely personal agendas—first to affirm their 
precedence in colonial affairs and then to gain traction in their ongoing legal feud. In so doing, 
they espoused a language of patriotic service that disavowed any sense of vested interest, 
recalling common humanist arguments about the selfless nature of good citizenship.327 Company 
claims about empire were thus increasingly premised upon the repudiation of private interest, 
even as profit seeking and patrimonial politics were sewn into the very fabric of France’s 
colonial project. As the Company became more involved in military and economic affairs on the 
subcontinent, this contradiction would create both new occasions for conflict and new 
opportunities for legal innovation.   
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CHAPTER 4: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JOSEPH DUPLEIX: COMMERCE, 
AUTHORITY, AND THE SECOND CARNATIC WAR 
 
He can only stand with the bitterness and pain of a citizen who watches his nation, blind to its own 
interests, give up the treasures [he won for it]. 
—Anonymous Mémoire regarding Joseph Dupleix 
 
In a 1755 treatise concerning France’s economic and political standing on the Indian 
subcontinent, Jacques d’Eprémesnil lamented what he considered to be a great “sophism” 
popular among officials in Paris: the idea that “it is not appropriate for a trading company to 
fight a war.”328 To d’Eprémesnil, conflict was an unavoidable “accident”—even for the “wisest 
and steadiest leaders.”329 It was also an opportunity for economic expansion. Military efforts 
shaped around “the land, manners, [and] customs” of India, he argued, would augment the “trade, 
credit, the glory, and the honor of the French nation.”330 If practiced effectively, warfare was not 
only a suitable vocation for a trading company, but also an efficient means of satisfying its 
commercial needs. A long-tenured administrator in the Company, d’Eprémesnil was well versed 
in the politics and commercial practices of the subcontinent. He contrasted his experience with 
the shortsightedness of the Company’s directors in the metropole, whom he believed lacked the 
local knowledge needed to craft effective policy, and who failed to consider suggestions for 
reform from officials stationed abroad. The Company’s continued opposition to aggressive 
expansion was, to him, one of the many examples of its misguided approach to commercial 
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strategy. The “failure to exploit new trading opportunities,” he lamented, “is the first step to 
losing all of one’s commerce.”331   
 D’Eprémesnil had an obvious agenda behind this critique of Company practice: to defend 
the policies of his patron and stepfather-in-law, Joseph Dupleix.332 Dupleix had been dismissed 
nearly two years before for implicating the Company in a series of dynastic struggles in southern 
India—known collectively as the Second Carnatic War (1749-1754). Eager to expand France’s 
territorial holdings, influence, and commercial privileges, the governor committed Company 
soldiers to support claimants in two succession crises: one in Hyderabad, the other in the 
province of the Carnatic. These efforts, and the early victories they produced, brought the 
Company considerable short-term gains. When Company military aid secured Hyderabad in 
1751, the French-backed pretender, Muzaffar Jung, granted France access to a wide swathe of 
revenue-producing lands. Dupleix’s proxy conflicts, however, soon spiraled out of control. 
Alarmed by the prospects of French expansion, the English East India Company stepped into the 
fray behind its own set of claimants. Dupleix soon experienced a series of reverses, culminating 
in a disastrous defeat at the fortress town of Trichinopoly and the death of Chanda Sahib, the 
French claimant for the Carnatic. As the proxy conflict escalated, and as France’s early 
advantages evaporated, the Company directorate eventually lost patience with Dupleix, recalling 
him to France and suing for peace in 1754.  
This chapter examines the fallout from the Second Carnatic War, which moved from a 
vicious internal feud that pitted Dupleix and his supporters against a diverse array of critics in 
both India and France to a public fiasco played out before the Parlement of Paris. 
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D’Eprémesnil’s argument illustrates the crux of this conflict. As his treatise suggests, Dupleix’s 
involvement in the campaigns in Hyderabad and the Carnatic reinvigorated contentious questions 
about economic strategy and political power in France’s colonies. If profit and commercial 
expansion were to be the markers of the Company’s success, what were the limits to appropriate 
behavior by its administrators? Could colonial officials, guided by superior local knowledge and 
trading expertise, ignore or even countermand orders from France when they seemed ill suited to 
conditions on the subcontinent? Should efficiency and proficiency, rather than strict obedience to 
the regulations enforced by the Company’s directors, serve as the markers of good service and 
citizenship? 
An analysis of this conflict underscores the partisan nature of the French colonial project 
in India. As in the aftermath of the Law episode, the ability to redefine the commercial goals of 
the Company represented a significant form of political power. Visions of Company trade were 
not only contingent, uncertain, and changing, but were also inflected by the specific conflicts and 
agendas of corporate employees. The contest between Dupleix and the Company highlights the 
conflicting assumptions about wealth and commercial management that framed debates about 
trade in the early modern period. It likewise shows how these ideas were ordered into a coherent 
economic and political program. The shifting political circumstances on the Indian subcontinent 
provided the opportunity for innovative policymaking. But they also fueled a divisive internal 
conflict concerning both the priority given to France’s overseas colonies, and the bonds linking 
them together as a coherent imperial system.   
 
Empire and Trade 
 Dupleix has often been seen as pivotal figure in the history of empire. In the nineteenth 
century, both French and British scholars saw him as a precocious imperializer who transformed 
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the European colonial project in India from one of modest trade to aggressive territorial 
expansion.333 According to Jouveau-Dubreuil, Dupleix initiated the strategy of nababisme—
grounding French power in Mughal titles, offices, and pecuniary privileges—that the English 
would later put to such effective use in their creation of an Indian empire.334 Thomas Macauly, in 
his triumphalist account of British colonial enterprise in India, compared him favorably with 
Robert Clive, who was soon to achieve fame for his own military exploits on the subcontinent.335   
In each of these accounts, Dupleix has been depicted as a tragic and misunderstood figure, 
unappreciated by a Company that simply failed to grasp the realities of colonial power on the 
subcontinent, and undone by the aggressive factionalism within the corporation.  
A wave of revisionist scholarship on Mughal India, however, raises doubts about 
Dupleix’s supposed foresight as an empire-builder. Instead of an arch-imperialist, Dupleix 
appears in these accounts as one of a number of European and Indian actors seeking legitimacy 
in a post-Mughal world, and as an individual who could not always predict the consequences of 
his policies.336 C.A. Baylay and Muzaffar Alam have both emphasized the political and 
economic vitality of provinces in the north of India during the disintegration of the Mughal 
Empire. Steward Gordon, meanwhile, has explored the sophisticated bureaucracy and taxation 
system of the Mahrattas, the confederation of Hindu princes who ruled in the center and south of 
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the subcontinent.337 This attention to the strength of local political powers during the 1750s and 
1760s undermines arguments that envision Dupleix and other Europeans as simply inserting 
themselves into a political vacuum created by Mughal decline.  
More than anything, Dupleix seems to have borrowed from the strategies of his Indian 
neighbors. Like the princes of the new successor states that emerged along the Coromandel 
Coast in the eighteenth century, the governor realized the importance of grounding his authority 
in Mughal titles and contracts, which he gained by lending out Company soldiers in regional 
conflicts. And like the native “portfolio capitalists” who dominated economic activity in 
southern India, he sought to safeguard Company finances by diversifying its investment practices, 
supplementing trading operations through tax farming, agriculture, and mercenary warfare.338 
Dupleix did not develop a comprehensive “strategy” for the Company as much as privilege 
adaptability and contingency in the formulation of new policy—a vision of empire that 
empowered agents on the ground.   
 Luck and circumstance played a large role in shaping Dupleix’s policies. The setbacks of 
the 1740s, when British raids effectively halted both the Company’s local and European trade, 
left the French settlements heavily in debt and created a growing sense of isolation from the 
corporation’s headquarters in Paris. During his hasty retreat from Madras, La Bourdonnais left 
over 1,000 soldiers behind in the city, a surplus that the French could easily farm out. Dupleix’s 
successful defense of Madras against the vastly superior forces of the Nawab of Arcot showcased 
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the potency of the Company’s army—making these troops attractive as mercenaries. Finally, the 
presence of Chanda Sahib’s family in Pondichéry, where they had resided after his capture by the 
Marathas in 1740, provided Dupleix with an open channel of communication with the would-be 
nawab, allowing the two to build a gradual alliance in the years leading up to the succession 
crisis in the Carnatic.339 
That this slow-developing, unscripted series of developments was recast into an 
innovative policy designed to draw the Company out of economic ruin is a testament to the 
efforts of Dupleix in defending his policies. As French fortunes began to turn in the Second 
Carnatic War, the governor and his supporters drew on a range of commonly rehearsed 
arguments about the Company and its activities, couching their defense of the French military 
effort in familiar debates about the balance of trade, the deleterious effects of unrestrained 
private interests, the pacifying nature of commerce, and the unique circumstances of credit 
acquisition in India. Broadcast in a variety of forums, from correspondence between the 
Company and the Superior Council of Pondichéry to published works of commercial science, 
these apologies for Dupleix each relied upon—and helped crystallize—a common set of 
arguments about trade and its management.    
For Dupleix, arguments about the Carnatic War ultimately hinged on a single question: 
did the Company’s engagement in the proxy wars of southern India actually benefit France? 
France’s early victories netted a series of territorial concessions and tax-collecting rights. With 
the death of Nasir Jung, the English claimant to Hyderabad, the Company obtained land grants 
for Mitchletatam, Covelong, and Nagore, not to mention the jewellery and treasure plundered 
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from the dead Nawab’s camp and given to France as rewards by Chanda Sahib and Muzzafar 
Jung.340 But with Chanda Sahib’s death, the French-supported war effort stagnated; by 1752, the 
English had installed its own pretender, Muhammad Ali, as Nawab of the Carnatic. As the 
French found themselves drawn deeper into a war that offered only dwindling prospects for 
victory, and as concerned parties in Paris began to clamour about the Company’s reverses, 
Dupleix struggled to demonstrate that the concessions he had secured would translate into real 
gains. In 1753, he dispatched two trusted subordinates, his nephew d’Auteuil and a fellow 
councillor Amat, to convince the directors of the value of his conquest. Although d’Auteuil 
quickly repudiated his uncle in Paris, Amat remained loyal, publishing a treatise that discussed in 
detail the value of Dupleix’s new concessions.341   
   This defense relied on a specific vision of commerce, one in which cost and profit 
mattered more than either political considerations in Europe or jurisdictional agreements made in 
India. In a 1753 mémoire written to the Company, Dupleix noted that the new territories acquired 
from Chanda Sahib and Muzzafar Jung had yielded 1,090,200 rupees that year, and predicted 
that their value would increase by nearly 500,000 rupees in 1754.342 Supporters of Dupleix, who 
included most of the senior officials in Pondichéry, family members and clients in France, and 
even some interested onlookers who heard of his exploits, also offered more qualitative 
measurements in his defense. The comte de Bussy, Dupleix’s chief commander in the Deccan, 
reported that the Company had acquired “forests of teak wood”, a bounty of “roots” used to 
make painted fabrics, and an abundance of navigable rivers on which to build a “port” or “shelter 
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for Company ships” during the monsoon season.”343 In each case, Dupleix and his apologists 
contrasted the ostensibly low cost of France’s military enterprise with favorable calculations 
about future revenues. 
More important than these profit projections, however, was the idea that the territory 
would add stability to the Company. In the same treatise, Dupleix expounded on the difficulties 
that overseas corporations faced in maintaining a favorable trading balance, avoiding the 
exhaustion of national bullion reserves, and building a colonial infrastructure. “The truth,” he 
argued, “is that no trading company can sustain itself by the profits of its commerce”—a “fixed 
revenue,” secured through the taxation of new territory, was required to fund the construction of 
ships, fortifications, and warehouses, and to compensate for lean years.344 Dupleix juxtaposed the 
Company’s commercial failures with the success of the Dutch, who had created a flourishing 
settler colony in Batavia, and who actively expanded their territorial holdings in the Indonesian 
archipelago. His argument recalled years of grumbling by Company employees about the 
corporation’s insufficient capitalization of its Indian factories—much of which called for looser 
restrictions on private trade to create a more reliable supply of specie. It also evoked an ongoing 
concern, expressed as far back as Colbert’s establishment of the first Company, that Indian 
commerce would deplete France of its stores of bullion. Dupleix, however, went far beyond such 
targeted complaints about corporate policy. Instead, he offered a fundamental reevaluation of 
France’s Indian enterprise, reorienting it toward the acquisition of taxable property rather than 
tradable commodities.    
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This proposition depended on the idea that the colonial marketplace was a finite space, 
and that trade in India was thus a zero-sum game in which Europeans competed over limited 
quantities of resources, choice territory, and fixed supplies of credit. As one anonymous author 
wrote in support of the Company’s acquisition of new territory, “the commerce of one nation 
cannot be established or increased except at the expense of another.”345 The anxious writings of 
British officials in Madras in 1751, who feared that the concessions given to the Company would 
enable the French to “annoy,” “levy customs” on, and “ruin” English commerce,346 suggests that 
such an aggressive understanding of market relations was not just posturing on the part of 
Dupleix’s supporters. Indeed, commercial theorists throughout the eighteenth century commonly 
described trade as a war-like rivalry with clear winners and losers, even if few would have gone 
so far as to extend these bellicose analogies into an endorsement for violence.347  
Dupleix did not so much argue that war was a necessary component of commerce as 
insist upon the uniqueness of trading conditions in India. D’Eprémesnil, for instance, blasted 
Company officials for their stubborn belief that commerce adhered to “simple constants” and 
“invariable principles,” and for flattening the complexities of the natural world to force it to 
cohere to universal “laws of gravity and motion.”348 Here was a critique of an entire corpus of 
Enlightenment writings on trade, from Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws to Hume’s conjectural 
theory. Untutored in the practicalities of corporate trade, these thinkers relied upon uniform 
principles to explain commercial development—constructing cultural and political taxonomies, 
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creating standardized rules for human behavior, and applying abstract theories of natural science. 
Dupleix’s supporters, by contrast, argued that commerce simply did not adhere to such rigid 
principles, and that only those who had experienced the vagaries of trade in India were thus 
qualified to speak about it. As another observer noted in a 1753 treatise: “We say that war is evil, 
that peace is good, but before elevating one over the other, let us learn of the actual 
circumstances”349 
Central to this distinction between totalizing theories of political economy and 
contextually specific commercial practices was the ambiguous concept of credit. As scholars of 
early modern France have recently shown, credit, or crédit, was an imprecise term—operating at 
once as a marker of reputation and individual status within traditional patronage relationships 
and as an instrument of exchange within impersonal economic transactions. These seemingly 
conflicting moral and material foundations of credit were by no mean mutually exclusive.350 
Social esteem often served as a form of capital within financial negotiations, where elites traded 
on their name to secure lines of credit, and personal wealth provided access to the ennoblements 
and offices that transformed roturiers into nobility. In Paris, financiers regularly exploited their 
connections in the royal court to secure contracts and favorable loans.351 
The Company found this complex entanglement of social status with borrowing and 
lending power particularly difficult to navigate in India. As relative latecomers to the 
subcontinent, the French struggled to win the confidence of indigenous moneylenders, 
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particularly along the Coromandel Coast. Pondichéry was caught between too many competing 
economic and political centers, from Madras and Porto Novo to Negapatam and Arcot, to attract 
a sufficient settlement of merchants, suppliers, and lenders.352 The Company’s limitations on 
private trade, meanwhile, foreclosed attempts to improve this situation by creating new 
commercial relationships. Credit was highly personal—grounded in the individual relationships 
between French merchants and their indigenous partners, and in the status of the Indian 
intermediaries who negotiated on the Company’s behalf. Dependability in repaying debts, 
knowledge of regional customs and practices, and the ability to simultaneously navigate multiple 
systems of influence and power all played a critical role in determining French access to local 
money markets. 
To many Company employees, there was a clear correlation between the corporation’s 
level of local esteem and its inadequate supply of regional credit. In his 1755 essay Sur le Crédit 
de la Nation dans l’Inde, D’Eprémesnil produced a long list of factors that had eroded the native 
confidence in the Company: the Jesuit persecution of the Company’s Indian intermediaries, 
French ignorance of local practices, and the niggardly disposition of the Tamil merchants settled 
around Pondichéry.353 This treatise was not just a list of random grievances based on abstract 
principles of commercial science, but rather a systematic critique of Company practices 
grounded in knowledge of the political, economic, and cultural conditions along the Coromandel 
Coast. The councils of the French settlements registered a similar set of complaints. A common 
theme in the correspondence between Chandernagor and Pondichéry, as well as Pondichéry and 
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Paris, was the inability of Company employees to transform themselves into “reputable” figures 
on the subcontinent. 
In both India and France, Dupleix’s supporters fixated on this connection between 
personal and material capital as a justification for his policies. War, claimed Bussy, pulled the 
“the French name” out of “ruin, ignominy, and opprobrium,” securing French commerce by 
raising the Company to “the highest point of native esteem.”354 D’Eprémesnil recorded similar 
sentiments, noting that “credit in India is absolutely dependent on the reputation of the [French] 
governors.”355 If Dupleix’s conquests granted the Company a stable source of revenue, the logic 
ran, then the esteem won through French feats of arms provided it with a real foundation through 
which to cultivate new commercial relationships. Such formulations crystallized decades of 
complaints about the low esteem of Company merchants into an argument that reputation 
represented the source of power for the French in India. As one writer noted, “the good 
appearance that they [Bussy and Dupleix] have made with the Indian Nabobs, and the high 
opinion that these Nabobs have of them, represent a real force for the Company.”356 To 
Dupleix’s supporters, the Company’s conspicuous displays of honor, glory, and élan rendered its 
merchants dependable in the eyes of both native powerbrokers and other European and Christian 
traders. Military victory achieved what many had hoped looser restrictions on private trade 
would accomplish, extending French influence into new political and commercial spheres.  
Such assertions had far-reaching implications, for they not only illustrated the value 
gained by Dupleix’s proxy wars, but also suggested a new way of conceptualizing legitimate 
                                                
354 ANOM, 25 DFC 93, Entretien de deux seigneurs mogols (1753). The skill of French soldiers was recognized by 
Indian rulers, and they were sought out as mercenaries by a number of Indian leaders. Jean-Marie Lafont, Fauj-i-
Khas: Maharaja Ranjit Singh and his French Officers (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) p. 9, 72-75.     
355 AN, 158 AP 14 Jacques III Duval D’Eprémesnil, “Sur le Crédit de la Nation dans l’Inde” (1755). 
356 ANOM 25 DFC 95, Mémoire sur l’Inde. 
147 
authority within the Company. From the propaganda of Charpentier to the polemics of Law, 
from the published texts of Melon to the correspondence of an assortment of corporate directors 
and investors, a common sentiment regarding the Company was that one its primary functions 
was to supervise and discipline its employees. The corporation extended both the sovereignty 
and the regulatory power of the king to distant colonial spaces; it controlled refractory traders, 
and transformed overseas commerce from a morally hazardous activity to a productive vocation 
undertaken on behalf of the state. The idea that merchants required such stringent moral policing 
had long served as a justification for the Company’s restriction of private trade. Dupleix’s claim 
that personal reputation and local knowledge represented the core of Company power in India 
explicitly challenged this heavy-handed regulation of the Asian settlements.  
Consider the variety of claims that identified the experience of the Company’s 
employees—rather than the regulatory apparatus put in place by the corporation—as the 
fundamental source of strength for French trade in the subcontinent. As one long-tenured 
employee noted in his discussion whether or not to surrender the Company’s land concessions in 
order to broker a peace with the English: “I maintain that it’s necessary to be in India to judge 
and decide according to the circumstances whether to sacrifice [them].”357 Another memoirist 
saw Dupleix’s experience as a necessary credential in the formulation of colonial policy: “the 
governor has a knowledge without which it would be difficult of perhaps even impossible to 
succeed in managing the interests of the Company [parvenir à concilier les intérêts de la 
Compagnie].”358 According to this logic, experience and expertise stood as the ultimate marker 
of authority within the Company—and as the most reliable safeguard against corruptive self-
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interests. The “spirit” of the corporation, noted D’Eprémesnil, “is manifested in a code of 
conduct that discharges the directors and makes the [colonial] employees responsible for what 
they cannot manage.”359  
Many of the tracts written in defense of Dupleix were thus laced with a powerful critique 
of the Company. While the expertise of individual employees safeguarded the French 
commercial interests, the Company created a culture of ignorance, peculation, and double-
dealing. Bussy argued that the Dupleix’s critics among the Company directorate were “oblivious 
to the interests of the Company,” and that they grounded their criticisms of the governor’s 
initiative in “deceit and false zeal.”360 Dupleix, meanwhile, turned the common trope of Asiatic 
primitiveness on its head, blasting his critics in France for thinking “a little too much like the 
oriental who cannot see beyond the present.”361 Central to each of these arguments was the idea 
that the Company empowered the wrong people, and that the institutional structures put in place 
to maintain order and probity actually hampered the profitability of Company operations. If 
Dupleix’s actions actually benefitted the Company, and if the critics among his superiors were 
too blind or self-interested to understand the advantages he had secured, who should have the 
final say in crafting corporate policy? In short, the attempt to justify Dupleix’s actions in the 
Carnatic War ultimately revealed a more general criticism of how authority was distributed 
within the Company.  
By 1753, Dupleix’s efforts had earned him a wide range of supporters. Some were 
closely implicated in his projects of expansion; others were random observers with a dilettantish 
                                                
359 AN, 158 AP 14 Jacques III Duval D’Eprémesnil, Réflexions sur les affaires des Indes,1753. 
360 ANOM, 25 DFC 96, Extrait d’une Lettre de M. Bussy à la Compagnie, 1753. 
361 ANOM, 25 DFC 93, Mémoire de M. Dupleix concernant le commerce de l'Inde. 
 
149 
interest in the problems of empire and trade. Some were high-placed members of the Company 
bureaucracy; others were anonymous employees. Yet despite this wide range of backgrounds and 
affiliations, these writers each focused on a common set of themes. They all lauded the value of 
Dupleix’s conquests by placing his achievements within a broader framework of Indian business 
relationships and credit structures. They each drew a clear connection between experience with 
overseas trade and claims to authenticity and trustworthiness—inverting the Company’s claim to 
moral authority by investing it in the employees who operated furthest outside its institutional 
controls. Elaborating upon decades of grievances voiced by Company employees, these 
arguments posed a radical challenge to the very idea of a state-enforced commercial monopoly. 
 
Managing Trade, Managing Traitors 
Company officials responded to the news of Dupleix’s early victories with guarded 
optimism, tempering their celebration of these triumphs with admonitions for caution. In an 
October 1750 letter, for instance, the directors wished the governor every success in his alliance 
with Chanda Sahib, but also expressed their concern that future victories would cause the Indian 
princes around them to view the Company as either “dangerous meddlers, or as a “resource” they 
could exploit “in their private quarrels.”362 Such concerns became more pronounced as the 
French war effort bogged down. In its correspondence from April 1751, the Company pressed 
Dupleix to bring about a peaceful resolution to the various conflicts in which he was engaged.363 
It made a similar push two weeks later: while noting that they “could only applaud the wisdom 
of [Dupleix’s] arrangements,” the Paris directors warned that they “could not regard” France’s 
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new gains as “assured until the governor concluded a solid peace.”364 After the defeat at 
Trichinopoly, these criticisms became more frequent and less restrained.   
Dupleix attempted to broker a peace with the English that would allow him to maintain 
the titles and concessions granted to the French. In a tendentious letter sent to the governor of 
Madras, John Saunders, he shifted the blame for the conflict to England. But the English 
employees in India were unwilling to agree to his version of events, and the royal diplomats in 
Europe refused to concede to his demands for peace. As the war continued, shipments to France 
were increasingly delayed or cancelled. Frustrations mounted as Dupleix’s reports about 
territories won, privileges secured, and concessions earned failed to translate into tangible gains. 
The royal commissioner to the Company, Etienne de Silhouette expressed this irritation pithily in 
a 1752 letter to Dupleix: “No victories, no conquests, lots of merchandise and little increase in 
the dividend [paid to investors].”365 The strained cycle of accusation and unconvincing 
justification finally culminated in Dupleix’s recall and replacement by the director Charles 
Godehau on 2 August 1754. 
Many of the scholars who have chronicled the Company’s response to the Second 
Carnatic War frame this reaction as a collision between two incommensurable visions of the 
colonial project: one based on trade, the other on conquest.366 The Company’s continued 
demands for a peaceful conclusion to the Carnatic Wars seem to bear out this claim. Yet an 
overriding desire for peace only partially explains the opposition to Dupleix, which developed in 
concert with the French war effort rather than at the opening of hostilities. The directors’ letters 
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to the governor, for instance, betray an assortment of concerns: anxieties about the expense of 
the governor’s campaigns, about the difficulty of defending new territory, and about the 
logistical challenge of maintaining a large military presence so far from France. For them, 
arguments about the relationship between peace and commerce were grounded in more basic 
claims about the proper management of trade and the nature of Company wealth. The 
controversy over the Second Carnatic Wars crystallized such ideas into a powerful new 
justification for corporate regulation.     
Dupleix attracted a wide range of opponents; his ambition had made him enemies 
throughout his career, particularly after the seizure of Madras. Among his most vocal critics were 
Jean-Baptiste Machault d’Arnouville, the controller-general; Pierre-Claude Delaître, a syndic; 
and Silhouette.367 Hostility toward the governor, however, ran far deeper than these senior 
officials. As Philip Haudrère has argued, there was a broad consensus of opinion against Dupleix 
among the shareholders, who feared that his machinations would reduce the value of their 
dividends.368 From this tangle of offices, motives, and agendas emerged a common sentiment 
that would color perceptions of overseas merchants for years to come: in stepping outside the 
Company’s normal circuits of regulation, Dupleix had sacrificed French interests to his own 
avarice and ambition. 
Even before the defeat at Trichinopoly, such wide-ranging opposition boiled over into ad 
hominem attacks. Charges of moral corruption, oriental despotism, and untrammeled greed were 
frequently leveled against the governor. According to Silhouette, Dupleix had sold himself and 
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the Company to the highest Indian bidder.369 Another writer represented the governor as a tyrant 
who left in his wake a string of “broken treaties” and “500,000 burnt homes.” France’s enemies 
on the subcontinent, he asserted, opposed “M. Dupleix,” not the “the Company.”370 That Dupleix 
had become a larger-than-life figure in the south of India was hardly disputed. The governor 
founded a string of eponymous settlements of the new lands granted to the Company, including 
the town of Dupleix-Fath-ábad on the site of the French victory against Nasir Jung.371 He was 
granted a number of private land concessions (jacquirs), and adopted prominent Mughal titles 
and emoluments. Muzaffar Jung named Dupleix Nawab of a territory stretching from the Kristna 
River to Cape Comarin on the southern tip of the subcontinent, and invested him with the mahi-
o-maratib, a fish standard representing one of the highest markers of Mughal sovereignty.372 To 
his critics, this conspicuous display of pecuniary interest and glory seeking—all of it marred by 
the oppressive, indolent, and decadent features of the oriental world—offered a clear reminder of 
how colonial order could break down if not carefully girded by corporate restrictions.373  
A recurring theme in the critiques written about Dupleix leading up to his recall was that 
by sidestepping the Company’s administrative hierarchy, the governor had implicated France in 
developments far beyond his control. Even at the height of French success in 1750, Dupleix’s 
efforts created unforeseen perils: that year, an army under Nasir Jung got as far as nine miles 
away from Pondichéry before being turned back; several senior Company officers mutinied; and 
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Chanda Sahib ignored his campaign plans and forced the French to commit to an invasion of the 
nearby kingdom of Tanjore.374 The pitfalls seemed to multiply as the conflicts in Hyderabad and 
the Carnatic dragged on. The Paris directors cautioned Dupleix that his actions had created a new 
culture of violence in India, where European powers would look to any future succession crisis 
as a pretense for challenging French gains along the Coromandel Coast.375 Jean Guignard de 
Saint-Priest, a royal commissioner to the Company, reported a similar sense of foreboding, 
noting that “the private letters from India speak of nothing but the flight of weavers, the 
desertion of merchants, and the emptying of the country.”376 
Such criticisms relied on an understanding of trade that went beyond simple projections 
about cost and profit. As one anonymous critic wrote, “the affairs of India… are not just the 
concerns of company to company, but of nation to nation.”377 Consider Delaître’s response to a 
letter from Georges de Leyrit, the governor of Chandernagor, reporting on the turmoil in Bengal 
resulting from Dupleix’s campaigning. In an addendum that he forwarded to Machault, Delaître 
wrote that the Company could follow two paths: a tranquil one in which it maintained a modest 
set of settlements and trading privileges and honored the claims of its European and indigenous 
neighbors, and an aggressive route like Dupleix’s. This second approach, he warned, required the 
Company to continue sending “ships, men, and money,” “ran the risk of war in Europe,” and 
ensured ongoing hostility against the French settlements in India.378 Even if Dupleix’s 
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machinations generated immediate returns for the Company in the form of tax revenue—
something that few of the governor’s enemies were willing to concede—they failed to cover the 
losses France had incurred to its international reputation. “No one would believe that we mean to 
restrain ourselves within the bounds of moderation,” Delaître wrote, “as long as everything is in 
the hands of a man who breathes nothing but aggrandizement.”379  
The Company evaluated Dupleix’s actions against a backdrop of tense internal politics 
and anxious international diplomacy. In 1744, the corporation began holding regular investor 
meetings as a concession to its stockholders, upon whom it had imposed a string of forced loans. 
Empowered by this new emphasis on shareholder advocacy, the syndics (officers tasked with 
advocating on behalf of the Company’s shareholders) grew into a powerful lobbying group. The 
mounting costs of the war effort, which imposed new burdens on the shareholders even as 
Dupleix extolled the virtues of his new conquests, provided them with a platform to air their 
grievances and expand the powers of the shareholders.380  
Delaître, for instance, wrote a scathing review of the Company in his 1750 Observations 
sur le gouvernement passé et présent de la Compagnie des Indes. In it, he criticized the 
corporation’s administration, which was fractured by “jealousy,” “collusion”, and nepotism in 
France, and rendered ineffective by competing factions of incompetent favorites in the colonial 
settlements.381 Dupleix provided the perfect foil for Delaître’s attack, which sought to show how 
the despotic power of the Company’s royal commissioners prevented the syndicate from 
exercising any real authority. With the syndics thus constrained, he claimed, the Company had 
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no means of controlling recalcitrant employees like Dupleix, who exploited his position as 
governor of India to accrue a “fortune” and an assortment of “private benefits.”382 
Delaître used these growing anxieties about Dupleix to propose several reforms: 
increasing the regulatory powers of the syndics, giving stock to the directors in order to ensure 
their interest in developing the corporation, and reducing the arbitrary control of the royal 
commissioners.383 What Delaître wanted was not only to imbue the syndicate with greater 
authority, but also to create a new set of institutional controls in order to rein in various abuses. 
He hoped to establish a new culture of accountability, and to ensure that the shareholders 
received adequate protection for their investments. The syndic expressed what was to become a 
common argument among Dupleix’s enemies: that overseas commerce must be bounded by a 
system of self-reinforcing interests in order to be productive. His arguments illustrate the climate 
of reform that had developed around the Company as a result of the institutional shake-ups of the 
1740s. They also hint at how the chaos of the Second Carnatic Wars was used to advocate for 
new policy and the creation of a new institutional culture. 
Concerns over international diplomacy further shaped the Company’s criticism of 
Dupleix. The governor wrote at length about the revenues that would be generated by his new 
territory. His opponents, by contrast, argued that trade should be measured through a more 
sophisticated calculus—one that registered financial concerns alongside considerations for 
dynastic politics, conventions of international law, and the geo-strategic imperatives of the 
French state.384 The tension between the economic imperatives of trade and this broader set of 
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political and legal concerns was put on spectacular display during the Anglo-French peace 
negotiations in London. Diplomats on both sides feared that the Carnatic Wars would expand to 
Europe, and the English insisted on Dupleix’s recall as a condition for peace. Machault 
d’Arnouville, upon whom the responsibility to sack Dupleix ultimately rested, dismissed the 
governor in large part to placate the English.385 
Central to all of these claims was the idea that the Company performed a key mediating 
function, calibrating its commercial activities so as to manage the often-conflicting interests of 
crown, employee, and investor. The restrictions put in place over the colonial settlements—the 
Company’s prohibitions on private commerce, its injunctions against conquering new territory—
were meant to make trade predictable and dependable, and thus safeguard the delicate balance of 
agendas that infused France’s overseas enterprise. According to critics like Delaître and 
Machault d’Arnouville, the Second Carnatic War represented a breakdown of this harmonious 
system. From the explosion of hostilities in India to the failure of negotiations with England, and 
from the new military costs imposed on the Company to the marginalization of its 
shareholders—the ill effects of this development were felt numerous times over. 
By 1753, the Company’s patience was at an end. While Dupleix pled his case from afar, 
and Amat defended him in Paris, dissatisfaction over the flagging war effort united a diverse 
array of critics against the governor: royal commissioners, corporate directors, syndics, investors, 
and employees in India. These complaints created a culture of opposition to the governor as 
Machault d’Arnouville worked to create a peace with the English. They also provided a forceful 
reminder that commerce must be managed to be productive—or at the very least nondestructive. 
Few believed Dupleix’s description of the costs and benefits of his campaign, or accepted the 
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political economy that he used to justify his arguments.386 Indeed, just as Dupleix used the 
conflict in India as a way of rethinking authority within the Company, his opponents turned his 
exploits into a new justification for corporate control. The Company, with its procedures and 
hierarchy, served as the marker of legitimate colonial enterprise; the unguided actions of colonial 
employees, by contrast, represented a dangerous moral hazard—even when couched in claims 
about potential profitability. In the wake of Dupleix’s recall, these internal discussions boiled 
over into a divisive judicial dispute. The very logic behind the Company’s management of 
overseas commerce was put on trial.  
 
Trials and Tribulations 
  
 In his 15 October 1754 diary entry, Ananda Ranga Pillai recorded the tragic scene of 
Dupleix’s recall, contrasting the ambitions of a once “great” man with the unceremonious 
circumstances of his departure.387 The colored flag, traditionally hoisted over the hotel de ville to 
honor a governor on his return to France, was conspicuously absent; Dupleix in every sense 
seemed a defeated man. Where he once defended his policies with such vigor as to challenge the 
very logic behind underpinning Company commerce, he now quietly advised his replacement, 
Charles Godehau, on how to rule in his stead. Although he was unhappy to see his longtime 
superior forced from the place where had once “hoped to leave his bones,” Ranga Pillai was 
unwilling to spare him much remorse: “Such is the fate of the man,” he wrote, “who seeks his 
own will without the fear of God.”388 
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Initially, Dupleix’s recall seemed to settle the conflict over colonial authority and 
Company policy begun by the Carnatic War. Soon after assuming the governorship, Godehau 
signed a treaty with the British to bring the fighting to an end. Dupleix, meanwhile, seemed to 
follow the course of quiet compliance outlined by his dubash. Upon reaching France, he was 
forced into a retirement. Although the directors stripped him of all his former offices and duties, 
they mostly left him alone, hoping the controversies of the last three years would quickly fade 
away. Such aspirations, however, proved fleeting; Dupleix would not be so easily consigned to 
the margins.   
 While he was willing to accept his expulsion from India, Dupleix also expected to be 
compensated for the personal expenses he had incurred during the wars. With the English fleet 
limiting supplies of bullion from France, Dupleix claimed he was forced to advance money for 
the war effort from his personal fortune. After returning to France, he wrote letters to the 
Company reminding it of its debts. His wife also contributed to this epistolary campaign, as did 
his nephew, Colonel Jacques Kerjean—an influential employee recalled to Europe because of his 
loyalty to Dupleix.389 When the Company ignored these entreaties, he sued it before the 
Parlement of Paris. This attempt to force the Company’s hand escalated into a decade-long series 
of legal disputes. These involved suits and countersuits between Dupleix and the Company, and 
defamation cases involving Godehau, Dupleix’s wife, and several prominent employees. Each 
trial led to new scandals, new libels, and new delays. Indeed, a judgment concerning the original 
indemnity suit would not be passed until 1776, when Dupleix’s assets from India were unfrozen 
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and his debts restructured. It took the direct intervention of Louis XVI to settle the case for good 
in 1790.390   
 More significant than how these cases were resolved is the way that they reignited—and 
ultimately reframed—the debates about empire and trade precipitated by Dupleix’s campaigns in 
India. Over hundreds of pages of legal briefs, the disgraced governor and the Company squared 
off over the principles and practicalities of colonial trade. What had begun as an internal conflict 
over policy and configurations of Company power evolved into a widely read cause célèbre. As 
Sarah Maza argues, judicial proceedings grew into a source of public consumption in the 1760s 
and 1770s; the briefs (mémoires judiciaires) from particularly celebrated trials were reprinted 
cheaply and sold by the thousands, and the forensic arguments within them couched in a 
sentimental language meant to drum up popular support for the defendants. As interest in these 
legal dramas grew, barristers used particularly sensational cases to advocate for larger political 
causes: they crafted stories not only to educate readers about the circumstances of a particular 
crime, but also to undermine the despotic policies of the crown, reinforce gender hierarchies, and 
effect judicial reform.391  
The drawn-out proceedings of the Dupleix case reflected many of these practices. Hoping 
to garner popular support for their claims, each side in this judicial contest employed the 
common techniques of forensic writing to make their arguments relatable and attractive to an 
audience untutored in foreign commerce. They presented biographical narratives laced with 
larger-than-life stories of tragedy and triumph, creating an emotional connection with their 
readership. They reduced complex calculations about credit, profit, and the moral and political 
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consequences of trade down to simple themes of equity, reciprocity, and fair compensation. And 
they called on an abstract public, and the reasoned opinion that supposedly guided it, as the 
ultimate arbiters in their judicial conflicts. Here competing claims about the political economy of 
empire adopted the tendentious tone and sensationalized style of the trial brief.    
 Dupleix’s first mémoire judiciaire offers an illuminating view into this blend of 
commercial science, biography, and legal writing. A firsthand narrative by Dupleix, the factum 
detailed his employment record and explained his motivations for publishing against the 
Company. The treatise was infused with pathos: Dupleix wrote at length about the calumniating 
enemies who forced him from the path of “moderation” and silence” after returning to France; 
about his need to sell his wife’s “jewelry” in order to rescue Pondichéry from the brink of 
insolvency; about the spiteful officials in Lorient who impounded his personal effects—
including his wife’s clothes; and about the Company’s willingness to profit from his efforts and 
expenditures without adequately compensating him.392 This tragedy-ridden framework served 
two purposes: it provided an index of Dupleix’s service to France, and established a personal 
connection between the governor and his wider reading audience. Indra Mukhopadhyay, for 
instance, compares the structure of Dupleix’s trial briefs to the narrative framing of eighteenth-
century epistolary novels, which drew the audience in by breaking down by the barrier between 
author and reader.393 
 Dupleix and his family combined this theme of individual loss with legal arguments 
about the relationship between the Company and its employees to illustrate the nature of the 
corporation’s debt obligations. In his first mémoire he grounded his claims in a simple call for 
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fair treatment by his superiors in the Company—all set against a backdrop of arbitrary policy, 
“cruel” calculation, and persecution.394 In a follow-up brief published in 1758, he elaborated on 
this assertion through specific references to contractual law, depicting himself as a proxy 
empowered to act on the Company’s behalf in India and entitled to compensation for all 
expenses incurred in this capacity.395 As he did in the letters written to the corporate directorate 
before his recall, Dupleix appended tables detailing the overall cost of his campaigns, the 
personal funds he contributed to the French war effort, and the projected revenues from the 
territorial concessions granted by Chanda Sahib and Muzzafar Jung.396 He relied upon an 
imprimatur of empiricism and legal precedent to legitimize his narrative of personal suffering, 
contrasting the transparency of his ledger books with the Company’s shadowy attempts to 
discredit his accounting.397  
 Dupleix’s case evolved from a series of arguments concerning his rights to compensation 
into a systematic critique of French imperial policy. “India,” he noted in his second legal brief, 
“is a chasm where money perpetually enters but never leaves.”398 Throughout his various 
mémoires, Dupleix recapitulated his earlier theories about the nature of colonial commerce, 
noting the importance of initiative, credit, and experience of individual traders. He argued that he 
was not only legal empowered as governor of Pondichéry to negotiate treaties and incur debts on 
the Company’ behalf, but that he was also compelled by the logics of overseas trade to commit to 
these acts without delaying to consult authorities in France. Dupleix hired Pierre le Gennes, the 
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attorney who had represented La Bourdonnais in 1751, to argue on his behalf in the 
compensation suit. An ironic consequence of this decision was that Dupleix ended up using 
many of the claims La Bourdonnais had earlier employed against him to criticize Company 
policy. While Dupleix professed his enduring fidelity to the Company and its economic interests, 
he painted the corporate administration as self-interested, averse to innovation, and jealous of its 
authority. This complaint centered both on particular employees, like Charles Godehau, and on 
the corporation’s management of trade in general. 
 Dupleix framed his claims as an appeal to an abstract group of public arbiters; references 
to earning the “public confidence,” to being “under the eyes of the public,” and to an “educated 
public” peppered his forensic writing.399 This narrative construction implicitly challenged 
Company authority. Duplex’s allusions to popular opinion were not merely symbolic flourishes; 
they were an acknowledgement of the readers who followed his trial with voyeuristic interest, 
and an attempt to press these spectators into his cause. Dupleix wrote in such a way as to 
illustrate the intricate circumstances of colonial commerce to a readership untutored in the 
principles of trade; he then called on this audience to render a verdict based on universal 
standards of justice and equity. Such appeals fundamentally undermined one of the Company’s 
central claims to legitimacy: the notion that only a group of commercial specialists, restrained 
through a rigid hierarchy and a wide assortment of disciplinary measures, could decipher and 
manage the exotic circumstances of trade in India. Throughout his legal briefs, Dupleix called on 
non-specialists to support his vision of commercial development. He “empowered” them to 
measure the economic interests of the French nation, and, ultimately, to sanction his claims about 
the proper relationship between the Company and its employees.  
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 At first, Company officials ignored Dupleix’s petitions, hoping to muffle his cries for 
compensation with their silence. But the former governor’s tenacity for litigation eventually 
compelled the corporation to respond with its own mémoire judiciaire in 1761. Charles Godehau, 
Jacques Maissin, and Jacques Law de Lauriston—employees who were both libeled by Dupleix 
in his trial briefs—also brought their own suits against him. So too did a number of his 
creditors.400 These campaigns employed many of the same legal strategies as Dupleix; they 
appealed to popular sentiment, and reduced technical problems of commercial management 
down to more easily digestible questions about Dupleix’s character and motives. In the process, 
the litigants recycled arguments made about the Company and its authority during the initial 
debates over the Carnatic War. 
 Whereas Dupleix framed his case as that of an individual denied just payment by faithless 
corporate administrators, the parties who opposed the governor adopted a different strategy: each 
claimed that he had purposefully deceived the Company. Godehau, for instance, accused the 
governor of violating longstanding Company regulations against participating in local wars, and 
of arrogating the political authority of the Paris directors to himself.401 He cited Dupleix’s 
frequent usage of the Persian title given to him by Muzaffar Jung, Zapherzingue Bahadour—
“always brave and victorious”—as evidence that the governor had forgotten his obligations to 
the Company in the pursuit of local power and esteem.402 Law de Lauriston echoed these claims. 
He insisted that the governor had “spilled [French] blood in order to fill his coffers with gold,” 
and had misrepresented the cost of the war to the Company’s directors.403 Like Godehau, Law de 
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Lauriston argued that Dupleix’s ambitions made him dangerous and untrustworthy: “Brothers-in-
law, nephews, parents, and friends; all, by turn, are sacrificed to his various caprices.”404  
 A number of the different litigants complained about Dupleix’s desire to hide his crimes 
through cunning and false sentimentality. One of Law’s witnesses, for instance, condemned the 
governor for “writing for the public”: for hiring a “famous and eloquent barrister” to dress his 
arguments in attractive “falsehoods and lies.”405 The Company leveled similar charges in a 1761 
mémoire written in response to his lawsuit. Here Company agents criticized the governor for 
masking the real history of the Second Carnatic War behind irrelevant stories about his family, 
personal struggles, and service record. “The questions that should be discussed”—about Chanda 
Sahib’s legitimacy, about Dupleix’s status as a creditor for the Company, and about the utility of 
territorial holdings in India—are “the only ones that sieur Dupleix does not explain,” declared 
the Company’s memoirist.406 These complaints extended beyond the tone and structure of the 
governor’s writing. The Company also protested his long history misleading his superiors, from 
the “tricks of the pen” that he used to mask the costs of his campaigns to his mendacious reports 
about military conditions in India.407 
 In its countersuit, the Company built on evidence of Dupleix’s dishonesty to reinforce its 
central claims about overseas trade. The 1761 mémoire thus emphasized the importance of peace 
in promoting commerce, particularly in a region as lawless and disorderly as India.408 Indeed, the 
Company’s barristers wasted little time in laying out the principles for appropriate commercial 
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practice. In their introductory remarks, they emphasized that “commerce should be restrained” 
by law and regulations, lauding the Company’s hierarchy for balancing order with initiative, and 
mercantile expertise with respect for royal authority.409 The piece juxtaposed accounts of 
Dupleix’s double-dealing with reminders about the need for good bookkeeping and the 
importance of invariable regulations in controlling recalcitrant employees.410 These arguments 
not only challenged the governor’s claim to have improved Company trade through aggressive 
expansion; they fundamentally undercut his argument that overseas commerce could not be 
successfully managed according to fixed principles of governance and political economy.   
  The company used the trial to promote itself as a safeguard for the nation’s commercial 
interests. Like Dupleix, the corporation’s barristers lined their forensic writing with references to 
a popular audience unfamiliar with the rudiments of colonial trade. In its mémoire, the Company 
represented its shareholders as a microcosm of the general public, with the interests of investors 
aligning perfectly with that of the French population as a whole.411 Rather than call upon this 
readership to render judgment on France’s colonial politics, however, the Company reaffirmed 
its place as a supervisory institution that sifted through and balanced the competing political and 
economic interests that infused the French colonial project. Company writers spilled hundreds of 
pages of ink refuting the details of Dupleix’s argument—all of which was framed as a means of 
correcting popular misconceptions about the events surrounding the Second Carnatic War. But 
the Company also insisted that it was by no means obligated to educate outsiders about the 
vagaries of colonial politics. The 1761 mémoire noted that the corporation was an instrument of 
the state, “tied to the government by its administration and the protections it received,” and thus 
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complicit in the management of the realm.412 In such a capacity, the Company had a 
responsibility to keep certain policies a secret, even in a trial that cut to the very core of France’s 
commercial strategy.     
 Dupleix’s suit against the Company thus created a legal drama that both highlighted the 
ambiguities riddling trading operations in India and forced the litigants to stake specific claims 
about the nature of commerce. Often lost in the whirl of hyperbole, ad hominem arguments, and 
circumstantial evidence were deeper questions about the nature of wealth, the means of obtaining 
it, and the applicability of universal principles and standardized rules for regulating it. These 
were arguments about how to quantify commercial progress, about how to gauge the reliability 
of information coming from distant colonial locales and written by individuals with partisan 
agendas.413 They were conflicts over specific issues like the distribution of power within the 
Company, but also about more general concerns over the role of people as individual economic 
actors. The parties involved in this contest employed a common legal strategy by calling upon an 
abstract public to endorse their story of the events. While they attempted to win the support of 
voyeuristic spectators through colorful narratives of suffering, injustice, and personal triumph, 
they also charged these readers to act as impartial judges in validating their particular visions of 
empire and trade.        
 
Conclusion 
 The factional conflicts that emerged from this Second Carnatic War offer a new 
perspective on its significance. From the first grumblings about Dupleix in Company council 
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meetings to the savage legal contest that ultimately followed, this affair helped crystallize an 
ambivalent set of attitudes about France’s Indian trade into resolute positions concerning the 
management of trade. Through this process, increasingly definitive claims about overseas 
commerce seeped into the public consciousness. The controversy surrounding Dupleix’s policies 
sparked new ways to talk about both the Company and the colonial enterprise it oversaw; it also 
raised fundamental questions about the economic interests of the French nation, and the people 
within it.  
The 1750s have become increasingly seen as a moment of growing interest in the French 
empire. Concerned that France had not sufficiently developed itself as a colonial power, the 
Intendant of Commerce Vincent Gournay embarked on a campaign to translate texts of political 
economy and inculcate a spirit of commercial enterprise in the French people.414 French failures 
in the colonial theaters of the Seven Years’ War, meanwhile, sparked numerous debates about 
the value of empire and overseas trade, culminating in the revenge-oriented policies of the Duc 
de Choiseul, France’s foreign minister. Such concerns were not just the preserve of high politics 
and high culture. As John Shovlin has shown, the crown successfully mobilized popular support 
for the preservation of its Atlantic empire through a concerted propaganda campaign from 1755 
to 1756.415 By this period even the most remote and landlocked French towns were connected to 
the colonies through a web of overlapping social networks, credit relations, and commercial 
transactions linking the interior to the sea.416  
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The fallout from Dupleix’s trial forces us to rethink these imperial connections in several 
ways. First, it demonstrates that concerns over France’s empire extended beyond the Atlantic and 
Caribbean. The Dupleix imbroglio broadcast to a wide audience the diverse nature of the 
France’s imperial commitments—the differences between distant enclaves in India and sovereign 
French territory in North America, and between commerce-oriented factory towns and settler 
colonies. These distinctions are important; the 1750s were significant not only as a result of 
France’s growing interest in its overseas possessions, but also because developments abroad 
exposed the French to the various types of commercial relationships, instantiations of sovereign 
power, and forms of international competition encountered across different colonial spaces.   
 An awareness of these factors not only provided greater appreciation of the problems of 
geo-strategy in the wake of the Seven Years’ War, but also gave contemporaries a new way of 
thinking about public life in the Old Regime. Although Dupleix and the Company framed their 
dispute as a contest over commercial strategy in a distant colonial locale, their conflict ultimately 
touched on the more basic relationship between individuals and governing institutions meant to 
regulate their economic interests. These were debates over hyphenated agents: the shareholder-
citizen, the merchant-patriot, the Company-tyrant. As the threat of warfare in India loomed once 
more with the Seven Years’ War, the lines between domestic politics and commercial policy 
would become increasingly blurred.  
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CHAPTER 5: TREASON, PATRIOTISM, AND THE FALL OF PONDICHERY 
 
Hell vomited me into this land of iniquities, and I am waiting like Jonah for the whale that shall 
receive me in its belly. 
—Comte de Lally 
 
“You have only ever regarded us as a society of petty merchants.” Thus wrote the 
members of the Superior Council of Pondichéry on 13 August 1760 to Thomas Arthur de Lally, 
the general appointed by the king to command France’s field armies in India during the Seven 
Years’ War.417  The council had ample reason to be frustrated: British forces had bested Lally in 
a series of battles and now threatened Pondichéry. In three months, the city itself would be under 
siege. Even as he imposed exactions of food and money on the settlement’s inhabitants, Lally 
went to great lengths to villainize both the Company and commerce more generally. In his 
dispatches to the Controller-General, he painted the councilors as an assortment of self-serving 
cabals, dominated by women and avaricious Indian servants, and who spoke nothing but 
“indecent words against the Paris administration.”418 A few months later, he declared Pondichéry 
“a Sodom” that was beyond saving.419 Under Lally, the council not only found itself excluded 
from managing the defense of the colony, but also branded as an internal enemy bent on 
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undermining the French military. Next to the war effort against the British emerged a parallel 
conflict over the virtues and loyalties of the Company’s employees—one that would not be 
resolved until Lally’s conviction and execution for treason six years later.  
This tumultuous relationship reflects the difficulties that the French army faced when 
cooperating with its colonial partners during the Seven Years’ War. In Canada, royal officers 
reacted with disdain toward their Amerindian allies, who lacked the discipline of regular forces 
but nonetheless exceeded them in military effectiveness.420 In India, meanwhile, European 
soldiers fought alongside a disorganized Company army composed mostly of impressed 
prisoners and native mercenaries. Reliant on pillage to offset their meager incomes, and 
employed by a corporation that, to its detractors, reeked of corruption and odious privilege, this 
force inspired little confidence among the French regulars. Even as the crown ministry oversaw 
an unprecedented propaganda campaign designed to underscore the value of France’s overseas 
colonies to the nation, royal officers struggled to overcome the differences in race, culture, and 
social organization that they confronted abroad.421 Instead of promoting a common cause 
through the shared objectives of military service, the Seven Years’ War often served to highlight 
the distinctions between French subjects in the metropole and the colonies.   
This chapter explores the conflicts that arose between Company and crown forces during 
the Seven Years’ War, concentrating in particular on the contentious dispute between Lally and 
the conseil supérieur of Pondichéry. I argue that the failures of this military collaboration 
spurred Company employees to develop a newfound political assertiveness. While Lally raged 
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about suspected treasons, the Pondichéry council insisted on its loyalty to the French nation—
first to the general himself, and then to royal authorities back in France. Both sides in this contest 
adopted a common language of patriotism, casting a localized and personal dispute in the more 
general terms of French national interest. Such claims suggest the growing importance of the 
French state as a source of legitimacy in the eighteenth century. During the Seven Years’ War, 
crown officials successfully forced the reluctant Company settlements, which often tried to 
maintain neutrality in the face of European conflict, to fight on their behalf in India. Even as 
Company soldiers bridled under the command of royal officers, they committed themselves to a 
war plan laid out in Versailles.  
This chapter, however, is about more than the growing capacity of the crown to impose 
order over privileged officeholders operating outside French territory. While the conflict between 
Lally and the Pondichéry council spurred Company men to define themselves more explicitly as 
Frenchmen, they did so on their own terms—developing a language of patriotism, and a vision of 
the French nation, that could facilitate both colonial politics and corporate intrigue. Such efforts 
point to a more de-centralized process of state formation than is traditionally recognized in 
France at the end of the Old Regime. Building on Tocqueville’s thesis about the ineluctable 
process of state centralization, historians have emphasized the numerous ways in which the 
crown expanded its authority over the course of the eighteenth century; during this time, the 
monarchy created a sophisticated bureaucracy and a standardized system of taxation, all the 
while reducing the political power of oppositional groups like the parlements.422 Often, the 
consequences of this process have been taken as evidence of preexisting intent: a “conscious will” 
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spurring the crown to increase its administrative authority. As I argue, though, this process of 
centralization was less the product of a coordinated effort of crown expansion as it was a 
negotiated process in which subordinate authorities invoked state power in order to gain local 
status and authority. Less Leviathan than a source of legitimacy for various interest groups, the 
absolutist state was constituted, in many ways, from the outside-in—a “net effect” of numerous 
instances of claims-making and internal competition.423  
  This chapter, in short, shows how conflicts between different agents of the monarchy 
helped create new ideas about French nationhood. In their disputes with Lally, Company 
employees not only insisted upon their civic loyalties; they also relied upon the high courts and a 
new culture of public debate to provide themselves with legal sanction while branding their 
accuser as a state criminal. They recast Company affairs as the affairs of the nation, adopting a 
language of common interests that elided differences in geography and status to emphasize 
shared connections with other Frenchmen. And, in identifying themselves as aggrieved subjects, 
they expanded the ideological reach of the crown to make it apply in distant settlements and 
unfamiliar political circumstances. Neither openly resisting nor unquestioningly obeying the 
monarchy, Company employees instead insisted upon their place within a French national 
community that was, in part, of their own making.  
 
 
                                                
423 This formulation is indebted to Michael Braddick’s work on state formation in early-modern England, which 
focuses on the relationship between centralized authority and local institutions, and the symbiotic dynamic in which 
subordinate officials invoked state authority to legitimize decision-making on the local level and, in turn, expanded 
the state’s political reach. While Braddick’s analysis is rooted in the specific political circumstances of Tudor and 
Stuart England, his model of state development is also useful for understanding political relationships in other 
contexts, such as Bourbon France. See Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, 88. On the implications 
of this model for French political life, particularly in France’s New World colonies in the seventeenth century, see 
Dewar, “Litigating Empire,” 51-52. 
173 
A Mercantile Army 
Over the course of the eighteenth century, the royal army developed into a bold political 
laboratory—a site where reformers investigated the pressing questions of authority, political will, 
and national identity facing France in the final decades of the Old Regime.424 As David Bell has 
shown, the carnage of the Seven Years’ War channeled these energies into a particularly virulent 
brand of patriotism, blending incipient notions of French nationhood with a xenophobic 
antipathy toward France’s chief enemy in the conflict: Great Britain. In stark contrast to earlier 
French conflicts, which were seen as battles between opposing royal houses or religious factions, 
literature during the Seven Years’ War framed the violence as a clash between two 
“irreconcilable nations.”425 Frenchmen voiced their loyalty to the patrie, and their hatred of the 
British, in increasingly visceral tones. Poems, songs, and panegyric essays elevated fallen French 
soldiers to martyrdom, while invective-stained pamphlets denounced the “perfidious Albion” and 
all he stood for. Throughout the conflict, propagandists emphasized the mythical roots of the 
French nation and the affective ties between its people, framing these ideas through reference to 
British difference.426  
Behind this war-fueled chauvinism, however, lurked a more hesitant and uneven sense of 
national identity. The patriotic rhetoric preached by the crown was fundamentally inclusive, 
reflecting a common bond between citizens, and affective ties that went beyond differences in 
legal, social, and economic status and particular type of government. Such notions were given 
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institutional form by the early revolutionaries, who substituted a system of citizenship based on 
juridical equality and shared national identity for the invidious, privilege-seeking subject of the 
absolute monarchy. Yet even during the final decades of the Old Regime, patriotic sentiment was 
often premised on the very same divisions, privileges, and legal exceptions that this language of 
national citizenship was supposed to transcend. In the constitutional disputes leading up to the 
Revolution, everyone from venal magistrates objecting to the impositions of the crown to nobles 
defending traditional tax exemptions claimed to speak on behalf of the “nation,” defining the 
collective will of the French people in terms of specific corporatist interests.427 Enlightenment 
thinkers, meanwhile, frequently looked to privileged society to articulate the values of French 
nationhood, as Montesquieu did when he argued that the nobility’s competition for honor 
represented an ideal foundation for good citizenship.428 The evolution of French patriotism 
during the eighteenth century thus entailed not only a growing recognition of the nation as a 
political and cultural unit, but also a charged debate about the relationship between social 
distinction and civic virtue.429 
 Scholars have generally overlooked the role of French colonialism in nurturing the 
patriotic impulses of the Old Regime. For many historians, France’s overseas possessions 
became important only in their absence—the loss of the North American colonies during the 
Seven Years’ War bringing France’s disaffected subjects together through a common desire for 
vengeance. Yet far from occupying a marginal role in the development of an inchoate national 
consciousness, France’s empire exposed many of the underlying limits to patriotic thought in the 
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eighteenth century. From Mahé to Martinique, colonial councils worked to clarify the legal and 
political rights of French settlers so as to push the crown into relaxing its trading restrictions. 
Even the most basic business of empire-management forced administers to negotiate a shifting 
dichotomy of subjecthood and non-subjecthood, the lines of which were redrawn through 
statutes determining who could possess property, serve in town militias, or hold local office.430     
Indeed, even as Old Regime writers came to speak of the nation as a primordial 
community carrying with it specific cultural characteristics and loyalty claims, many still saw the 
terms of membership as highly conditional, especially within the context of France’s overseas 
territories.431 Thorny questions abounded across the colonial sphere: Could Frenchmen maintain 
their national character in distant lands and unfamiliar climates like that of India, especially 
given the influence that Enlightenment thinkers imputed to geography and temperature in the 
development of human personalities?432 To what degree did institutions like the Company, which 
exercised sovereign claims over exotic spaces, be considered part of a territorially-bound French 
nation? Situated far outside the levers of state power, Company settlers often invoked patriotism 
to gain authority over local commercial and political affairs. Yet such loyalties were 
inconsistently professed. As we have already seen, corporate officials adopted a variety of 
identities in the interest of colonial diplomacy; depending on the audience, they alternatively cast 
themselves European subjects, independent merchants, plenipotentiaries exercising proxy 
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sovereign powers, or the feudatories of Indian princes. Throughout the course of Company 
service, the bonds between subject and sovereign were repeatedly made and unmade, as royal 
tradition was reframed according to the dictates of natural law, inter-imperial politics, and 
Mughal contract.433    
Far from resolving the divisions imposed by privilege and geography by aligning the 
obligations of Company members more closely with those of their fellow Frenchmen, military 
service spurred both jurisdictional disagreement and personal conflict. Like other early-modern 
European trading corporations, the Company divided its employees into civilian and military 
arms: la plume and l’épée. Vital to the defense of vulnerable settlements in Asia and the Indian 
Ocean, the second was rarely appreciated and often criticized. The Company directors 
condemned most offensive actions by its administrators, reiterating the popular argument that 
violence harmed trade.434 Many shareholders proved similarly critical of martial activity, 
especially since excessive military costs could reduce dividend payments.435 In India, the civilian 
and military spheres often squabbled. The Company’s heavy defense budget limited commercial 
opportunities: soldiers outnumbered civilians in every settlement, and smaller towns like Mahé 
could afford little beyond their garrison costs.436 Dissatisfied soldiers, many of them former 
prisoners impressed into service, deserted in droves. Anquetil Duperron, a celebrated French 
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scholar of Persian, noted that 40 of the troops quartered on his ship during his 1756 voyage to 
India abandoned the Company when they reached Pondichéry.437 
Intra-service rivalries with regular French forces abounded during times of war. In some 
instances, the Company’s sailors and soldiers cooperated effectively with their counterparts in 
the royal navy and army. During the Company’s years of operation, over 100 of its officers 
received brevets to serve on the king’s ships, and dozens of senior officers in the royal navy 
commanded Company vessels.438 Yet there were also notable disagreements between the two 
services. The Company supplemented its allocations of European troops by commissioning 
indigenous auxiliaries; these men, who constituted the bulk of the Company’s soldiery in India, 
served as everything from infantry and cavalrymen to porters, sailors, and support staff. Vital to 
the Company’s war effort, such diversity nonetheless stirred racial tensions.439 French regulars 
also bridled under the command of Company traders, recalling traditional French biases 
denigrating the acquisition of money while celebrating the pursuit of military glory.440 Mahé de 
la Bourdonnais, for instance, is reported to have rallied his troops into supporting him during his 
conflict with Dupleix by playing on their aversion to being commanded by “mere merchants.”441  
Even to its supporters, the Company fit uncomfortably within a broader project of 
national defense. According to one 1761 memoirist, the corporation’s Indian settlements “were 
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isolated and circumscribed establishments that contained no Frenchmen other than the 
employees and officers in its employ.”442 Such towns could be easily “abandoned, whenever 
their commerce required it, without affecting the glory of their king.”443 While refuting claims 
from critics of the corporation, who insisted that it aspired to become a “state within a state,” the 
author nonetheless noted that the Company’s mercantile ethos endowed its members with a 
fundamentally different code of conduct than that of regular French subjects. Administered 
according to the dictates of commerce, the corporation created an institutional culture that 
cohered little with the war-like, honor-driven culture of France more generally.444 The naval 
administrator-turned-belle-lettriste André-François Deslandes echoed these sentiments, arguing 
that the French national character was poorly suited for the tedious commercial vocations 
practiced by the Company.445   
The Company’s performance in past conflicts did little to allay suspicions about its 
military capabilities, or about its willingness to incur costly sacrifices on behalf of the crown. 
The French lacked a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and the Company’s settlements 
were often left to fend for themselves during times of war. To avoid the destruction of their 
commercial infrastructure in India, employees would negotiate ad hoc peace agreements with 
their Dutch and British counterparts on the subcontinent—with varying degrees of success. 
While Dupleix’s entreaties failed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities with Madras during the 
War of the Austrian Succession, councilors in Mahé were able to maintain a regional non-
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aggression pact with British traders in Tellichery for nearly twenty years. Prior to the start of the 
Seven Years’ War, the Superior Council of Pondichéry likewise labored with officials in Madras 
to create a comprehensive neutrality agreement, though this effort ultimately failed.446  
In France, too, Company officials struggled to reconcile the conflicting imperatives of 
trade and conquest. At a shareholders’ assembly in 1746, for instance, corporate representatives 
refused to provide investors with a “detailed account of the Company’s [financial] operations,” 
arguing “that prudence dictates concealing the condition of the Company from our enemies.”447 
The creation of a six-man secret committee tasked with overseeing the corporation’s military 
affairs further underscored this tension between fiscal transparency and military secrecy.448 Intra-
Company feuding created additional problems. The beginning of the Seven Years’ War saw the 
corporation embroiled in its ongoing dispute with Dupleix, one that pitted high-ranked officials 
within the Paris administration against several of the Company’s most successful commanders in 
India. In this climate of mistrust, Company officials were quick to label their opponents as 
“internal threats” bent on undermining both crown and the corporation for personal gain, creating 
doubts about the ability of Company agents to conduct military operations on behalf of either 
crown or country. 
 Yet at the same time as the Company's uneven war record produced misgivings about its 
loyalty, reformers offered some startling reassessments of the corporation’s capacity for civic 
virtue. In an attempt to facilitate the development of commercial society in France, royal 
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administrators in the 1750s embarked on a publicity campaign that sought to reframe mercantile 
activity as a form of state service, imputing to traders a selfless love for their country that 
overrode any baser pecuniary agendas. While few advocates actually equated this “patriotic 
commerce” with the violent sacrifices undertaken by the French army, such efforts nonetheless 
helped combat traditional biases against the Company by making its merchants appear concerned 
with the broader interests of the nation. Some prominent apologists went so far as to see the 
values inherent in trade as foundational qualities for modern citizenship. The abbé Coyer, for one, 
equated commerce with the humanist ideal of active living, contrasting the utility and 
productiveness of mercantile activity with the idleness, waste, and vanity of military-oriented 
society.449  
 Within these same circles, a growing concern with the geo-political implications of 
commercial rivalry complemented these claims about merchant patriotism. As Istvan Hont has 
argued, a pathological “jealousy of trade,” characterized by an obsession with economic 
competition, emerged as a dominant theme in the commercial science of the eighteenth 
century—supplanting earlier understandings of commerce as form of peaceful sociability.450 
Contemporary political economists often described trade in bellicose terms, envisioning the 
marketplace as a zero-sum game and lacing their works with analogies to violence and combat. 
Commerce, in this sense, served as a proxy for actual warfare: a means of protecting the nation, 
imposing power over lesser states, and ensuring France’s survival.451 During the 1750s, 
concerned administrators such as Vincent de Gournay, the intendant du commerce, poured state 
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resources into various projects meant to increase the commercial disposition of the French 
population, commissioning translations of several major works of early-modern commercial 
science.452 For many of these more competition-minded commercial thinkers, Company 
employees were on the frontlines in a contentious battle over the nation’s economic future.   
 The Company therefore found itself in a confusing position at the outbreak of the Seven 
Years’ War. Decried in some camps as avaricious merchants who by their very vocation could 
never adopt the selfless virtues of citizenship, Company employees were seen by others as new-
model patriots who played a vital role in the nation’s defense. Reluctant to engage in a protracted 
military campaign, the corporation was not only forced to commit its own soldiers to combat the 
British in India, but also to fight alongside royal troops with whom it had traditionally struggled 
to cooperate. The conflict with Lally would bring questions about the Company and its 
obligations to the fore, pushing employees to assert both their rights as French subjects and their 
capacity for civic virtue.   
 
“Here bad faith is extended to its very limits” 
 During in the War of the Austrian Succession, French policymakers at Versailles 
relegated India to a secondary theater—with disastrous consequences for the Company.  With no 
French naval vessels in the region, the British ravaged commercial shipping in the Bay of Bengal 
for nearly a year before Mahé de la Bourdonnais’s squadron arrived in relief. Ten years later, 
royal planners proved more proactive in defending France’s Indian settlements, dispatching two 
regiments under Lally to India soon after hostilities were declared between France and Britain in 
1756. The first French troops arrived in Pondichéry the following year. While Lally’s 
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deployment was not rapid enough to prevent the British capture of Chandernagor in the early 
months of 1757, it did provide the Company with a large advantage in manpower and material 
along the Coromandel Coast.    
 Company administrators in Paris understood this effort as not only a defensive campaign 
against the British, but also as an opportunity to establish greater control over its colonial 
employees in the wake of Dupleix’s defiant policymaking. Lally was their handpicked candidate: 
he had extensive military experience and, more important for officials in France, was opposed to 
implicating Company forces in native political squabbles.453 His mission carried with it two 
seemingly overlapping mandates. While the crown tasked Lally with the defense of the French 
settlements in India, the Company ordered him to reduce corruption among its colonial 
merchants and administrators. In a 1758 letter to the general, for instance, the Controller-General 
Jean de Boullougne pushed him to discontinue the common practice of subcontracting Company 
troops in exchange for money and local favor—projects, he claimed, that “exhausted the 
Company” and succeeded only in “enriching individual officers.”454 By its own instructions, the 
Company thus made Lally responsible for the policing of refractory traders and the creation of a 
new disciplinary regime in India, giving him wide latitude to define the boundaries between licit 
and illicit activity among Company employees there. 
 Almost from the beginning, however, Lally struggled to reconcile European military 
practices and standards of conduct with the dictates of a distant colonial theater. The general 
stamped his arrival in India with immediate success, capturing the British outpost at Fort St. 
David, less than twenty miles south of Pondichéry. Yet even victory produced intractable 
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logistical problems. Lally brought nearly three million livres with him to finance his campaign, 
intending to cover any additional debts by drawing on the credit of Pondichéry’s Superior 
Council. Despite these preparations, costs quickly spiraled out of control. The Company 
depended heavily on local contractors to supply its army and to man its wagon train; even short 
campaigns required vast expenditures on food, support staff, and native mercenaries.455 Their 
reserves exhausted by over twelve years of steady warfare along the Coromandel Coast, the 
Pondichéry council could do little to supplement Lally’s war chest. The general’s aversion to 
meddling in local politics cut off other sources of income, particularly in the Deccan, where 
Bussy had maintained close relations with Nizam of Hyderabad. Soon after his capture of Fort St. 
David, Lally would find himself disastrously short of money and provisions.  
 Inconsistent support from the French fleet under the comte d’Aché, which had carried 
Lally to India and remained in the Bay of Bengal to combat a British squadron there, exacerbated 
these supply problems. After the conquest of Fort St. David, Lally turned his attention to Madras, 
which he planned to take through siege. The general called on the French squadron to transport 
food and artillery for the upcoming campaign. D’Aché, however, refused to risk his ships in an 
engagement with the British fleet, retreating to Ceylon and stranding the French army in 
Pondichéry. In desperate need of supplies, transportation, and funding, Lally then turned his 
attentions to the nearby kingdom of Tanjore, whose Raja he forced into a one-sided alliance 
intended to victual his troops in preparation for an assault on Madras. Through a campaign 
marred by violence—Lally threatened to “sack, pillage, burn, and impale” those towns and 
individuals who refused his entreaties, strapping several Brahmans to the muzzles of his cannons 
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and firing—the French gained much needed supplies and money.456 Yet even these violent 
exactions did little to restore Lally’s forces to a sound logistical footing. When the general finally 
launched his assault on Madras in December 1758, he could keep his army on the field for little 
more than three months before desertion and a lack of food compelled him to retreat to 
Pondichéry.  
 These setbacks brought long-simmering tensions over the Company’s role in the war to 
the fore. Frustrated with the delays to his campaign, and predisposed by his instructions to 
suspect the Company’s colonial administrators, the general vented his frustration at the “abyss of 
misappropriation” into which he believed Pondichéry had fallen.457 Alongside the stagnating war 
effort against the British emerged a parallel conflict between Lally and the city’s administrators. 
The general also became involved in a protracted feud with the comte de Bussy—the senior 
Company commander in India—whom he petitioned repeatedly for personal loans to sustain the 
French effort.458 Over the following months, Lally shifted the blame for his losses to 
Pondichéry’s council, saving his harshest words for its leader: Georges de Leyrit. The general’s 
poor choice of allies only aggravated this tense relationship. Lally increasingly sought council 
with a Jesuit missionary named Père Lavaur—a cunning manipulator who volunteered to act as 
an intermediary between the general and the Company’s employees. Despite his pretended lack 
of interest in local politics, Lavaur played both sides off each other, adding to the friction in the 
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hopes of turning their growing conflict to his advantage by becoming a “trusted” advisor to 
whichever side eventually prevailed.459 
The general’s growing criticism of the Pondichéry council betrays a singular logic: 
Company employees were intentionally undermining the French war effort in order to safeguard 
their ill-gotten fortunes. On a map of the 1746 Madras siege, repurposed by Lally into a 
makeshift chronicle of his own campaigns, the general wrote despondently of how his soldiers 
had been reduced to “eating on the credit and from the table scraps of the [Pondichéry] 
councilmen.”460 He recorded similar complaints in his letters to Company authorities in France, 
even as the councilors insisted that “they had exhausted all of their resources” trying to resupply 
the army.461 Such accusations were not merely the product of a suspicious mind, but also a 
manifestation of a particular vision of national service—one that elevated the war effort to a 
paramount place, and that viewed the corporatist and commercial dispositions of Company 
employees as incapable of supporting patriotic behavior. Consider a letter written by Lally to de 
Leyrit in August 1760, which cast the mounting discord between the military and the Pondichéry 
notables as a natural outgrowth of Company corruption: “But I declare it is in your nature to 
object to having a superior on the council, to having a superintendent, and for the entire colony, 
as merchants, to see royal troops arrive here who are not in your pocket, and therefore animated 
by different interests.”462 
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One can see evidence of similar tensions in other dealings between Company 
administrators and French military officials, as during d’Aché’s efforts to resupply his fleet in Ile 
de France. An overly cautious commander who, according to one subordinate, was “detested by 
all his men [tout son corps],”463 the Admiral harbored his ships in the Mascarene Islands during 
the monsoon season in 1758. There he embarked on the painfully slow process of refitting his 
forces—an effort that took so long (nearly a year) that it earned d’Aché the condemnation of 
both Lally and the governor of Ile de France, Réné Magon. Over the course of these drawn-out 
repairs, the admiral’s relationship with the islands’ chief administrators became strained as his 
sailors requisitioned much-needed food and supplies from its inhabitants.  
Incapable of supporting even their own populations through local agriculture, which 
concentrated mostly on cash crops such as coffee and cotton, the colonies’ provisions were soon 
depleted by the extra mouths.464 Noting that the French settlements had “exhausted themselves 
under the weight” of supplying d’Aché’s fleet, Magon repeatedly begged the admiral either to 
return to the Bay of Bengal or to search out additional provisions from the Dutch colony at the 
Cape of Good Hope.465 D’Aché, in response, accused the governor of aspiring to impede the 
military projects of the king through “guile” and “tortuous conduct”—a sentiment he reiterated 
in his reports to Paris.466 Driven to the extremes of frustration by both the admiral’s requisitions 
and unwillingness to accept that the islanders were not concealing food from the fleet, Magon 
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eventually quit his position and returned to France. There he would find that d’Aché’s dispatches 
had already poisoned the opinions of the corporate directors against him.467 As in the case of 
Lally and the council, inadequate provisions provided the pretext for questioning the loyalties of 
Company agents.    
In each circumstance, French military commanders adopted a fundamentally different 
view of the common interest than their Company allies. Like the Paris directors, the controller-
general, and other senior officials in France, Lally viewed the Company as a constituent part in a 
broader war effort; the corporation was expected to facilitate the campaign in India, rendering up 
men and supplies while playing a subordinate role to the regular forces sent to the subcontinent. 
“Your duty,” he wrote to de Leyrit in 1760, “is to receive every morning my orders regarding the 
civilians here, and to use your authority to execute them.”468 Employees in India, by contrast, 
expected to be protected as well as to serve—to maintain the integrity of French commerce and 
the Company’s colonial settlements while also fighting against the British. In both Pondichéry 
and Ile de France, colonial officials bristled as the broader challenges of integrating Company 
employees into a war effort run from Europe gave way to accusations of disobedience and 
disloyalty. These difficulties extended beyond Lally’s reluctance to adjust his war plans, which 
failed to account for the logistical impediments of colonial warfare and hindered the 
establishment of any type of collaborative relationship with the princes of the Deccan. At the 
most basic level, they reflected an underlying disconnect over the duties that Company members 
owed to administrators in other bureaucratic spheres such as the royal army.   
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By the summer of 1760, the conflict along the Coromandel Coast had turned decisively 
against Lally’s forces, which had retreated back to Pondichéry. The British began laying siege to 
the city in September, having already captured many of the other Company settlements. While 
Chandernagor had fallen in 1757, Masulipatam capitulated in 1759, an event that pushed Salabat 
Jang to renege on the territorial concessions he had granted to Dupleix and sign them over to the 
British.469 In Pondichéry, frustration boiled over into open disobedience. Lagrenné, who served 
as the secretary of the conseil supérieur, threatened to quit his post in response to Lally’s 
harassment.470 Defamatory graffiti denouncing the general appeared on several public streets, 
while a muster of Pondichéry’s militia descended into an impromptu mutiny against Lally, which 
only the direct intervention of de Leyrit succeeded in dispersing.471 Members of the council, 
meanwhile, grew increasingly firm in asserting their rights against Lally, and in trying to 
reconcile the competing obligations of colonial governance with the need to defend France’s 
national interests on foreign soil. 
In August 1760, the council petitioned Lally to convoke a “national assembly” comprised 
of all the colony’s French inhabitants. Once constituted, this collective body would present a 
formal grievance against d’Aché for his refusal to bring his fleet back to the Bay of Bengal in 
support of the city and manage the defense and provisioning of Pondichéry during the upcoming 
siege.472 By this point, Lally had essentially stopped consulting the conseil supérieur on political 
matters, appointing his own clients to administrative positions and ruling through executive 
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fiat.473 The August “revolution,” as it has since been termed, attempted to create a more equitable 
system of governance by involving all Company employees in the administration of the city. 
While finding justification for this reform agenda in the Company’s “constitution,” which 
delegated the administration of the French settlements in India to a representative council, the 
councilors also cited the exigencies of the upcoming siege to push for an expansion of the city’s 
franchise.474 With the entire remaining population of Pondichéry under threat by the British, all 
its inhabitants were thought to have a stake in its defense. After initially resisting the councilor’s 
petitions, Lally finally conceded to their demands, becoming the reluctant president of the new 
national assembly.475 The body fell apart soon after. 
 In short, the growing British threat pushed the council not only to press for greater 
administrative responsibilities in Pondichéry, but also to clarify the status and responsibilities of 
the city’s inhabitants—both as employees and subjects of the French crown. Theoretically, 
Company agents were organized in a strictly defined series of vertical relationships; they served 
under the king and his councilors, receiving payment and other incentives for their labor. As 
conditions in Pondichéry deteriorated, however, the councilors reframed the hierarchical 
structure of the corporation as a set of horizontal solidarities, arguing that their service endowed 
them with common set of rights such as security from arbitrary punishment and a voice in the 
war council. Both Lally and d’Aché saw the inability of the colonial governors to provision their 
forces as proof of bad faith by the Company’s merchant-subjects. The Pondichéry council, by 
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contrast, asserted that Lally’s failure to respect their jurisdiction, preserve their property, and 
protect their lives represented a form of “tyranny.”476   
 Throughout the fall, Lally and de Leyrit engaged in an increasingly bitter exchange of 
letters, juxtaposing problems of military expediency with a deeper debate over the patriotic 
disposition of Pondichéry’s inhabitants. Each clung to a specific vision for civic virtue in the 
colonial sphere. De Leyrit expounded on the selfless commitment of the Company’s employees 
to the defense of the French settlements, noting the “zeal” and “good will” that they showed in 
the sieges of Chandernagor and Masulipatam.477 Lally, in turn, accused the councilors of 
professing a conspicuous but nonetheless misguided patriotism, arguing that “the Company 
needs neither the lives nor the blood that the councilors persist in offering me; it needs food and 
money.”478 This contest came to a head when Lally expelled Pondichéry’s non-French 
inhabitants to reduce the strain on the settlement’s dwindling stores. Forced to navigate through 
the British siege lines, many of the expellees were killed in the crossfire. Their deaths sparked 
vocal objections by the Pondichéry council, which claimed both political authority over the 
settlement’s Indian population and a paternalistic obligation to discipline them and look after 
their welfare. 
 As this episode suggests, Company employees articulated their opposition to Lally in 
increasingly capacious terms; they demanded not only protection for themselves, but also the 
preservation of social relations in the city. The expulsion of the natives, de Leyrit argued, tore at 
the communal fabric of Pondichéry by disregarding basic rules of reciprocity, denying sanctuary 
to a population that had served the Company on a daily basis by filling commercial orders, 
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performing translation work, and acting as domestic servants. “Here is your compensation,” 
lamented de Leyrit, “for having helped this colony by any means possible; we took your money, 
your goods, [and] your lives, and then we threw you out…leaving you either to be butchered by 
the enemy or die of hunger under our walls.” According to him, such behavior robbed the French 
of their moral authority in India, even if the natives blamed Lally alone for their plight; military 
practices needed to be adapted to conditions on the subcontinent to be considered patriotic, 
equitable, and conducive to France’s national interests.  
The conflict with Lally thus entailed the renegotiation of basic categories of Company 
service, a redrawing of the lines between employee and citizen, merchant and soldier, and 
Frenchmen and non-Frenchmen. What Lally defined as the simple imperatives of an effective 
campaign—to combat the British and discipline any employees who interfered with this 
process—Company employees labeled as both an abrogation of the traditional rules of sociability 
in India, and a violation of their rights as French subjects. Each side cleaved to a specific notion 
of what it meant to fight for France in a colonial theater, as well as a particular conception of 
French military interests. In so doing, they both sought to define the appropriate conditions for 
collaboration between the royal and Company armies. 
By January, conditions in the city had reached the point of desperation. Realizing the 
futility of continued resistance, Lally surrendered Pondichéry to the British in the middle of the 
month—doing so without consulting any civilian authorities beforehand. The city’s capitulation 
stripped the French of their last remaining settlement in India. Although the Company regained 
control of the comptoirs as a result of the 1763 Treaty of Paris, the terms of this agreement 
dramatically constrained French rights on the subcontinent, stipulating the destruction of all 
Company fortifications and prohibiting the deployment of new garrisons. The terms of the treaty 
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thus resolved the immediate challenges of coordinating between the Company and royal army by 
restricting future opportunities for colonial war. Back in France, however, the deeper problems 
exposed by the siege remained, as did the frustration of Pondichéry’s inhabitants toward Lally.  
 
“The blackest treason” 
 Upon hearing the news of Pondichéry’s surrender, several employees rushed to his 
chambers, intending to kill the general. With a pistol in hand, he was able to delay his would-be 
assassins long enough for the British to take him into custody, where they would hold him until 
23 September 1761.479 In this instance at least, Lally’s assertiveness and unwavering conviction 
served him well, likely saving his life. For the seething civilians of Pondichéry, however, the 
thirst for revenge would not be so easily slaked. Quickly paroled by the British, many returned to 
France ready to denounce the general to all who would listen. Through published mémoires and 
gossip, in the royal court and on the streets, these frustrated employees placed the blame for the 
recent military failures squarely on Lally’s shoulders. They also attempted to prove him guilty of 
a more malicious crime: committing an act of treason by betraying France’s colonial settlements 
to the British.  
 This conflation of military defeat with treason was rare during the Old Regime, even in 
the climate of embarrassment, scapegoating, and vengeance-seeking that permeated France 
following the humiliation of the Seven Years’ War.480 The unfortunate French commander 
Charles de Rohan, for instance, suffered no such accusations for his disastrous rout at Rossbach 
in 1757—an event that damaged the French military effort far more grievously than the loss of 
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the Indian factories. Several factors, however, combined to provide the Company’s claims with 
legal traction. First, Lally’s family was foreign: the general was the son of a Jacobite émigré, and 
critics pointed to his Irish roots to emphasize both his weak ties to France and his natural affinity 
to Britain.481 Second, many of the aggrieved employees boasted influential patrons at Versailles. 
The comte de Bussy, for instance, was related by marriage to the duc de Choiseul, France’s 
foreign minister, and used this connection to expedite Lally’s incrimination. Finally, the 
eagerness of several Jansenist-leaning magistrates to embarrass the king by finding a high noble 
guilty of treason spurred the parlement to pursue a case against Lally, even though, as a civilian 
tribunal, its judges held no jurisdiction in military matters. With pressure mounting on the crown 
to launch an official investigation into the events surrounding the collapse of Pondichéry, Lally 
was arrested on charges of treason on 1 November 1762. He would be confined to the same cell 
in the Bastille as La Bourdonnais.482   
 The case against the general relied upon several unsubstantiated claims. The councilor 
Lenoir, for instance, published a 1761 mémoire that delved into fabricated details about the 
general’s schemes to sell Mazulipatam and French-occupied Arcot to British forces. Lally’s 
harshest critic was his erstwhile ally, Père Lavaur, who had died in 1762. Reluctant to take sides 
in a conflict until the outcome was clear, Lavaur recorded two contradictory accounts of the 
siege of Pondichéry: one that incriminated Lally, and another that blamed the council for the 
city’s loss. Posthumous chance led Lavaur’s executors to discover only the journal denouncing 
the general. In it, the priest produced a litany of controversial reports; he painted Lally as an 
incompetent commander who alienated his subordinates, disregarded the advice of the “loyal 
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subjects” and “true patriots” in the Company with whom he was meant to cooperate, and 
exhibited the avidity and foul temperament of the natives he so openly despised.483 With so many 
of Pondichéry’s inhabitants eager to incriminate Lally, few questioned the validity of Lavaur’s 
story.  
Such self-serving motives have obscured the importance of the Lally trial in reframing 
the Company’s relationship to the nation. Yet beneath the inflammatory rhetoric lay a tense and 
substantive debate about the obligations owed by the French crown to corporate employees. As 
Sarah Maza has shown, the judicial opinions and mémoires produced by the Paris Parlement in 
the middle of the eighteenth century were often laced with social commentary, with barristers 
using the legal stage both to expose the problems facing Old Regime society and to investigate 
possibilities for reform.484 In asserting Lally’s guilt, Company lawyers sought, by extension, to 
clarify the political status of the corporate settlements in India.485 They not only produced 
tendentious evidence about the general’s supposed loyalties to British agents, but also worked to 
show how his mistreatment of a quasi-private, mercantile corporation constituted a crime against 
France more generally.  
 In Old Regime France, the shifting parameters of treason law both reflected, and helped 
to produce, new political realities. For medieval jurists, treason was most frequently described as 
an incidence of lèse-majesté, a derivation of the Roman crime of laesa maiestas—literally, 
“wounding the king.” The crime featured heavily in period works of jurisprudence, a sign of the 
growing importance of royal sovereignty as a marker of political authority. During the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries, definitions of lèse-majesté gradually broadened, encompassing both 
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physical assaults on the king and the symbolic rejection of his authority through acts such as 
counterfeiting.486 Around the same time, legal scholars also began to speak of a parallel crime 
known as trahison, or “treachery”—an ambiguously defined set of duplicitous activities that not 
only encompassed crimes against the crown, but also the forsaking of seigneurial obligations.487 
These two concepts developed in tandem over the following centuries, merging various acts of 
physical violence, apostasy, and oath breaking into a single capital offense. 
In short, lèse-majesté slowly evolved from a personal crime into a transgression against 
society more generally, providing jurists with considerable latitude when interpreting treasonous 
acts. The key development in treason law during the eighteenth century was the 
reconceptualization and transfer of sovereignty from the king to the people—a shift in legitimacy 
codified during the Revolution by the replacement of lèse-majesté with the crime of lèse-nation. 
Rooted in the constitutional conflicts of the late Old Regime, this transition juxtaposed the 
repudiation of royal power with an acknowledgement of the collective will of the nation as the 
basis of political authority in France. In the 1750s and 1760s, for instance, scandals such as the 
Unigenitus debates eroded the sacral authority of the crown, while legal treatises published by 
Montesquieu and Beccaria challenged the moral foundations of monarchical rule by criticizing 
the use of capital punishment in lèse-majesté cases.488 The legal definition of treason thus 
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became an important point of political contention during the final decades of the Old Regime, 
outlining competing visions for French society by defining transgressions against it.  
Colonial conflict played a critical role in this conceptual shift. As we have already seen, 
distance from supervisory authorities and the ambiguous distribution of power within the French 
settlements in India provided Company employees with easy opportunities for legal innovation. 
In a variety of imperial settings throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, disputes 
between colonial agents spurred the development of more capacious treason laws—transforming 
the crime from an accusation of direct betrayal of the crown to an open-ended debate about the 
authority of proxy bodies such as viceroyalties, trading corporations, and imperial courts. The 
ability to reinterpret the meaning of treasonous activity represented a valuable tool in these 
power struggles. From Bombay to Virginia, New France to the Río de la Plata, colonial 
rebellions frequently turned on the question of whether imperial agents had the right to 
administer royal laws on behalf of the king.489 Personal conflict thus produced a litany of 
competing loyalty claims, while also generating creative interpretations about the meanings of 
treachery, corruption, and tyranny. As Miranda Spieler has shown, such “legal experiments” 
often filtered back to the metropole to constitute new norms in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century, implicating France in an “accretive cycle of invention and absorption.”490 
Consider the charges leveled by Lally’s most vocal accusers. In 1762, the comte de Bussy 
finally obtained his long-delayed parole from military prison in England. Upon his arrival, he 
wrote an accusatory mémoire, framing the collapse of the Company’s settlements in India as a 
crime against France. Like Company writers during the Dupleix scandal, Bussy emphasized the 
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importance of military success in the development of local esteem in India. Lally’s defeat, he 
therefore argued, “had destroyed the French nation in India”—“dishonoring” and 
“sapping…[the] power” from the agents delegated to act on its behalf there.491 Bussy combined 
these criticisms of Lally’s military abilities with denunciations of his avid disposition, suggesting 
that the general’s crimes went beyond mere incompetence. Lally’s “conduct,” Bussy noted, 
“makes me think that he only came to India to get rich.”492 The imputation of such avaricious 
motives to a member of the nobility was particularly damning in the social context of the Old 
Regime. Nobles were meant to prize glory and honor over material wealth—their status a 
reflection of their selfless service to the crown.493 In so clearly betraying the traditions of his 
social caste, Lally had rendered himself both untrustworthy and politically dangerous. 
Throughout his mémoire, Bussy was careful to distinguish between the profit-seeking activities 
of Company agents, which facilitated French political and commercial interests on the 
subcontinent, and the harmful desire for self-enrichment ascribed to Lally.  
Over the course of the trial, Lally’s opponents transformed these ad hominem arguments 
into a more systematic critique of his actions, quantifying his crimes in India to clarify his crimes 
against the nation. A judicial summary written by Denis-Louis Pasquier, the president of the 
Parlement’s chambre des enquêtes, provides a list of Lally’s supposed crimes. Among the most 
grievous recorded by Pasquier: “sowing discord among his collaborators, making cooperation 
with them impossible as a result of his abuse of authority, using violence to assert his power over 
them, pursuing a path to treason by following the course to despotism, [and] breathing jealousy 
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over those he was meant to defend.”494 Pasquier argued that such bad faith toward colonial 
agents charged with the defense of French interests abroad made the charge of “lèse-majesté” 
self-evident, and insisted upon a penalty of capital punishment: “In preferring his ideas, his 
devious outlook, and his atrocious will to the actual well-being of the colony conferred to him, 
[Lally] does not deserve to remain among [France’s] citizens.”495 The general’s death, Pasquier 
insisted, would serve as “an example to an offended nation.”496 
The case against Lally thus relied upon an ecumenical conception of treason, one that 
encompassed everything from unsubstantiated claims of selling off French factories to the British 
to reports of the mistreatment of French subjects and even the non-subjects in their employ. 
Early on, Company employees recognized that incriminating Lally would clear them of any 
blame for the military failures on the Coromandel Coast. Many also realized the general was 
likely to denounce them to the king if they did not do something to preempt him.497 As Charles 
Walton notes, the culture of reputation in France was “quasi-mercantilist”: a zero-sum game 
where gaining esteem and social influence meant doing so at the expense of others.498 The trial 
against Lally thus combined a desire for vengeance on the part of Pondichéry’s inhabitants with 
a need to demonstrate their innocence in the loss of French territory and profess their loyalty to 
France. In blaming the general, the Company’s employees were ultimately advocating for the 
Company after the surrender of the colonial settlements that essentially justified its existence—
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shifting the corporation’s relationship to the nation from that of a privileged institution meant to 
advance its commercial interests to a society of loyal citizens to whom the crown owed 
protection in return for their fidelity and productive service.  
Many of these arguments built on claims first made during the siege of Pondichéry. De 
Leyrit, for one, wrote extensively on Lally’s efforts to deprive Company employees of both their 
ability to serve France in India, and of their basic rights as French subjects. The former governor 
laced his testimony with references to the general’s “despotism” in ruling over Pondichéry, 
manifested in the false “zeal” and “selflessness” that he adopted by “forcing others to make 
sacrifices on his behalf,” and in his “abuse of the authority granted to him by the king.” By this 
logic, Lally not only betrayed the crown by failing to defend its interests in India, but also by 
“taking away” the council’s traditional power to regulate colonial affairs and govern judiciously. 
Implicit in all of this was the intimate connection between French and corporate interests. In 
violating the rights to municipal self-governance that the Company granted its employees in 
India, Lally was ultimately contravening the collective will of the nation.    
The treatises written on behalf of Lally failed to match these accusations in either 
quantity or conviction. The general built his defense primarily around three arguments: that the 
accusations of his being in league with the British were totally false; that the failures in India had 
mostly to do with his subordinates, especially d’Aché; and that the Parlement of Paris had neither 
the jurisdiction nor the expertise required to judge a military case.499 Such claims only served to 
worsen his position, causing potential allies like d’Aché to join his growing chorus of 
denunciators. Even Lally’s apologists expressed misgivings. The Histoire des deux Indes 
                                                
499 Thomas Arthur de Lally-Tollendal, Vraies causes de la perte de l’Inde (1766); Idem, Memoirs of Count Lally, 
from His Embarking for the East Indies, as Commander in Chief of the French Forces in that Country, to His Being 
Sent Prisoner of War to England, After the Surrender of Pondichery (1766). 
200 
described the general as an “odious and contemptible man; a man incapable of commanding 
others”—all the while mounting a defense on his behalf.500 Rather than attempting to salvage 
Lally’s character, supporters instead concentrated on the inconsistencies in the accusations 
against him, and in the injustice of punishing his reputed crimes as a capital offense.  
In the end, the toxic combination of an unfocused defense and a concerted effort against 
Lally led to his conviction. On 6 May 1766, the court read out his crimes, charging him with 
having “betrayed the interests of the king, his state, and the Compagnie des Indes; of abusing his 
authority, humiliating and extorting subjects of the king and foreign inhabitants of 
Pondichéry.”501 His estate confiscated and partially redistributed to the “poor of Pondichéry,” the 
general was executed three days later in a botched affair that represented one of the late Old 
Regime’s more macabre public spectacles. (With a huge crowd assembled before him, the 
executioner reportedly took several strokes to decapitate the general.) Over the following years, 
critics of the case would refer to this gruesome scene when lamenting the injustice of Lally’s 
execution.502 If few rushed to salvage the general’s reputation, a number of prominent writers 
worried about the social and political implications of such clear scapegoating.  
Indeed, Lally’s most famous defender did not publish his initial thoughts on the case until 
1769—three years too late to save the general. One of the most perceptive commentators on the 
trial, Voltaire framed the Lally affair as a self-serving manipulation of the French legal tradition 
by the Company. Voltaire worried about the partisan intentions behind the Company’s patriotic 
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claims. In several treatises, the philosophe discussed the ambiguous circumstances of the charges 
laid before Lally, particularly the ill-defined crime of “betraying the interests of the king.”503 
Wondering how such a transgression could ever equate to “lèse-majesté,” Voltaire argued that 
“betraying the interests signifies nothing more in our language than poor conduct, forgetting the 
interests of someone, [or] harming those interests, and doesn’t imply being perfidious or 
treacherous.”504 The writer grumbled, moreover, at the spectacle surrounding Lally’s case—the 
crush of “merchants,” “shareholders,” “employees,” “commissioners,” “wives,” and “patrons” 
interested in his demise—and the ways in which unrelated developments like the collapse of 
Company stock during the Seven Years’ War were imputed to his treachery.505 Writing with the 
benefit of hindsight (Voltaire published after the Company had already been dissolved), the 
philosophe summed the entire episode up with one damning verdict: “The death of Lally did not 
prolong the life of the Company: it was nothing more than useless cruelty.”506  
The basic question of Lally’s culpability always reflected a broader set of factors, from 
the shifting legal definitions of treason to the partisan interests surrounding his trial. These 
elements continued to impact the case long after the general’s execution. In 1778, Lally’s son 
Trophime-Gerard appealed Lally’s sentence to salvage his father’s name and estates.507 In a 
curious instance of inter-generational feuding, the younger Lally found his path opposed by the 
young parlementaire Jean-Jacques Duval d’Eprémesnil, the son Jacques d’Eprémesnil and 
nephew of de Leyrit. While Louis XVI formally pardoned the elder Lally and restored his 
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family’s estates, the Parlement of Rouen—to which the case had been referred—refused to 
recognize the new verdict, a consequence of the continued hostility between the crown and 
parlementaire magistrates across France. The quarreling would continue until the eve of the 
Revolution, and was never fully resolved.  
In the short term, however, Lally’s trial supplied employees with a new framework for 
appealing to both the crown and the larger public. Throughout the proceedings against Lally, 
employees from Pondichéry professed a language of patriotic devotion to France—the meaning 
of which they amplified by attempting to show how the general’s poor relations with the 
Company constituted a treacherous act against crown subjects. Indeed, by renegotiating the legal 
parameters of treason to facilitate Lally’s conviction, they helped turn a relationship traditionally 
based on service and privilege into one framed around ideas of subjecthood, rights, and royal 
obligation. In so doing, they underscored the Company’s capacity for civic virtue, suggesting 
that corporate employees could exercise a greater degree of patriotic devotion than even the most 
trusted of royal servants. 
 
Conclusion 
 For many historians, the French empire became an important political site only after the 
Revolution. It was thus intimately connected to the ideologies and practices of French 
republicanism. From Saint-Domingue to Vietnam, Algeria to Polynesia, colonial officials 
grappled with the legacy of the republican political tradition—confronting its racial and religious 
limits while exporting its foundational values to a diverse group of subjects.508 While the 
Revolution crystallized the reformist impulses of the late Old Regime into a new concept of 
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republican nationhood, the development of France’s colonial empire over the following century 
and a half carried this idea into maturity.  
 As this chapter suggests, however, the problems of empire played a critical role in French 
political life long before the tumultuous summer of 1789. The confrontation between Lally and 
the Superior Council of Pondichéry highlights the diverse implications that colonial settlement 
and trade had for Old Regime society, from the evolution of patriotic culture to the 
reinvigoration of state-sponsored privilege. Operating beyond the limits of easy surveillance, 
Company administrators developed a unique perspective on their place within the absolutist state, 
and a firm resolution to defend this status against what they perceived as excessive encroachment 
by crown agents. Such efforts remind us of the wide sense of political possibility facing France 
in the eighteenth century. In the course of the Seven Years’ War, Company reformers forged a 
settlement that simultaneously reinforced crown authority while dissolving the geographical and 
cultural boundaries that relegated the corporation to the margins of French politics. They adopted 
a language of nationhood that emphasized inclusiveness and the contractual nature of state 
sovereignty—both hallmarks of republican political culture—all while serving to reinforce an 
absolutist tradition based on personal rule. In short, as France’s colonial ambitions floundered 
after 1763, employees sought to embed Company service more fully within the public life of the 
Old Regime, gaining legal recourse and social capital by turning corporate obligation into a 
platform for citizenship.  
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CHAPTER 6: “CROWNED BY THORNS”: SHAREHOLDING, COMMERCIAL 
LIBERTY, AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLICITY  
 
What else does the Company represent, if not a part of the nation? 
—Isaac de Panchaud 
 
 In May 1769, a satirical article entitled the Prospectus de la pompe funèbre de feue très 
haute, très puissante, très excellente princesse, Madame la Compagnie des Indes circulated 
through the Paris salons. The piece made light of the moribund Company, which was on the 
verge of losing its monopoly, by depicting it as a sickly princess on her deathbed. Few were 
spared from its scathing commentary. Company administrators appeared uninformed and poorly 
suited for their position, standing before the dying corporation while “neglected books on trade” 
lay about their feet.509 Corporate shareholders, meanwhile, were represented as amoral profiteers. 
Consider the portrayal of Jacques Necker, a prominent shareholder and future Controller-General 
of France. “Equivocal” in his sentiment, he offered half-hearted gestures of support while 
remaining ready to “cast [the Company] aside” at a moment’s notice.510 The Paris banker 
Jacques Dupan forewent mourning altogether as he greedily counted the “diamonds and jewels” 
adorning the Company’s bedroom,_ while one of his fellow stockholders spent the time 
scribbling away calculations for a caisse d’escompte—a national banking scheme proposed as a 
replacement for the corporation.511 All around the Company stood the sources of its demise, from 
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the clueless officials who had mismanaged its trade to the avaricious shareholders who viewed it 
as little more than an instrument of private profit. For the author of the piece, the poor health of 
the Company and the self-serving inclinations of its members were intimately related problems.  
The Prospectus de la pompe funèbre’s deprecatory treatment of Company shareholders 
was by no means new. Since the collapse of Mississippi, corporate investors had operated under 
a shadow of popular opprobrium, labeled as stock-jobbers and amoral profiteers by a public that 
still blamed them for Law’s “original sin.”512 What distinguished this pamphlet from other 
critical works of the same period was the status of its reputed author, the comte de Lauraguais. A 
prominent pamphleteer and salonnier, Lauraguais was also the Company’s largest investor. 
Company shareholders had never been above infighting, but they rarely published against each 
other; such efforts only served to undermine the image of the corporation in the eyes of both the 
public and its royal benefactors. In this case, however, it was the comte’s insider status that 
inspired his indignation. Lauraguais criticized his peers for their failure to attend to their 
collective interests, and worried that consistent mismanagement had imperiled his investment.513 
He saw the purchase of corporate stock not just as a financial decision, but also as a political 
commitment that bound subjects to the economic agenda of the crown in exchange for the 
“property” represented by their dividends.514 For Lauraguais, shareholders were more than 
individual investors; they were a community united by a discernible set of values, rights, and 
civic obligations. In highlighting the Company’s impending “death,” the comte also laid bare the 
failures of this body politic that had been constituted within in it.  
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This chapter is about the political ties created through Company investment. It shows 
how shareholding moved from an economic practice to a form of political franchise that found 
expression within the public culture of the Old Regime. An account of shareholder politics helps 
to shed new light on the symbolic resonance of the state—and in particular the monarchy—over 
the course of the eighteenth century. Whether articulated in opposition to or in concert with the 
policies of the crown, investors’ emerging sense of corporate identity always developed through 
reference to the interests of the state. Unlike in Great Britain, which had an established history of 
limited liability and corporate personhood, the French legal system treated institutions like the 
Company (a société commandite par action) as an extension of the royal treasury. Both in the 
terms laid out through the various édits and lettres patentes that constituted the corporation, and 
in the idioms of popular culture, the Company’s status was always a reflection of this close 
connection with the crown.515 For shareholders, state service thus provided a consistent reference 
point, a sense of duty that was constantly invoked even as they reworked its meaning over 
decades of debate, lobbying, and special pleading. By aligning themselves with the values and 
goals of the monarchy, Company shareholders carved out a political community that both 
validated the projects of the crown and, ultimately, provided investors with the space and 
ideological legitimacy needed to advance their own claims.   
The following account explores the political evolution of Company investors over the 
course of the eighteenth century, from the establishment of the corporation to its dissolution by 
royal ministers in 1769. As a society formed around common economic concerns, shareholders 
developed a political voice in response to the broader pressures faced by the Company over the 
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course of the eighteenth century. Political principle emerged side-by-side with an easily 
discernible set of economic interests, as investors learned to articulate specific, group-based 
motives in a language of common interest. Over time, such efforts were institutionalized through 
a shared value system, organizational practices, and, ultimately, a growing call for self-rule. This 
burgeoning sense of corporate sovereignty impacted shareholders as well as the broader political 
culture of the Old Regime. As they defined their own political space, investors both reshaped the 
contours of the French nation and reconceived the sovereign powers of the monarchy.  
 
Going Public 
Company investment was always a public affair. While theorists like Bodin and Hobbes 
spoke of a singular and indivisible monarchy, in practice royal power developed out of extensive 
collaboration. Even at the height of French absolutism under Louis XIV, the crown relied on 
various political and economic incentives to ensure the cooperation of its most powerful 
subjects—from provincial elites to Gallican clergymen.516 The monarchy’s faltering efforts to 
entice investors into financing the Company likewise speaks to the limits of absolutist power in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. From Colbert’s subscription campaigns to Law’s 
exaggerated claims about the financial benefits of unrestrained credit, royal ministers had to “sell” 
both shares and the merits of public finance to hesitant investors. Company shareholders thus 
emerged as consummate middlemen within the political culture of the Old Regime. On the one 
hand, they were a public who needed to be convinced by royal officials to invest in crown-
sponsored enterprise. On the other, they were state insiders responsible for advertising the power 
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of the king in order to safeguard their investments. By purchasing or refusing to buy shares, 
stockholders passed judgment on the viability of crown-sponsored monopoly and, by extension, 
the absolutist monarchy. 
In many ways, shareholding conformed to the mold of corporate solidarity that framed 
social life in the Old Regime. Drawn from different estates, professions, and areas of France, 
shareholders were nonetheless united by their common role as state creditors.517 Investors relied 
upon traditional social relationships to advance a common project of shareholder advocacy. Like 
other members of France’s corporate chain of being, well-connected shareholders milked 
patronage connections to lobby for reforms within the corporation after the Mississippi Bubble, 
using personal influence to ensure the viability of their shares.518 Yet Company investors also 
differed in important ways from the other privileged groups that composed the corporatist 
landscape of the Old Regime. Lacking an established tradition of corporate privilege, local 
custom, or feudal contract, shareholders instead derived their legitimacy from the monarchy and 
popular faith in its monopolistic policies.519 Theirs was a community defined by the existing 
hierarchies of both the crown and the Company, and, in particular, from the early-modern belief 
that trade needed to be governed in order to be effective.  
These characteristics of corporate investment—an implicit connection to the political 
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projects of the crown and a shared economic agenda that provided a powerful source for unity—
help explain the claims that shareholders commonly made over the course of the eighteenth 
century. Investors published frequently in the wake of Law’s “system,” bolstering the legitimacy 
of the monarchy (their chief benefactor) as a way of safeguarding their shares. Discussions about 
dividends, fiduciary responsibilities, and capitalization were laced with patriotic pronouncements, 
and couched in a language of national interest. Shareholder publishing efforts were by no means 
coordinated in the early years of the Company; the corporation provided them with little in the 
way of formal communication channels. Yet the various petitions and mémoires produced by 
corporate investors in the decades following the Mississippi Bubble regularly reproduced themes 
that helped to explain and legitimize their pursuit of economic interests. As with other lobbying 
interests under the Old Regime, shareholders worked to make their own goals consistent with 
established conceptions of the public good.520   
 The purchase of corporate stock thus came increasingly to stand as a testament of investors’ 
patriotism: a “mark of their confidence and their willingness to submit” to the authority of the 
crown.521 Investors were part of an ongoing debate over the ideology and purpose of the 
Company; this process, in turn, helped remake the corporation’s image to align it more closely 
with state goals. Such efforts imbued the Company with new political and legal form: it became 
a proxy institution extending the royal reach to distant shores; a bulwark against the corruptive 
influence of non-European peoples; and a moral instrument that channeled the self-serving 
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interests of French merchants toward more constructive pursuits.522 In each case, the Company’s 
civic contributions extended beyond the mere pursuit of profit. Consider, for instance, the 
arguments advanced by one investor in support of the corporation’s unprofitable commercial 
operations along the Barbary Coast. By taking on this “onerous trade,” he argued in a 1726 
polemic, the Company “supplied Provence with wheat during periods of famine,” proving 
valuable to France even as it lost money.523 Such claims speak to the complex nature of 
commercial discourse in the eighteenth century, which is often assumed to have fixated on 
simple dichotomies between protectionism and free trade and private vice and public interest. 
For shareholders, as for many of the core economic thinkers of the late Old Regime, the question 
of how to manage foreign trade was intimately related to the political circumstances, civic 
structures, and moral disposition of the French kingdom more generally.524 
An important consequence of these efforts was that they served not only to outline 
Company contributions to an often skeptical public, but also to bring investors together through 
the development of a collective identity that transcended their various polemics, petitions, and 
lobbying activities. A sense of both communal bond and shared purpose was apparent early on in 
shareholder writing. In the 1726 Mémoire sur les Causes du Discrédit, an anonymous investor 
polemic written in response to collapse of the Mississippi Bubble, the author described 
shareholding as an ecology of symbiotic relationships. “Each investor who does not contribute to 
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[state] commerce through his knowledge,” the author noted, “does so by his investment,” while 
individual “ignorance is overcome by the competence of those appointed to administer the 
Company.”525 The bonds created through investment ultimately provided a source of shared 
edification:  “the members who compose” the corporation “grow mutually through the sharing of 
knowledge.”526 Over the course of the following decades, shareholders carved out an identity as 
members of community integral to the function of Company trade and governance. 
The work of Joseph Delaître, a syndic and one of the most vocal opponents of Joseph 
Dupleix, is particularly useful for understanding how status as an investor evolved into a form of 
political currency. In his 1750 report, Observations sur le gouvernement passé et présent de la 
Compagnie des Indes, the syndic argued that the purchase of stock should serve as a prerequisite 
for the holding of political office within the Company. Worried that Company’s officials had 
little to no vested interest in its prosperity, he suggested that the directors increase their 
investment in the Company from the obligatory 50 shares they were required to hold, and argued 
that new syndics be chosen from only among the “great stockholders.”527 Investment, he argued, 
would serve as the foundation for a “good administration,” creating layers of overlapping 
interests that would transform the Company into a better functioning economic and political 
community.528  
Shareholders did not develop these claims on their own; both crown and Company 
officials helped shaped their collective interests and identity. The 1740s marked an important 
shift in the political life of Company investors. As the War of the Austrian Succession disrupted 
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trade in India, the Paris directors grew increasingly reliant on the shareholders to provide short-
term financing for the corporation. Company officials employed a combination of forced loans 
and caps introduced on future dividend payments to stabilize corporate finances. These measures 
kept the Company solvent, but they also incurred a heavy political cost: shareholders protested in 
force against alterations to the dividend, which many of them had come to see as a sacrosanct 
property right.529 In response to these complaints, the Company directorate offered several 
political concessions. In 1746, they once again began convening regular assembles of the 
corporation’s shareholders, who had not met together since 1728. A 1748 decree further 
expanded investor representation by increasing the responsibilities of the corporation’s six 
syndics, officials charged with advocating on behalf of the shareholders to the Company’s 
directors.530 With both reforms, shareholders acquired significant new institutional powers: a 
regular forum from which to voice their demands, and representatives who could agitate on their 
behalf among the leaders of the corporation.  
The reforms of the 1740s effectively established a new sort of contractual relationship 
between shareholders and state and company agents. In exchange for the public advocacy and 
financial assistance provided by investors, the Paris directors promised both a new commitment 
to transparency and a greater degree of fiduciary responsibility. Building on the shareholders’ 
language of good citizenship, loyalty, and shared responsibility, the directors portrayed the 
Company as a link in the political chain connecting investors, administrators, and crown officials 
together through a common set of interests. “Far from representing separate bodies,” wrote one 
polemicist in 1739, the Company and its shareholders were united “in extreme union,” with 
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“mutual aid” providing the “solidity” needed to sustain this relationship.531 The terms of this 
dynamic were outlined in each annual shareholder assembly, which were presided over by the 
Controller-General.532 Company investors would serve at once as a conduit between the 
Company and popular opinion, a symbol of the corporation’s responsible management. Calling 
public opinion “the Queen of the World,” the director François Castanier tasked the shareholders 
with redressing the Company’s poor public image, much of which he attributed to “lack of 
sufficient knowledge” about the intricacies of trade among the French people.533 The syndic 
Charles Colabau likewise argued that greater accountability to the shareholder would infuse the 
Company with the “vigor” of popular “confidence.”534 Both men spoke of congruent goals, with 
the interests of the crown, the Company, and its shareholders in precise alignment. 
Company investors, in short, were participants in an ongoing process of political 
negotiation, as the meaning of France’s empire, the French nation, and the agencies and 
corporations that constituted both were worked out in relation to one another. Their collective 
identity emerged through a continuous dialogue with both state and Company officials; the 
shifting imperatives of the crown and France’s colonial politics provided them with a new sense 
of common purpose. Yet Company shareholders never simply reflected the political goals of the 
monarchy; they refracted them as they sought to carve out a corporate culture that could 
accommodate the public interest and, at the same time, make sense of their status. Corporate and 
crown interests may have often overlapped, but, despite the claims of Castanier and Colobau, 
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they were never entirely coterminous. And when developments occurred that might challenge the 
self-supporting terms of this relationship, shareholders could use the language of service and 
patriotism that had refined over the precious decades to challenge the policies of both state and 
Company officials.  
 
Reform, Reaction, and the Political Culture of Shareholding 
In France, the consequences of the Seven Years’ War generated deep-felt anxiety. The 
national debt had nearly doubled, nine-tenths of France’s overseas territories had been lost, and 
the army had suffered a profound humiliation.535 Both the forfeiture of the North American 
colonies and the reduction of French sovereign claims in India—a consequence of the 1763 
Treaty of Paris settlement—represented more than just material losses. Voltaire might dismiss 
French colonies like Canada as “a few acres of snow,” but for many France’s overseas 
possessions represented a point of public pride, not to mention a central part of the political 
space of the Old Regime.536 For decades, these far-flung settlements had played an integral role 
in highlighting and clarifying the sovereign powers of both the monarchy and many of the other 
political bodies comprising the corporatist landscape of prerevolutionary France. The “loss of 
empire” that followed the Treaty of Paris thus had brutal implications: it unsettled established 
conceptions of sovereignty, political right, and public interest, while also inspiring a new chorus 
of critics against France’s colonial administration.  
The Seven Years’ War played a significant role in the erosion of crown authority before 
the French Revolution. Historians often place it within a genealogy of constitutional crises 
ranging from the Unigenitus controversies of the 1730s to the Maupeou coup and Turgot’s short-
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lived abolition of the guilds in 1774. Both France’s poor performance in the war, and the 
spiraling debt that resulted from it, produced a new culture of opposition against the state, from 
the mordant remonstrances of the Paris Parlement to the philosophical ruminations of Rousseau. 
A defining feature of this process was not only loss of faith in the royal authority, but a growing 
belief that sovereignty could—and should—reside outside the office of the king. “Politics,” to 
quote Keith Michael Baker, simply “broke out of the absolutist mold” in the 1750s and 1760s.537 
In place of divine right, royal tradition, and absolute monarchy the French people gradually 
turned toward an opposing set of ideals to make sense of their political world; public opinion, the 
general will, and an implicit social contract became their new ordering principles. These decades 
thus initiated a long-term process that would reach its culmination during the Revolution: a 
“transfer” of sovereign power from the crown to the nation more generally.538  
An important yet unexplored factor behind this conceptual shift was the reconfiguring of 
state sovereignty that followed on the heels of the Treaty of Paris. Parlementaire polemics might 
have challenged the sovereign powers of the king, but even deep into the eighteenth century 
French political authority was rarely understood to reside in a single person or office. The 
Company was just one of a number of institutions—ranging from municipal councils to 
seigneurial courts—to which the king delegated authority. Even though monarchy provided a 
frame of reference through which these intermediary agencies defined themselves, France 
remained a patchwork of overlapping jurisdictions, local regimes, and proxy agents. The 
imperial reshuffling caused by the Seven Years’ War precipitated a bracing reassessment of the 
institutions and practices of the Old Regime. Indeed, the 1760s bore witness to a diverse array of 
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arguments about the distribution of sovereign power in France. While economic writers like the 
Physiocrats argued that monarchical power was indivisible and ubiquitous, Atlantic merchants 
asserted that the French kingdom was made up of different sovereign zones: a center-periphery 
divide between France and its Caribbean colonies.539 Before sovereignty could be “transferred,” 
it first had to be theorized anew. The bitter disputes sparked by the dissolution of the French 
overseas empire played a critical role in this process.    
French defeat, in short, created space for an array of competing interest groups, each 
seeking to forward new claims about the sovereign composition of the Old Regime. The future of 
the Company represented a central point of contention in this contest. For even ardent advocates 
of monopolistic trade, the consequences of the Seven Years’ War seemed to warrant a 
thoroughgoing reform of Company operations. Conflict with India had not only robbed the 
Company of large swathes of territory; it had also reduced the sovereign authority of the 
corporation by restricting many of its military and political powers. Corporate insiders published 
a string of proposals designed to restructure the corporation to accommodate these changes. 
These schemes ranged dramatically in both concept and technical sophistication, from proposals 
pushing the Company to abandon its colonies in India and consolidate trading operations on Ile 
de France to arguments that the corporation should simply resume its normal activities, reclaim 
its prior jurisdiction, and redevelop its former commercial networks on the subcontinent.540 
While the specific details of these reform projects varied, but they all revolved around a central 
premise: the Indian trade still needed to be governed to be effective.541  
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For a growing chorus of Company critics, by contrast, this principle was by no means 
self-evident. In the wake of the Seven Years’ War, two groups formed the core of a vocal 
opposition to the corporation: a coterie of financiers centered around the banker Jean-Joseph 
Laborde and the Malouin shipowner Jean-Baptiste Magon de la Balue—whose father had once 
served as a director of the corporation—and Jacobite merchants living in France’s Atlantic port 
cities.542 Both sought financial gain from the dissolution of the Company’s monopoly and the 
consequent deregulation of French commerce in India. Both also published at length about how 
free trade would provide much-needed relief for the French economy. Debates over the 
Company quickly evolved into “political” conflicts through which concerns about the ideological 
foundations and administrative structure of the Old Regime were refracted. The intendant de 
commerce Vincent de Gournay, for example, undertook an aggressive publishing campaign 
designed to show how the elimination of monopolistic commerce would ultimately rationalize 
the country’s administration.543 The actions of Gournay signal an important shift in royal 
attitudes toward the Company. Occupying an office that stood traditionally as a stepping stone 
toward higher positions within the royal minister, he used his position to advocate for the 
wholesale restructuring of French commercial practices.544 Well-known for the collection of 
academics he assembled to support his ideas (the eponymous Gournay Circle), Gournay helped 
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undermine royal support for the Company. As crown officials began to turn against the Company, 
the incentives for collaboration gradually disappeared.  
For Company shareholders, this jostling over the principles and political consequences of 
corporate trade not only generated anxiety, but also created a sense of opportunity. Investors took 
a different approach to the question of whether or not the Indian trade should be managed: they 
insisted upon the wisdom of regulating overseas commerce, but suggested that it should be them, 
rather than Company administrators or the crown, who should do the regulating. By this point, 
the act of investment had come increasingly to stand as a form of political sanction—a 
qualification based not only on the apparent loyalty of Company stockholders to the state, but 
also on the functions that their collective bonds performed. As the Company’s colonial power 
evaporated, and as competing parties reevaluated the nature of sovereignty under the Old Regime, 
investors leaned heavily on this common bond as a source of political legitimacy. “We have first 
considered,” noted one shareholder petition in 1763, “that if that capacity of an individual to do 
good or bad is linked to his personal qualities, such is not the case for men united together in a 
society.”545 The connections formed through investment, he asserted, helped to create a more 
moral and productive citizen: “once personal qualities do not matter, an individual will follow 
the spirit of their corps, it is from there that the laws to which they are subject emerge.”546 For 
decades, investors had insisted that the associational bonds created through shareholding 
provided a source for shared edification. In the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, they began to 
see these connections as the foundation for their own sovereign authority.    
In short, shareholders not only began to push for a voice in the reform projects 
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surrounding the Company; they also argued that the changes brought about by the Treaty of Paris 
made it necessary for investors to have a more active role in governing the corporation. Several 
prominent investors assumed a leading role in this effort, the most vocal of whom was Jacques 
Necker, a financier who would later gain fame as Controller-General. With close ties to the Paris 
banking interests who represented the Company’s main creditors, Necker had a clear agenda in 
both defending the corporation and expanding his role in the administration. So too did many 
other large investors. Isaac Panchaud, another Paris financier, hoped to transform the Company 
into a caisse d’escompte—a project for which he obtained a broad degree of support. Both men 
possessed important contacts outside the Company: Panchaud was a prominent financier with 
connections in the financial center of Geneva, whereas Necker courted powerful patrons at the 
royal court. While milking these patronage relationships to establish their credibility both inside 
and outside the Company, they each argued that the collective authority of the shareholders 
constituted a form of political mandate. 
These lobbying efforts provided a new source of unity, even if shareholders remained 
divided over the exact direction that the Company should take. As Necker, Panchaud, and others 
waded into the thick of post-treaty debates over corporate trade, they invoked the shared bonds 
and communal interests created through Company investment. They outlined the practical 
functions of shareholding in light of the corporation’s mismanagement during the Seven Years’ 
War. And, in everything from public petitions to internal assembly meetings and direct 
negotiations with the king, they insisted that shareholders themselves constituted a body politic 
whose sovereign authority stemmed from its ability to manage Company trade properly.547 As 
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they debated the administrative needs of the corporation, and assigned blame for its most recent 
failures, vocal shareholders like Necker outlined a political authority for his fellow investors that 
was distinct from either the monarchy or the Company’s official leadership. 
Investors relied upon new expedients such as internal audits to provide weight to these 
claims, creating a powerful empirical foundation from which to outline their collective 
interests.548 Projections about the expense and potential profit of future trading operations helped 
underline to the monarchy the financial wisdom of shifting commercial responsibilities to the 
shareholders. These audits likewise served as political capital within the investor assembly 
meetings. Necker quickly gained in popularity when he proposed a plan to give shareholders 
administrative autonomy and, as a consequence, earn an annual profit of nearly 8 million livres. 
The dividend emerged as a key point of contention in these debates—both as a financial reward 
that investors sought to protect and as a legitimizing force in claims to shareholder governance. 
Such arguments proved very much in line with the claims that Delâitre had first advanced a 
decade before: financial investment and the self-interest derived from it would provide powerful 
incentives for shareholders to manage the corporation soundly. 
 What these efforts reveal is not only the development of new lobbying methods for 
appealing to both crown and Company officials, but also the evolution of an internal value 
system, government structure, and sovereign expectations. Whereas previously shareholders had 
once represented themselves as a society embedded within—and subordinated—to the 
hierarchies of both Company and state, they now began to define themselves as a distinct society 
whose constitution reflected the collective interests of its members. Necker nurtured this 
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evolving sense of authority with a reform scheme meant to convince the crown to cede its stock 
in the corporation, thereby giving the shareholders a controlling stake. The plan offered a 
comprehensive restructuring of the corporate administration, with shareholders selecting leaders 
from their own ranks and determining an appropriate sum for the annual dividend payments. To 
convince the king to forfeit his shares, Necker proposed several concessions: the Company 
would transfer ownership of Iles de France and Bourbon, the Port of Lorient, and its slave-
trading factories on the West African Coast directly to the crown.549 Eager to shed its obligations 
to the corporation, the crown proved receptive to this proposal, and after two months of 
bargaining, agreed to its terms. On 20 June 1764, Necker announced before the assembled 
shareholders that they had assumed control of the Company’s administration.550  
 The gift of autonomy came with stipulations: the crown limited the Company’s purview 
exclusively to trade, and forced it to rely on the Ministry of the Marine for the defense of its 
overseas settlements. Still, for both Necker and the shareholders more generally, even these 
limited gains represented an important victory. Over the next few months, reforms proceeded in 
earnest as Necker outlined a new vision for his political community. He restructured the 
Company along more participatory principles, proposing that the shareholders hold elections to 
choose representatives from among their number (directors had previously been appointed by the 
king).551_ Consistent with the notion that the financial interest would generate a commitment to 
sound management, property qualifications were set on this new franchise: only investors who 
owned at least 25 shares could attend and speak at assembly meetings.552 Necker also outlined 
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the leadership responsibilities of the Company’s new officials, who consisted of five directors 
and ten syndics.553 By January 1765, his new administration set about the difficult task of 
restoring the Company’s finances.   
These reforms instilled in shareholders a new sense of political authority. But they also 
created a potential source for conflict by grounding Company governance in principles of shared 
interest, property rights, and collective administration. As Philip Stern and Richard Ross have 
argued, commercial management in the early modern world was most often understood in 
humanist terms: inherently republican, rooted in the associational values of guilds and other self-
regulating mercantile institutions, and based on a sense of shared expertise and civic 
commitment. Even under the absolutist regime of the French monarchy, small, incorporated 
institutions like merchant courts and municipal councils remained to many the model for 
mercantile administration.554 The Company’s previously two-tiered system of organization, 
which  divided power between the shareholders and a corporate leadership consisting of directors, 
syndics, and royal councilors, was itself rooted in the traditional bicameral structure of town 
councils like that of Toulouse.555 Necker’s administration derived legitimacy from this 
associational mold: his reforms, many shareholders believed, had turned the Company into a 
self-constituted “republic,” and he insisted upon the advantages that a small community bound 
by clearly discernible interests could have over a larger bureaucracy composed of administrators 
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who lacked a personal investment in the organization they governed.556 In so doing, however, he 
also created an expectation for a certain level of accountability and transparency within the 
corporate administration. When Necker’s government failed to meet these obligations, his fellow 
shareholders rose up against him.  
 Indeed, the ink on the deal ceding the Company to its investors had barely dried before the 
first signs of discord appeared. While Necker embraced a hopeful language of efficient 
administration and improved investor representation, displaced Company insiders worried about 
the impact of his reforms. According to Vilelaut, the corporation’s one-remaining royal 
commissioner, the restructuring had left the Company in a state of “complete anarchy.”557 What 
Necker’s proposals possessed in terms of abstract ideological appeal, they seemed to lack in 
institutional substance. Key administrative details remained unaddressed long after the 1764 
retrocession: the Controller-General continued to meet with Company officials on a weekly basis, 
preserving the basic dynamics of control that existed before the shareholders acquired the 
corporation; the reforms contained no provisions for handling the reelection of incumbent 
syndics and directors; and Necker had done little to improve trade in India.558 Due to ongoing 
delays, the administrative reforms proposed in 1764 would not be ratified until the spring of 
1767. By this point, the corporation was once again in crisis, reporting to its shareholders that it 
lacked sufficient funds to finance commercial shipments to India for the following year.559 Little 
research has been done connecting Necker’s time with the Company to his later work as France’s 
finance minister. But the failure of his reforms must have loomed large in his mind as he sought 
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to restructure the royal treasury around more transparent policies in the 1770s and 1780s.  
 Disgruntled investors began to challenge both the specific direction of Necker’s 
government and the legitimacy of a shareholder administration more generally. Ponant 
merchants likewise continued to petition the crown in an attempt to deregulate the Indian trade. 
Fractious politicking exposed the limits to investor claims that the purchase of stock had 
provided them with the credentials needed to manage the corporation; opposing blocs of 
investors each laid claim to the moral authority, commercial expertise, and political rights that, 
only a decade before, activists like Delaître had argued belonged to the corps of stockholders as 
a whole. Shareholders “seemed to applaud” the ruin of the Company, noted one anonymous 
pamphleteer, as if they were not “themselves affected by the weakening of their common 
investments [gage commun].”560 A believer in Necker’s administrative skills, the author 
nonetheless worried that the participatory principles on which his shareholder regime had been 
established might ultimately undermine its integrity: “The loudest voices,” he noted regretfully, 
“dictate terms to those who are the most timid.” [le plus vive dicter la loi à la partie la plus 
pacifique].561  
As a hostile climate of calumniation and political maneuvering soon pervaded the 
shareholder assembly, Isaac Panchaud emerged as a vocal critic of Necker’s policies. In 1767, he 
penned the Lettre d’un actionnaire sur le commerce de la Compagnie des Indes—a scathing 
commentary on the political practices and economic performance of the corporation. Published 
in protest of a new set of statues produced by the Company directors in the spring of that year, 
the mémoire railed against the culture of “despotism” that supposedly pervaded the corporate 
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administration. Despite Necker’s promise of an efficient political transition, Panchaud 
maintained, many basic issues such as the length of election terms, the process of achieving 
majority voting, and the method for producing audits remained unaddressed nearly three years 
after the crown’s retrocession.562 Of particular concern was the lack of accurate accounting 
available to the corporation’s voters—a deficiency that had led shareholders into accepting 
without question the “chimerical calculations” that Necker and his coterie used to make 
“specious” claims about the effectiveness of their government.563 “In a society of merchants,” he 
insisted, “it is the display of truth, it is the liberty of opinion, that keeps minds focused, that 
prepares them for all events, that purifies, so to speak, the mixture of opinions.”564 
Necker’s reforms, Panchaud insisted, had perverted the system of overlapping interests 
that had linked the Company to the crown. Where once the king had been a majority holder of 
Company shares, ruling over stockholders as “subjects” while also standing beside them as a 
“co-investor,” now the corporation stood bereft of any legitimate source of political authority.565 
Self-serving individuals had then filled this vacuum, blinding investors to their needs while 
manipulating the regulations of the Company to perpetuate their stranglehold on offices that 
were supposed to be chosen through “free elections.”566 For Panchaud, the shareholders lacked 
legitimacy as political community. On the one hand, Necker had severed the Company’s 
longstanding relationship with the crown, whose sovereign authority had regularly been used to 
explain and justify corporate policy. On the other, he had created a commercial society deficient 
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in both the values and financial acumen needed to regulate its trade.  
Panchaud was merely the most vocal of an increasingly enraged corps of shareholders. 
Tensions reached a head on 3 July 1767, when investors seized hold of the Company’s meeting 
hall and placed a list of demands before the administration. The aggrieved shareholders called 
upon the famed Parisian avocat Jean-Baptiste Gerbier, who had acquired a reputation for 
combating social injustice in his efforts against the Jesuits, to present their case for them.567 This 
airing of grievances gave way to a tense standoff, as Necker arrived to defend his policies. The 
Genevan voiced his surprise that the investors would turn on administrators whose “zeal” and 
“wisdom” supplied them with the requisite credentials to lead the Company—all the while 
urging the assembly to ratify his reforms.568 The dispute continued long into the night, and did 
not end until 11:30 PM. Finally, at Necker’s behest, the Controller-General Clement de Laverdy 
burst into the meeting and summarily dismissed the shareholders.  
Laverdy’s intervention signaled an important shift in the Company’s political fortunes. 
While ongoing delays had prevented Necker from making his claims of corporate autonomy into 
an institutional reality, the Company had nonetheless benefitted from a prolonged period of 
salutary neglect following the king’s retrocession of his shares. The July protests, however, 
revealed that even this limited independence was illusory: the crown not only could, but would 
intervene in Company affairs when doing so suited its interests. Laverdy’s language is likewise 
significant. The Controller-General summarily dismissed the shareholders by declaring “we are 
not in England”—an admonishment that framed their political activities and efforts to assemble 
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as a violation of proper practice under the absolutist state.569 Since 1764, investors had claimed 
the king’s retrocession of his shares as a form of administrative mandate. For many, this act not 
only legitimized investor claims to self-rule, but also for the construction of a distinct political 
community within the heart of the Old Regime. By 1767, however, the failure to construct a 
healthy political community capable of sustaining French trade had so eroded shareholders’ 
confidence in their political system that state officials had to be called in to restore order. 
Necker’s inability to reinvigorate Company trade had not only undermined the very rationale 
upon which investors relied to articulate their administrative rights—the idea that a shareholder 
regime could manage trade more effectively than the corporation’s previously mixed 
administration of directors and royal ministers. It also raised questions about the compatibility of 
an investor regime with the broader political culture of the absolutist state.   
 
“The greatest of service to the state” 
Laverdy’s intervention brought short-term relief to Necker’s administration, but also 
portended a deeper crisis. Beset by both political conflict and economic crisis, Company leaders 
were forced, in the aftermath of the July uprising, to turn to the monarchy for support. Investors 
consequently petitioned the king for both a direct loan and permission to oversee a crown-
sponsored lottery to keep their finances afloat.570 Yet personnel changes within the royal ministry 
made this dependence more problematic than it had been in the past, and the Company could no 
longer count on unconditional royal patronage. In 1768, court intrigue led to the dismissal of 
Laverdy as Controller-General. His replacement, Maynon d’Invault, was an adherent of 
Gournay’s, and an ardent believer that eliminating crown-sponsored monopolies would facilitate 
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economic development in France. Firm in his convictions, Maynon d’Invault made the 
dissolution of the Company one of the primary goals of his administration.  
As Anoush Terjanian argues, the crises experienced by the Company at the end of the 
1760s represented a “crystallizing moment” in the history of the Old Regime. Conflict with the 
royal ministry consolidated the litany of competing perspectives concerning Company trade into 
opposing camps of pro-monopoly and free-trade advocates.571 For shareholders, Maynon 
d’Invault’s well-publicized animosity toward the Company created a new sense of consensus 
within the assembly meetings. Divisions over specific policy issues certainly remained: 
Panchaud continued to push for the Company’s transformation into a Caisse d’Escompte, 
whereas Necker insisted on the wisdom of his administrative schemes. But as the prospects of a 
concerted ministerial campaign being launched against them increased, many investors moved 
beyond partisanship in an effort to defend their investments and rights to self-rule. Murmurings 
over the threats faced by the Company likewise echoed beyond its assembly chambers to become 
a divisive public issue. “The affair of the Compagnie des Indes is consuming both the court and 
the city,” noted the Mémoires Secrets, all of it premised “on the interest that so many people 
have in it.”572 Indeed, by the late 1760s, the Company’s uncertain status caught the attention of a 
range of commentators, from actual investors like Voltaire to interested outsiders like Diderot.  
Shareholders quickly found themselves immersed in a debate not merely about the 
viability of Company commerce, but also about the sovereign composition of the French state. 
At issue were two questions: whether or not France actually benefitted from monopolistic 
commerce, and whether the sovereign authority of proxy institutions like the Company actually 
                                                
571 Terjanian, Commerce and Its Discontents in Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, 138. 
572 Mémoires Secrets pour servir à l’histoire de la République des lettres en France, depuis 1762 jusqu’à nos jours, 
Volume II (1766-1769) (Paris: Honoré Champion Editeur, 2009), 3 April 1769, 1100. 
229 
constituted a legitimate form of political expression in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War. In 
1769, Maynon d’Invault commissioned an ally—the fellow Gournay adherent, royal pamphleteer, 
and abbé Andre Morellet—to write a polemic against the Company. Morellet’s résumé of anti-
Company publishing extended all the way back to 1755, when he worked alongside Gournay to 
pen a series of scathing attacks on the corporation’s monopoly on the import of painted cloth 
(toiles peintes). At Maynon d’Invault’s behest, he now set to work writing a more comprehensive 
critique of Company practices. In June 1769, he finally released his Mémoire sur la Situation 
Actuelle de la Compagnie des Indes. Over two hundred pages long, Morellet’s polemic provided 
both a comprehensive audit of Company finances since 1725 and a series of political arguments 
about why the corporation should be forced to abandon its monopoly. 
 Morellet fulminated against the Company’s economic lassitude, characterized by the 
“inactivity” [autant d’activité] and “circumscription” [autant d’étendue] that he believed had 
befallen its trading operations in India.573 While rehashing common arguments about the 
institutional deficiencies of the corporation—its tendency to create foreign wars, the large cost of 
its trading operations—the abbé depicted himself as an advocate for the beleaguered 
shareholders.574 Through a long series of calculations, he claimed to prove the Company’s 
duplicity toward its investors, who had been blinded by the “arbitrarily determined” value of 
their dividend payments. Morellet likewise decried the so-called “false patriotism” that infused 
the rhetoric of leaders like Necker, whom he claimed dressed self-serving and inefficient 
practices in the garb of civic virtue.575 At the same time, he pushed for a program of commercial 
liberty, grounding arguments for the dissolution of corporate monopoly in both economic 
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projections about the profit potential of free trade and contractual claims about the obligations of 
the crown to its subjects. “Truly all the nation,” he wrote, “deserves protection from the 
government; this is a right more sacred than that possessed by a privileged Company.”576 
 Like the shareholders before him, Morellet framed his analysis of the Company’s 
monopoly through references to both financial productivity and the nature of citizenship within 
the absolutist state. What made these connections particularly powerful was the highly 
publicized nature of this attack, which disclosed the previously secret accounts of the corporation 
while treating readers as informed auditors capable not only of navigating a complex list of 
hidden costs, projected values, and actual returns, but also of making clear distinctions between 
political virtue and personal vice. Morellet presented his polemic as both an investigation of the 
Company’s affairs and a publication meant to raise the political consciousness of the French 
nation. The Mémoire sur la Situation Actuelle de la Compagnie des Indes, he claimed, would 
break through the otherwise “superficial” knowledge surrounding the Company by exposing 
previously uninformed subjects to the discussions going on in the shareholders’ “general 
assembly.”577 
 Oriented specifically toward the question of monopolistic trade, Morellet’s polemic also 
reflected a pervasive Old Regime anxiety over the place of overseas trade within the absolutist 
state. His writing was as much about the management of people as it was about the management 
of commerce—for he sought to mold French citizens through the creation of shared economic 
interests. Even as he opposed the efforts of Necker and his supporters, he thus ironically found 
himself making similar claims about the creation of sovereign bonds. Both men argued that 
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collective interest constituted a foundational component of French political life. Both also saw 
the question of Company administration as intimately related to the consequences of the Seven 
Years’ War: a development that Paul Cheney terms as the breakdown in the “provisional 
coincidence of interests” between the monarchy and France’s burgeoning commercial society.578 
For each, government and its attendant regulations were a manifestation of shared interests—and 
should be judged on the ability to serve them. But whereas Necker claimed that the political 
powers of the monarchy could be preserved and expanded if it simply transferred responsibility 
for the Indian trade to Company shareholders, Morellet envisioned a more thoroughgoing reform 
of the institutions and practices of the Old Regime. For him, corporatism, monopoly, and other 
impediments to private enterprise would have to be eliminated if the state were to prosper. Self-
interest would replace self-effacing loyalty as the true marker of citizenship.579   
Morellet’s writing also reveals an important shift in the political identity of Company 
shareholders. Prior to the Seven Years’ War, investors spoke of themselves mostly as loyal 
subjects serving underneath the king. In the aftermath of both this conflict and the king’s 
retrocession of his shares, meanwhile, they framed themselves as a sovereign political unit 
working alongside the crown. Now, in the face of growing opposition from the royal ministry, 
they found themselves pushed into direct opposition with a powerful bloc of crown 
administratiors, branded as a refractory society that served neither the state’s interests nor its 
own. In response, the comte de Lauraguais, who up to this point had ridiculed most of 
shareholder reform efforts (he was the reputed author of the Prospectus de la pompe 
funèbre), wrote a scathing riposte to Morellet’s tract, painting him as a mercenary seeking only 
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self-enrichment.580 His was just one of a series of outraged responses that helped transform the 
complex issue over corporate monopoly into a polarized conflict opposing liberty to political 
despotism. 
 In the wake of Morellet’s publication, shareholders found themselves pressed not only to 
defend the privileges that they hold over the Indian trade, but also their very credentials as 
informed and loyal citizens who could be trusted to speak about the economic interests of the 
French nation. Fearful that Maynon d’Invault would soon suspend its monopoly, the Company 
staged a protest-filled meeting on 8 August. Necker assumed a leading role in these proceedings, 
exhorting the assembled investors to defend the corporation and the property they held through 
their investments.  
 The Genevan leaned heavily on a language of investor sacrifice to argue for the 
protection of the Indian monopoly. In a speech before the Company assembly, he insisted that 
shareholders “demanded neither compensation nor reward, asking only that it be remembered 
that they are members of a society that is useful to the state.”581 For Necker, the Company’s 
value to the crown could not merely be judged by simple projections of cost and profit, but rather 
by a more comprehensive set of calculations that considered the virtuous disposition of its 
shareholders, and the patriotic undertakings that it undertook on behalf of the crown. The 
Genevan went to great lengths to show that investors had “shouldered all the costs of sovereignty” 
incurred by the French in India. He outlined the litany of burdensome commitments for which 
their shares had paid, including “constructing and maintaining ports, raising fortifications, 
clearing roads, building arsenals, churches, hospitals, and other public works, funding a civil 
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court, [and] maintaining troops.”582 The extent of these sacrifices both underscored the 
Company’s role in facilitating the needs of the state and provided a powerful defense of 
monopoly. By Necker’s logic, any effort to deprive investors of their hard-earned income would 
be tantamount to “refusing a solider his duly earned prize by disputing with him the utility of his 
conquests.”583  
 Necker’s speech represented a desperate attempt to unite his fellow shareholders for a 
final showdown with state authority. More generally, though, it stood as a defense of a pluralistic 
vision for monarchical political authority. Necker not only highlighted the civic contributions of 
the Company; he regarded as self-evident that the crown would depend on the sovereign powers 
of intermediary political bodies to exercise political power. “I say this as one of the highest 
truths,” he asserted, “and maintain it with the utmost confidence, that the Compagnie des Indes 
has rendered the greatest of service to the state.”584 Like parlementaire magistrates during the 
Maupeou coup and guild members resisting the Turgot reforms, Necker and his fellow 
shareholders painted a picture of a despotic monarchy that had overstepped its bounds by 
undermining the rights of its subjects. They likewise framed the sovereign power of proxy 
agencies such as the Company as a necessary check on the arbitrary authority of the crown. “The 
public’s interest,” insisted the investor and famed polemicist Pidansat de Mairobert, “is to reject 
any system that would allow the government to seize its property, and to make whatever law it 
desires.”585 
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 The conflict over the Company reveals two contradictory trends at work in France after 
the 1760s. On the one hand, this decade bore witness to the evolution of corporate groups like 
the Parisian barristers’ association, the merchant courts, and, of course, Company shareholders 
into powerful political institutions. Over the course of the eighteenth century, many of the older 
privileged orders constituted through venality of office (bureaux de finances, the general farms) 
found their powers slowly stripped away by the monarchy—all in the name of political 
rationalization. Yet those corporate agencies that did not owe their existence to the purchase of 
sinecures (like the Company) often proved adept at expanding their powers, as they exploited 
arguments about the utility of their office to extend their political, judicial, and economic 
authority.586 The shareholders’ creation of a self-constituted republic of investors was just part of 
this broader process of corporatist reinvention in the face of growing upheaval under the Old 
Regime. 
 On the other hand, the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War saw a progressive narrowing of 
political options under the monarchy. The dissolution of France’s colonial system broke apart the 
reciprocal system of interests binding the crown together with its colonies, while the loss of 
Company authority in India removed one of the crown’s key legitimizing institutions. For 
decades, Company employees had relied on the power of the monarchy to explain and justify 
their activities abroad; this process, in turn, helped bolster crown authority by creating new legal 
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and economic applications for royal power. Even after 1763, shareholders succeeded in 
promoting their own corporate body as a sovereign solution to the vacuum created by the Treaty 
of Paris. But for both statesmen and economic writers, such limited reform—a mere 
reconfiguring of the institutions responsible for the managing French commerce in India—did 
not go nearly far enough. In the aftermath of the Treaty of Paris, the doc de Choiseul, the 
Minister of State for War and the Navy, oversaw a dramatic restructuring of French foreign 
policy; he made the restoration of empire a central crown objective, and replaced many of the 
proxy agencies responsible for managing France’s colonial settlements with royal agents, 
soldiers, and institutions.587 Economic writers like physiocrats and the Gournay Circle, 
meanwhile, exploited the failures of the Seven Years’ War to argue for the leveling of corporatist 
society. In place of the tangle of corps, privileged bodies, and sinecures that comprised the 
political landscape of the Old Regime, they argued that sovereign authority should reside 
exclusively in the state.  
 Morellet’s critique, by extension, focused on certain Company policies. But more than 
anything, he questioned the very premise that corporate and state interests could ever really 
overlap. The abbé grounded his argument in the notion that shareholder governance created an 
implicit conflict of interest: one could not function in equal parts as both citizens and members of 
a corporate society. He employed arguments common to critics of the Company over the 
preceding century: that the institution had been derelict in its duties; that free trade would 
represent a more efficient commercial option to monopoly; that Company employees could not 
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be trusted to create an accurate report of their annual earnings. Yet his criticism also reflected a 
more novel consideration rooted in the specific circumstances of the post-war years: that 
although the Company certainly exhibited a number of practical failings, its main problem was 
that a proxy institution possessing delegated sovereign powers no longer had a place in the 
political space of the Old Regime. His argument, in short, concerned not only the liberalization 
of the French economy, but also a reimagining of the context through which trade could be 
pursued and political power exercised. How he planned to institute these changes is less clear. In 
the case of India, Morellet imagined that the Company’s former colonies would be maintained as 
entrepôts for private merchants—without addressing the problem of who would fund and defend 
them. As was frequently the case in Morellet’s writing, polemical vigor compensated for any 
glaring practical deficiencies.588   
As it turned out, Necker’s address would represent the last concerted effort to defend the 
Company. Five days later on 13 August, Maynon d’Invault formally suspended the corporation’s 
monopoly. The dismantling of the Company would occur at an agonizingly slow pace over the 
following decade. While diehard supporters of the Company like Charles Godehau continued to 
advocate for the restoration of the Indian monopoly, the majority of shareholders recognized the 
futility of continued resistance.589 In 1770, they voted to ratify the ministry’s decision to 
dismantle their exclusive trading privileges. In India, meanwhile, the crown assumed direct 
control of the Company’s settlements, although British interference and the monarchy’s inability 
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to create a consistent foreign policy platform limited its authority there.590 The financial records 
for each of the comptoirs were in such a state of disarray that it would take royal officials years 
to discharge the Company’s remaining debt.591   
Within France, the specific circumstances of the Company’s dissolution were soon 
overshadowed by new developments. The Chancellor Maupeou’s 1771 suspension of the 
parlements sparked ferocious conflict between the crown and France’s corps of legal 
professionals—a polarizing debate that helped solidify public opinion as a new source of 
political authority, and that sparked increasingly concerted resistance to the crown and its 
policies. Like the shareholders, French magistrates and barristers opposed Maupeou by 
portraying themselves as part of a broad-based patriotic opposition that was under attack by 
despotic royal policy. The conjuncture of timing and language for these two events was readily 
apparent to anti-Maupeou activists like the Pidansat de Mairobert, who incorporated the 
arguments raised by investors in a publication criticizing the suspension of the parlements.592 Yet 
the significance of the shareholder protests extends beyond their parallelism with protests against 
the Maupeou coup. The conflict between Necker and Morellet also represented an important shift 
in French thinking about corporatism and privilege. 
Shareholders’ short-lived experiment with internal governance fit with a broader pattern 
of Company lobbying going all the way back to John Law. From Necker to Panchaud, investors 
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presented themselves not as the holders of traditional privileges that the crown was obliged to 
honor, but rather as loyal subjects taking on political responsibilities that the monarchy itself was 
unable to manage as effectively as they could. For each, understandings of France as a 
centralized state composed of free and individual citizens and as a corporatist hierarchy 
constituted around distinct rights, obligations, and political powers were not mutually exclusive. 
The monarchy could be both absolute and dependent on proxy institutions, centralized and 
pluralistic. Indeed, like many Company administrators before them, investors saw themselves as 
governing on behalf of the crown; their limited sovereign powers served to make royal power 
more pervasive. Morellet’s claims, by contrast, as well as those of a new generation of economic 
thinkers like Dupont de Nemours and Turgot, drew a firm line between these two visions 
concerning the composition of the French state. By viewing shareholder authority as merely a 
form of social and economic privilege, rather than as a sovereign responsibility exercised under 
the auspices of the king, these critics helped reduce the complex political landscape of the Old 
Regime to a simple dichotomy: either a patrimonial state constituted around personal authority, 
custom, and traditional right, or a centralized and bureaucratic regime of equal citizens.593  
This transition is important for understanding the nature of political conflict in the final 
decades of the Old Regime. Ministers like Manyon d’Invault sought to expand crown authority 
by obliterating monopolies and corporatist impediments. Yet in suppressing intermediary 
institutions like the Company, they ultimately rendered the state more vulnerable by recasting it 
as France’s sole sovereign entity. In decades past, critics of the Company blamed its employees 
for their failures in India, all the while absolving the crown. After the 1760s, however, political 
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conflict increasingly centered on opposition to the crown itself. In place of a pluralistic regime 
composed of overlapping jurisdictions and political responsibilities, France was increasingly 
framed as a singular state defined through clear divisions between public and private interest, 
politics and society, and ruler and ruled—even as the exact nature of these divisions remained 
open to debate. The various political and legal traditions that were once used to make sense of 
crown rule, from natural law to classical republicanism, now became part of a rhetorical arsenal 
deployed against royal encroachment into private life.594 By removing opportunities for 
collaboration or the delegation of sovereign power, polemicists like Morellet helped to reduce 
the options available to critics of the crown. Negotiation and accommodation gave way to simple 
resistance. 
 
Conclusion 
 The dissolution of the Company has traditionally been understood as the consequence of 
broader shifts in French economic policy. As free-trade advocates like Maynon d’Invault and 
Turgot gained prominent roles within the royal ministry, and as Gournay’s famous maxim 
“Laissez faire, laissez passer” became the byword for a new generation of economic writers, the 
mercantilist policies that had guided crown policy were swept away in a wave of liberalization. 
According to one prominent scholar of the period, the 1760s saw the birth of “economics” as a 
distinct discipline in France—an argument supported, as least anecdotally, by the popular 
nickname given to the Physiocrats: “Les économistes.”595 By this logic, the Company represented 
one of many corporatist impediments to the rationalization of French finances. Its dissolution set 
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in motion a long process of deregulation that continued well into the Revolution and 
Restoration.596  
 This chapter, by contrast, suggests that the collapse of the Company was part of a longer 
story involving the reconceptualization of sovereignty under the absolutist state. For both 
supporters and critics of the Company, the viability of corporate monopoly extended beyond 
simple considerations of cost and profit, capitalization and finance; it was also a reflection of 
changing beliefs concerning the structure and constitution of the French state, and the nature of 
citizenship in a monarchy. The dissolution of France’s overseas empire played a key role in this 
reimagining of French sovereignty. As the colonial commitments that had once required the 
crown to parcel out of political power disappeared, the lessons learned from the failures of the 
Company would be increasingly applied to the French state.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In 1770, the first edition of the Histoire des deux Indes was published in Amsterdam. The 
book represented a massive undertaking: it numbered over 2,500 pages—divided over 10 
volumes—and was the product of a collaborative effort that included some of the greatest minds 
of the Enlightenment.597 Although authorship was formally credited to the abbé Guillaume 
Thomas Raynal, the Histoire des deux Indes included among its contributors such luminaries as 
the Baron d’Holbach and Diderot. The imprint of the latter is particularly evident in the structure 
of the book, which was intended to match the breadth and analytical depth of Diderot’s other 
great literary project: the Encyclopédie. Reprinted in multiple editions, and translated into over 
ten different languages within a decade of its first publication, the Histoire des deux Indes also 
became one of the best-selling works of the eighteenth century.598 A sweeping narrative of the 
European imperial experience, the book focused in particular on global developments over the 
preceding twenty years. As Anoush Terjanian writes, Raynal’s essay was perhaps the most 
“influential cultural and political product of the Seven Years’ War.”599 
The Histoire des deux Indes was one of the most celebrated achievements of the 
Enlightenment: a work that channeled the collective knowledge of the Republic of Letters into a 
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powerful critique of the invidious practices of empire, especially the slave trade. Yet the book 
also dealt with more immediate French concerns, particularly the recent controversies 
surrounding the dissolution of the Company. To account for the notable failings of the 
corporation, the authors turned to one of the favorite whipping boys of le Monde: France’s 
absolutist monarchy. Sounding a refrain heard throughout this dissertation, the Histoire des deux 
Indes blamed the crown for the conditions of “servitude” in which it had kept the Company—the 
tangle of burdensome regulations and demands that had led the corporation “to the abyss where 
it [now] finds itself.”600 The work also contrasted the despotic practices of the crown with the 
reform campaign led by Necker. This comparison was made at length: 
The goal of these reforms was that the Company would no longer be governed by 
men unworthy of their office: that its government would do more than merely 
protect itself: that the Company would be shielded from the [condition of] 
servitude imposed on it—and about which it constantly complains—as well as 
from the opaque practices [l’esprit de mystère] that perpetuate corruption within 
it: that there would be continued relations between Company administrators and 
shareholders: that Paris, deprived of that advantage that other commercial nations 
enjoy—that of being a port—would be enlightened about commerce by free and 
peaceful assemblies: that French citizens would finally understand the vital link 
[between commercial progress and national health] that shapes all nations, and 
that they would learn, in being enlightened about the sources of public prosperity, 
to respect the merchant for the work he does to contribute it.601  
 
Such idealistic ambitions would not have been out of place in the reform proposals later 
outlined in the cahiers de doléances, the lists of grievances drawn up by each estate on the eve of 
the French Revolution. Although specific concerns varied by estate, the cahiers nonetheless 
focused on common themes. Each called for a greater degree of participation in the 
government—for a nation ruled by reason rather than royal fiat, an administration built on 
transparency instead of obscurantism, and a fiscal landscape streamlined to promote prosperity in 
                                                
600 Guillaume Thomas Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des 
Européens dans les deux Indes, Volume 2 (Geneva: Chez J.-L. Pellet, 1781), 309-310. 
601 Ibid, 311-312. 
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place of feudal privilege. The parallels between Company politics and revolutionary agitation did 
not stop there. Just as Necker’s reforms of the shareholder assembly (particularly his call for 
regular elections and greater financial accountability) preceded his later efforts as Controller-
General, so too did the “national assembly” launched in the final months of the Pondichéry siege 
prefigure demands for collective representation voiced in 1789. And just as La Bourdonnais’s 
laments about monopoly foreshadowed later critiques of corporate privilege, so too did the 
arguments developed in the aftermath of the Madras affair forecast a turn toward natural law in 
revolutionary debates about the nation’s legal order.602 Decades before the fall of the French 
monarchy, Company agents thus anticipated key features of the revolutionary project—often in 
an effort to preserve the institutional structures and hierarchies around them.     
To highlight these parallels is not to suggest any explicit causal links between Company 
politics and the Revolution that occurred twenty years after the corporation’s dissolution. Nor is 
it simply to add the legion of detractors, supporters, and commentators implicated in the 
Company’s history to the “checklist” of writers and thinkers who shaped revolutionary political 
culture.603 Instead, such overlap suggests the importance of the Company as a space through 
which many of the most pressing economic, social, and political concerns facing the French 
monarchy were worked out. The significance of the corporation is often lost amid a swirl of bad 
business ventures and abusive practices. Yet even as the Company succumbed to the twin 
pressures of insolvency and imperial rivalry, its institutional framework continued to connect a 
wide range of actors to both the seats of power and the organs of public opinion. Whether as a 
                                                
602 This is not to imply a direct connection between natural law arguments focused on colonial sovereignty and the 
questions about natural right and social contract that informed the earlier revolution, but does suggest the use of a 
common conceptual framework to understand the French political order. See Dan Edelstein, The Terror of Natural 
Right: Republicanism, the Cult of Nature, and the French Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).  
603 This formulation is particularly indebted to Maza, Private Lives and Public Affairs, 9. 
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mercantile organization, a colonial government, or a semi-autonomous military, the corporation 
tested the limits of royal authority throughout the eighteenth century. It is of little surprise, then, 
that the policies of good governance and equitable management formulated during the early days 
of the Revolution were anticipated, at least in part, decades before in debates over the Company. 
At times, former employees and shareholders participated directly in these discussions. As they 
moved into positions of power within the royal bureaucracy and revolutionary government, they 
applied the lessons learned over the course of the Company’s history to reshaping France’s 
political order. 
 A prominent trend in eighteenth-century scholarship has been to show that those thought 
to have the most at stake in the Old Regime—nobles, rentiers, and officeholders—actually 
constituted its most vicious critics.604 The seeds of discontent, argues David Bell, were sown 
within the very “ambit of French government” and social privilege, as critics exploited their 
insider status to challenge the legitimacy of the monarchy free from concerns over either 
censorship or reprisal.605 Yet this focus on broad-based political conflict obscures a more 
complex dynamic of accommodation, collaboration, and agitation for moderate change than is 
traditionally acknowledged. As my analysis of Company scandal suggests, a powerful politics of 
preservation paralleled the violent contestations of the eighteenth century. Like the late 
Enlightenment writers who traded the vitriol of their predecessors for the comforts of court life, 
the diverse groups and actors engaged with the Company did less to challenge existing 
                                                
604 This trend began most notably with the work of David Bien. The contours of this scholarly turn are summarized 
in Rafe Blaufarb, Michael Cristofferson, and Darrin McMahon, ed., Interpreting the Ancien régime (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
605 Bell, Lawyers and Citizens, 12. This loss of even insider support is likewise evident in Baker’s descriptions of the 
struggle between crown historiographers and polemicists in the Parlement of Paris. Consider his description of 
Jacob-Nicolas Moreau, whom he calls “the last official defender of the absolute monarchy in France.” Baker, 
Inventing the French Revolution, 84. 
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hierarchies than to temper their most glaring faults in order to protect traditional markers of 
authority.606 For all its inefficient practices and well-documented failings, Old Regime society 
proved consistently able to adapt to new ideas and circumstances. Under the Company, the 
sovereign foundations of the French political order were repeatedly stretched to accommodate 
the shifting imperatives of colonial trade and governance.    
 The imprint of this process, and of colonial politics more generally, was felt across 
French public life. While new research has rightly emphasized the importance of Saint-
Domingue and the Atlantic colonies in shaping the political culture of the late eighteenth century, 
the broader impact of France’s imperial activity during this period remains understudied.607 
According to one specialist, French colonies were simply incorporated into the messy and often 
ambiguity-laden institutional culture of the Old regime “without inciting too much reflection.”608 
As I have argued throughout this dissertation, however, the process of settling and trading in the 
Indian Ocean inspired a bracing reassessment of contemporary political assumptions and 
economic practices. Traditional conceptions of sovereignty proved inadequate when faced with 
the problems posed by colonization efforts in India. As they negotiated with local rulers, 
managed populations of mixed culture and race, and reoriented their economic strategies to 
accommodate local trade, Company employees gave new meaning to traditional idioms of 
corporatist order and crown authority. This process papered over growing tensions within French 
society, simultaneously building up state power while also carving out space for group interests 
and private initiative.   
                                                
606 This dynamic was famously documented by Robert Darnton and his “Grub Street” thesis. See The Literary 
Underground of the Old Regime (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 3-8.  
607 Dubois, A Colony of Citizens, 2-8 and Idem, “The French Atlantic,” in Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, ed., 
Jack Greene and Philip Morgan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 137-162. 
608 Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce, 202.  
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Indeed, a history of the Company reveals the importance of colonial expansion on the 
formulation of new political assumptions and practices in France. The eighteenth century was 
truly an era of globalization, as new empires and the trading links between them facilitated a 
vigorous circulation of ideas. These exchanges took place within the same imperial systems, as 
well as between competing empires. As we have seen in the collisions between the French, 
British, and the successor states in the south of India, colonial interaction inspired ongoing 
conflicts over legal status and jurisdictional right. Rivalry also fired the emulative impulses of 
imperial agents, as they studied and imitated the practices of other powers to gain a competitive 
advantage.  
C.A. Bayly uses the term “conjunctural revolutions” to describe the collective series of 
political transformations that took place in Asia during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century. Such phrasing is useful, for it hints not only at common elements of timing, but also at 
the broader connections between these different revolutionary movements. From the 1744 
Wahabi revolt that created an independent kingdom in Saudi Arabia to Sikh attempts to carve out 
an autonomous political space in the Punjab, this period witnessed a sundering of imperial ties on 
a scale comparable to the more famous revolutions occurring in Europe and the Atlantic 
World.609 While the ideological links between these different revolutions were limited, the 
impact of so much simultaneous political change was nonetheless felt across the global stage. 
The overthrow of one kingdom or imperial system necessarily required adjustments by another—
whether it be a political ally, trading partner, or sworn enemy.  
                                                
609 C.A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914 (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003) and Idem, “The 
‘Revolutionary Age’ in the Wider World, c. 1790-1830,” in War, Empire and Slavery, 1770-1830, ed., Richard 
Bessel, Nicholas Guyatt, and Jane Rendall (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 31-34.  
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This feedback loop was particularly evident in the collective struggles that Company 
writers termed the “revolution” in India. As regional crises exploded along the Coromandel 
Coast and in Bengal in the 1740s and 1750s, the French committed troops in the hope of 
advancing their interests there. These disastrous campaigns, which we have already explored in 
detail, culminated in Clive’s 1757 victory at Plassey and the consequent granting of the Bengal 
diwani (tax-collection rights) to the British in 1765. The British thus gained an empire as the 
French lost one. Plassey’s aftershocks were felt not merely in Pondichéry, but also in Paris. From 
the prolonged battle over Dupleix’s machinations in Hyderabad and Arcot to the scapegoating 
campaign against Lally, the struggle to make sense of broader transformations on the Indian 
subcontinent prompted both vocal debate and prolonged reflection. Separated by context, time, 
and ideological underpinnings, the “revolutions” in India and the Revolution in France 
nonetheless belong together within a common genealogy of French political crises.  
Indeed, the controversies generated by Company activity in India overlapped with—and 
mediated—what are often seen as the hallmark developments of the eighteenth century: the 
evolution of a critical public sphere; the reconceptualization of market society; the development 
of commercial science; and the replacement of a language of subjecthood with one of citizenship. 
Colonial scandal made for exciting reading, as the howling mobs and clusters of engrossed 
courtiers suggest. But it also touched on the major ideological currents of the day. While 
Enlightenment writers worried over the defining features and patriotic virtues of the French 
nation, a host of employees, shareholders, and administrators fought to mold the myriad 
institutions and settlements that constituted France’s overseas empire into a coherent political 
system. And while crown propagandists and Paris magistrates debated each other over the 
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historical foundations of royal sovereignty, this same assortment of Company-related lobbyists 
established a vision of state power based on the regulation of labor and colonial territory.  
The Company’s monopoly dissolved in a flash of royal fiat in 1769. Existing accounts 
and property were transferred to the state; outstanding debts were settled, or sometimes simply 
forgotten. Yet the Company remained a fixture in popular culture. Inheritance suits brought 
forward by the families of Lally and La Bourdonnais dredged up not only personal conflicts, but 
also the ideological justifications behind earlier rulings.610 The son of Jacques d’Eprémesnil used 
his position as a parlementaire barrister to lobby for the restoration of the corporation. He 
received his wish in 1785, when Controller-General Charles Alexandre de Calonne established a 
new Indies Company. This corporation lacked the far-reaching political and military mandates of 
its predecessor, and was intended merely to reestablish trading links with India. But it also 
reinvigorated the longstanding fears about speculation and stock manipulation first produced by 
Law.611 Calonne’s Company likewise inspired its own public scandal: in 1793, a Montangard 
scheme to profit from the impending liquidation of the corporation led to the arrest and execution 
of its main conspirators.612   
Neither the tensions nor the arguments raised over the course of the Company’s history 
disappeared after its dissolution. Lingering concerns over the equity of crown-sponsored 
monopoly received a new lease on life in the debates over the exclusif—the onerous system of 
economic regulations that the monarchy imposed on its Atlantic colonies. Such conflicts built on 
                                                
610 Both trials were adjudicated by the Parlement of Paris. See AN, X 2b 1394 for La Bourdonnais, and AN, X 2b 
1395 for Lally’s case.  
611 Rebecca Spang, Stuff and Money in the Time of the French Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2015, 79-80. 
612 Marc Bouloiseau, The Jacobin Republic, 1792-1794, trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), 114. 
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earlier Company debates about the legal precedents, economic principles, and political authority 
behind colonial policy. Similar anxieties were voiced in the constitutional crises of the 1770s. 
We have already seen how the patriotic rhetoric articulated during the shareholders’ revolt was 
positioned as a part of the protests against arbitrary government during the Maupeou Coup. 
Physiocratic reformers and defenders of corporatism squared off around the same time over the 
crown’s right to regulate—and ultimately dissolve—the privileged bodies beneath it. Questions 
about the proper management of trade saturated the royal court even as they filtered out into the 
public sphere. From Terray’s liberalization of the grain trade to Necker’s controversial compte-
rendu, the struggle to define the nature of wealth and determine how to regulate it under a 
common sovereign system remained at the heart of French political conflict.    
The dissolution of the Company, however, meant that such discord was to be 
concentrated on a new target: the monarchy. Throughout the eighteenth century, the vitriol 
generated by Company scandal was mostly directed against the corporation. Regardless of 
whether their commitments to the king were sincere or contrived, disputants realized the value of 
making their position consistent with crown interests. The monarchy thus remained insulated 
from the most damning accusations of corruption or bureaucratic inefficiency, even when these 
faults were directly attributable to royal mismanagement of the Company. Calls for fiscal 
restructuring, improved transparency, and established legal procedure—shibboleths of the 
Enlightenment and bywords of the future revolutionary order—were directed toward the 
Company on behalf of the crown, rather than extended to it as well. After the corporation was 
eliminated, however, and once the pluralistic political culture of the Old Regime was 
consolidated under a singular state, such criticisms turned increasingly toward the royal 
government. The failings of the Company thus became the failings of the crown.  
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Ultimately, this dissertation stands as a reminder that neither the anxieties nor the ideals 
of the eighteenth century were ever simply worked out in the abstract. The circumstances behind 
Company disputes—the shifting political climate on the Indian subcontinent, the evolution of 
French market society, an institutional culture riddled by infighting and personal conflict—
closely affected the arguments they produced. France lost its East India Company and most of its 
empire over the course of the eighteenth century. But these spaces produced ideas and political 
perspectives that would long outlast both of them.       
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